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CriticalPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2026-126187: Unauthenticated RCE in React Server Components Flight Transport

Published Nov 10, 2026 · Updated today
Trending this week#27of 428,812 vulnerabilities
Mention activity · 30 days42 mentions · peak 20 in a dayToday
CVSS9.5Critical · v4
EPSS1.8%78th percentile
CISA KEVNoNot listed
In the wildNonePublic exploit, no exploitation reported
IdentifiersCVE-2026-126187CWE-502 · Deserialization of Untrusted Data

CVE-2026-126187 is a critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the React Server Components Flight transport implemented by react-server-dom-webpack, react-server-dom-parcel, and react-server-dom-turbopack. It affects versions 19.0.0–19.0.8, 19.1.0–19.1.9, 19.2.0–19.2.8, and 19.3.0. In extremely rare configurations, responses containing multiple typed-array views sharing an underlying buffer and attacker-controlled data can suffer incorrect stream framing. Transferring the backing buffer can detach queued payload views, causing the writer to omit binary payload bytes while retaining their length headers. The reader can consequently interpret attacker-controlled bytes as Flight protocol rows, enabling unintended module execution or Server Action invocation. Applications without server-side React or without React Server Components integration are unaffected.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation can compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected application through execution in its server-side or edge-rendering context. Injected protocol rows can trigger application-bundle module execution or invoke Server Actions with attacker-chosen arguments. Operating-system command execution through the Server Action path requires an action that handles those arguments dangerously. The vulnerability has a reported CVSS v4.0 base score of 9.5.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

No vendor-supported workaround is identified; upgrading is recommended even when the rare triggering application pattern has not been found. As a temporary risk-reduction measure, avoid transporting multiple views sharing one ArrayBuffer in an RSC response, for example by copying each view into an independent backing buffer before serialization. This measure is not a substitute for patching.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade affected react-server-dom-webpack, react-server-dom-parcel, and react-server-dom-turbopack packages to the fixed release for their branch: 19.0.9, 19.1.10, 19.2.9, or 19.3.1, or a later patched release. Upgrade affected Next.js 16.0.0–16.4.0 applications to 16.4.1 or later; Next.js 15.5.28 also incorporates the transport fix. Because Next.js bundles its RSC implementation, verify the resolved Next.js version rather than relying solely on separately installed react-server-dom versions. Verify resolved dependencies, rebuild, and redeploy affected applications. The React fix copies large typed-array payloads into exact-size buffers to prevent writer-side framing corruption.

Public exploits

Exploits

3 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis.

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CVE-2026-126187-pocThe supplied repository contains 18 files, including eight application/exploit source files: a standalone standard-library Python client and seven JavaScript/JSX configuration or application files. Makefile, Dockerfile, Compose, package metadata, documentation, and ignore files provide the surrounding lab infrastructure. It is not part of an exploit framework. poc.py fetches a target page, discovers Server Action IDs from HTML or client JavaScript, constructs padded attacker bytes containing forged Flight rows, and parses a rendered <pre> JSON summary for action output. The documented attack sends these bytes as a base64 annotation query parameter, without a multipart POST or Next-Action header. The proposed mechanism is serializer/deserializer framing desynchronization when multiple typed-array views share an ArrayBuffer: a missing later view payload causes the decoder to consume attacker bytes and resume at forged records. These records construct a bound action reference and a thenable. Awaiting that value triggers the referenced action. The lab deliberately creates this layout in payload.js and awaits the resulting annotation in page.jsx. console.jsx exposes a client reference to runMaintenanceJob, while actions.js executes a supplied string through /bin/sh. Consequently, command execution is demonstrated through an intentionally dangerous application action; arbitrary action invocation does not establish universal shell execution against unrelated applications. The action contains no actual authorization check, despite comments describing an operator-only use case. Docker defaults to Next.js 16.4.0, React 19.3.0, Node.js 22, and an unprivileged node runtime. A comparison build selects Next.js 16.4.1. The README additionally claims affected react-server-dom-webpack, react-server-dom-parcel, and react-server-dom-turbopack releases, identifies GHSA-xqc2-xf4c-x3h3 and GHSA-673q-mjm6-r5xr, and lists fixed React versions 19.0.9, 19.1.10, 19.2.9, and 19.3.1. These identifiers, release claims, and reported test results are not independently verified by the supplied material. Useful fingerprints include a long base64 annotation query, the User-Agent 'rsc-cache-check/GHSA-xqc2-xf4c-x3h3', exposed Server Action markers, and the lab's /api/payload route. There is no visible fixed external callback or exfiltration service. Advisory and repository URLs are documentation links, not exploit callback endpoints. Assessment limitations: poc.py is truncated across the attempt implementation and part of the CLI/main logic, and no execution evidence is provided. Its output classifier accepts many nonempty strings as execution evidence, so success and patch conclusions can be misleading. The visible code is consistent with an exploit attempt rather than a detection-only script or obvious operator-targeting fake, but end-to-end validity cannot be established. The repository URL is inferred from SECURITY.md; the analyzed git reference and archive size were not supplied, so ref is empty and size_bytes is an unknown-value placeholder of 0.briskets · Disclosed Nov 8, 2026 · python · javascript · network · webOperationalGHSA-673q-mjm6-r5xrThis standalone, Dockerized exploit laboratory contains 25 files: seven JavaScript source files, one shell runner, three Dockerfiles, a Makefile, Compose/package configuration, documentation, captured output, and two upstream-labeled patch diffs. The 12-file code count includes Dockerfiles and the Makefile, but excludes configuration and diff artifacts. poc/exploit.js is the main remote client; victim/server.js supplies an HTTP-accessible Flight encode/store/decode boundary, and victim/app-modules.js supplies the module resolver and execution recorder. evidence/ contains separate ArrayBuffer-detachment, encoder-desynchronization, thenable-invocation, and full-chain demonstrations. Compose builds vulnerable 19.2.8 and patched 19.2.9 transport variants for comparison. The proposed chain starts when streaming one large typed-array view detaches an ArrayBuffer shared with another view. The second row retains an 8192-byte declared length without its corresponding payload. The decoder consequently consumes subsequent framing and padding as binary data, then interprets the remaining attacker-controlled string as fresh Flight rows. An injected root with a server-reference-valued then property causes function invocation during thenable resolution. The client makes three HTTP requests in normal operation: GET /health, the triggering POST /profile, and GET /proof. Its payload alignment is specific to the supplied model, and command execution uses the victim's existing privileges. Important limitation: this is not a complete Next.js application or evidence of universal arbitrary-command execution against Next.js. The victim intentionally accepts arbitrary rce: identifiers through a Proxy-backed manifest and implements a command-executing export. This demonstrates the claimed deserialization-to-function-invocation primitive with an artificial execution gadget; a real application's exploitability depends on its actual manifest, reachable functions, and vulnerable serialization shape. A missing proof is not conclusive evidence that a target is patched, and proof state is not correlated to a unique request. The supplied sample output reports invocation on the vulnerable dependency and safe decoding on the patched dependency, but no code was executed or advisory/version claims independently verified in this analysis. Several supplied files are truncated. No external command-and-control endpoint, persistence mechanism, or container escape is visible. Repository URL, git reference, archive location, and archive size were not supplied; empty metadata and zero size indicate unavailable information.rudSarkar · Disclosed Nov 11, 2026 · javascript · sh · web · networkOperationalpoc-cve-2026-126187-rsc-usecache-rceThe repository contains 15 files, including a standalone Python exploit and seven JavaScript/JSX application or configuration files. poc.py uses only the Python standard library. It discovers a Server Action ID from public HTML or referenced client scripts, constructs padded forged Flight rows, submits them through a base64 annotation query parameter, and parses the first rendered <pre> block for action output. Optional scanning tests 48 combinations of chunk IDs and overread sizes; HTTPS and disabled certificate verification are supported. Requests use the distinctive User-Agent cve-2026-126187-repro. The lab supplies a cached function returning two 8-KB views over one shared buffer, an annotation-consuming page, an intentionally shell-capable Server Action, a client console exposing that action's reference, and a diagnostic API route. Docker runs the application as the node user. Compose provides loopback-only vulnerable and optional comparison services. No fixed callback, exfiltration destination, persistence mechanism, or reverse shell is included. The proposed vulnerability is a typed-array serialization framing desynchronization that allows annotation bytes to become interpreted as Flight records and invoke an existing action. This is exploit code rather than a detection-only script, but its advertised CVE, affected ranges, runtime behavior, and differential results cannot be established from static source alone. Crucially, runDiagnostics has no authorization or command allowlist and directly executes any nonempty job string; the lab therefore already contains an independently unsafe Server Action, and successful command output alone does not establish the claimed serializer flaw. The success heuristic accepts almost any nonempty annotation string other than a few excluded forms, rather than verifying a command-specific marker. The comparison build changes only the Next.js version; package.json still pins react and react-dom to 19.3.0, so the README's assertion that all relevant runtime components become 19.3.1 is not demonstrated by the supplied configuration. The README's broad affected range also overlaps its listed fixed releases. No malicious operator-side behavior is evident. Repository URL, git reference, and archive size were not supplied; empty strings and zero represent unavailable metadata. The dependency lockfile content was partially truncated.TahuCryptsi · Disclosed Nov 12, 2026 · python · javascript · web · networkOperational
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2026-126187 exploited in the wild?
As of Nov 17, 2026, Mallory has no reports of CVE-2026-126187 being exploited in the wild. It is not listed in CISA KEV.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2026-126187?
Yes. Mallory tracks 3 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2026-126187, the earliest disclosed Nov 8, 2026.
Is there a patch for CVE-2026-126187?
Upgrade affected react-server-dom-webpack, react-server-dom-parcel, and react-server-dom-turbopack packages to the fixed release for their branch: 19.0.9, 19.1.10, 19.2.9, or 19.3.1, or a later patched release. Upgrade affected Next.js 16.0.0–16.4.0 applications to 16.4.1 or later; Next.js 15.5.28 also incorporates the transport fix.
How severe is CVE-2026-126187?
CVE-2026-126187 has a CVSS v4 score of 9.5 (Critical) and an EPSS score of 1.8% (78th percentile) as of Nov 17, 2026.
Activity feed

Recent activity

42 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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tenable nessus pluginsNews · Nov 13, 2026Linux Distros Unpatched Vulnerability : CVE-2026-126187 | Tenable®An unpatched vulnerability associated with Ubuntu's react package. The supplied CVSS vectors describe network exploitation without authentication or user interaction and potentially high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts. Exploits are reported as available, but the content does not describe the underlying flaw or confirm exploitation in the wild.Read more ↗step security blogNews · Nov 12, 2026CVE-2026-126187: React Server Components Flaw Lets Attackers Execute Code Through Smuggled Flight Rows - StepSecurityA critical RSC Flight serialization and framing vulnerability enabling unauthenticated execution of modules from an application's own bundle, including server-side execution in SSR and edge-rendering contexts. Exploitation requires multiple typed-array views sharing an ArrayBuffer, attacker-controlled bytes in one view, and a downstream consumer that transfers backing stores. Buffer detachment can cause the writer to omit binary payload bytes while retaining their length headers, making the parser interpret attacker-controlled data as protocol rows. The article reports successful local, end-to-end exploitation, not observed attacks in the wild. Affected versions are 19.0.0–19.0.8, 19.1.0–19.1.9, 19.2.0–19.2.8, and 19.3.0; fixes are 19.0.9, 19.1.10, 19.2.9, and 19.3.1. Client-only applications without a server and applications without RSC support are not affected. As a temporary mitigation, avoid transporting multiple views of a shared ArrayBuffer and copy views before rendering.Read more ↗nuclei templates pull requestsNews · Nov 12, 2026Add CVE-2026-126187 vulnerability details by omarkurt · Pull Request #17789 · projectdiscovery/nuclei-templatesDescribed as a critical remote code execution vulnerability affecting Next.js applications under unspecified conditions. The content provides no technical details, affected versions, or independent validation.Read more ↗tenable cloud security pluginsNews · Nov 11, 2026SCA: security update for react-server-dom-parcel, react-server... | Tenable®A critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in three React Server Components packages, affecting releases beginning with 19.0.0 under rare response-handling conditions. Applications without server-side React or without a framework, bundler, or plugin supporting React Server Components are unaffected. Fixed releases are 19.0.9, 19.1.10, 19.2.9, and 19.3.1. The advisory reports CVSS v3 and v4 base scores of 9.8 and 9.5, respectively, and states that no known exploits are available.Read more ↗
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The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, and which detections to deploy tonight.
Exposure mappingQuery your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Threat actor evidenceEvery report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malwareMalware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity34Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.