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CriticalPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2026-18963: Unauthenticated Account Takeover via Keycloak Reset-Credentials Bypass

Published Aug 18, 2026 · Updated 4 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days5 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
CVSS9.1Critical · v3.1
EPSS8.1%95th percentile
CISA KEVNoNot listed
In the wildReported2 exploitation records in Mallory
Vendor
Red Hat
IdentifiersCVE-2026-18963CWE-640 · Weak Password Recovery Mechanism…

CVE-2026-18963 is a password-recovery authentication bypass in the keycloak-services component of Keycloak and Red Hat Build of Keycloak. Improper state validation in the reset-credentials flow allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass email-token verification and set a target account's password. The "try another way" credential selector stores an authentication-session flag without binding it to the current authenticator execution. Reusing this state can invoke ResetCredentialEmail.action(), which, in vulnerable implementations, marks the email address as verified and advances the flow without validating a consumed reset action token. The attacker can consequently reach UPDATE_PASSWORD without proving ownership of the account's mailbox. The issue is fixed in upstream Keycloak 26.7.2 and applicable Red Hat backports.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation enables full takeover of a targeted user account, including an administrative account, through attacker-controlled password replacement. An attacker can access information and perform actions permitted to the compromised identity, potentially extending access across applications and services that trust Keycloak. Demonstrated exploitation can also return a valid OAuth authorization code for the victim. The vulnerability is rated Critical with CVSS v3.1 9.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N), reflecting high confidentiality and integrity impacts and no direct availability impact in the base assessment.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Until updates are deployed, disable Forgot password separately in every affected realm through Realm settings → Login → Forgot password → Off. This prevents use of the vulnerable recovery workflow but makes self-service password reset unavailable. Restrict network access to affected identity-management services. For Siemens Industrial Edge Management Pro and Virtual, block direct internet access and, where necessary, use a WAF or reverse proxy to block the customer realm's reset-credentials endpoint. Monitor password-reset events, credential changes, and unusual administrative authentication activity.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade upstream Keycloak to 26.7.2 or later. For Red Hat Build of Keycloak, deploy the fixed 26.4.15 or 26.6.6 release, or a later supported release, using the applicable security updates under RHSA-2026:56519, RHSA-2026:56520, RHSA-2026:56523, and RHSA-2026:56524. Update affected standalone installations, container images, and operator-managed deployments. The fix scopes selector state to the authenticator execution and validates that the reset action-token user matches the current user. For affected Siemens Industrial Edge Management deployments, upgrade Pro V1 to 1.15.20, Pro V2 to 2.2.2, or Virtual to 2.9.1 or later; the cloud service has already received a service-side fix. For affected HCL BigFix Service Management v27 deployments, apply the vendor-provided hotfix. Investigate unexpected credential changes and force password resets for potentially compromised accounts.

Public exploits

Exploits

15 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis. Hidden: 3 rejected by Mallory's analysis as not a working exploit; 1 not yet analyzed, such as Exploit-DB entries.

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My-ExploitsThis 34-file repository is a multi-CVE offensive research collection for Keycloak, Apache NiFi, HashiCorp Vault, and HashiCorp Nomad. It contains four standalone Python PoCs under exploits/, three corresponding Metasploit modules under metasploit-custom-modules/, module documentation, and four deliberately vulnerable Docker labs under docker-lab/. The Metasploit modules provide reusable Keycloak account takeover, Vault secret disclosure, and NiFi command/reverse-shell exploitation; Nomad is supplied as a standalone PoC only. The labs bind their primary services to localhost and intentionally use vulnerable versions: Keycloak 26.7.1, NiFi 2.8.0 with graph NARs and Keycloak OIDC, Vault 2.0.3 dev mode, and Nomad 2.0.0 with a privileged nested Docker/client setup. Notable implementation issue: exploits/nifi_rce_39816.py imports nifi_oidc from a repository-root configs directory, but the supplied nifi_oidc.py is actually located in docker-lab/nifi-cve-2026-39816/setup/; absent an external configs/nifi_oidc.py, that standalone script will fail at import time. The equivalent Metasploit NiFi module contains its own OIDC implementation and is not affected by this path mismatch.M4xSec · Disclosed Aug 31, 2026 · Framework: metasploit · python · ruby · web · network · containerWeaponizedCVE-2026-18963-ExploitRepository contains a standalone Python proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-18963 / GHSA-4gv3-mc9p-5wqc affecting Keycloak reset-credentials flows. The main file, cve_2026_18963_poc.py, is a standard-library-only exploit that drives Keycloak’s web authentication/reset workflow over HTTP, parses HTML forms, maintains cookies, follows redirects, and abuses the vulnerable reset flow to bypass the intended email action-token step. Its capabilities include: (1) safe-check mode to determine whether the vulnerable flow behavior is present without sending email or changing state, (2) non-destructive exploitability checking, (3) username/account enumeration behavior, and (4) full unauthenticated account takeover by setting a chosen password for a victim identified only by username or email. After exploitation it can optionally verify success by authenticating to the token endpoint with the new password. The exploit is operational rather than framework-based: it is not a Metasploit/Nuclei module and uses custom Python code. Internally it constructs Keycloak endpoints under /realms/{realm}/..., especially login-actions/reset-credentials and protocol/openid-connect/auth, and uses a cookie jar plus redirect handling to preserve the authentication session. The README documents affected versions as Keycloak 26.0.0 through 26.7.1, fixed in 26.7.2, and explains that forgot-password must be enabled on the realm for exploitation. Repository structure is small and focused: README.md provides extensive vulnerability explanation, usage, remediation, and detection guidance; candidates.example.txt is an input list for identifiers; lab/docker-compose.yml builds a reproducible environment with vulnerable and patched Keycloak instances plus Mailpit; lab/realm-poc.json defines the demo realm/client/user; lab/legit_reset.py performs a genuine reset by reading the emailed action-token from Mailpit for comparison/detection research; and lab/reset-victim.sh restores the lab victim password through the Keycloak admin API. Overall purpose is to demonstrate, validate, and study an unauthenticated Keycloak account takeover vulnerability, while also providing defender-oriented safe detection and a self-contained lab.Snizi · Disclosed Aug 20, 2026 · python · yaml · web · networkOperationalPOC-CVE-2026-18963This repository is a small standalone Python proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-18963 affecting Keycloak's forgot-password / credential-selection flow. The repo contains one executable script (poc_cve_2026_18963_terminal.py), a README with usage and attack description, a requirements.txt listing requests and beautifulsoup4, and a .gitignore. It is not part of a larger exploit framework. The exploit is a web attack against a Keycloak server. It uses requests.Session plus HTML parsing with BeautifulSoup to drive the reset-password workflow entirely over HTTP, without a browser. Core helper functions parse forms, extract hidden fields, resolve form actions, save intermediate responses, and recover a restart URL from JavaScript by parsing startSessionPolling(...). The script also forcibly marks cookies as non-secure in the local session object so they continue to be sent even over HTTP, which supports testing against non-TLS lab deployments. Operational flow described by the code and README: (1) load the realm login page, (2) locate the forgot-password/reset-credentials link, (3) open the reset flow and trigger tryAnotherWay, (4) submit the target username on the credential selector, (5) extract and replay the restart/session-polling URL from page JavaScript, (6) replay the initial reset URL to obtain a second credential selector, (7) submit the username again to reach the UPDATE_PASSWORD form, and (8) optionally submit a new password for the target account. The script validates success by checking for known password-update success strings in the returned HTML. Capabilities: it can non-destructively prove the bypass by stopping once UPDATE_PASSWORD is reached, or destructively reset the victim account password by submitting the password update form. It stores each intermediate HTML page under the output directory for debugging and offline review. The exploit requires only network access to the Keycloak web interface and knowledge of a valid username; no browser automation or local code execution is involved. Fingerprintable targets/endpoints are mostly dynamic URLs derived from the supplied base URL and Keycloak HTML responses rather than hardcoded remote endpoints. The notable static observables are the default target base URL http://localhost:8080, example target https://target.example.com, the reset-credentials path fragment used to discover the forgot-password link, the parsed startSessionPolling restart URL, and local output artifacts such as debug_http/ and saved HTML files. Overall, this is a real, functional exploit PoC rather than a detector, with operational maturity because it can carry out the full password reset action when provided a new password.T0w0T · Disclosed Aug 24, 2026 · python · markdown · webOperationalCVE-2026-18963-keycloakRepository contains a working Python proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-18963 against Keycloak's reset-credentials flow. The main logic is in exploit.py, supported by documentation (README.md, docs/ROOTCAUSE.md), a vulnerable lab environment (run_lab.sh and lab/docker-compose.yml), and a Burp request chain (requests/burp-chain.txt). The exploit is not part of a major framework. Exploit capability: unauthenticated account takeover by resetting any user's password without receiving the verification email. The script automates an 8-step HTTP sequence: request the OpenID Connect auth page, follow the forgot-password link, trigger tryAnotherWay=on to corrupt/reset flow state, submit the victim username through the selector, optionally hit the restart path, re-enter the reset flow, submit the victim again to reach the password update form without a valid action token, then post a new password. It manually preserves cookies and follows redirects because the author notes Keycloak's quoted KC_AUTH_SESSION_HASH cookie can break python-requests cookie handling. Targeting: README and docs state vulnerable upstream versions are Keycloak < 26.7.2, with the issue fixed in 26.7.2. Preconditions are that forgot-password/reset credentials is enabled on the realm and the attacker knows a username or email. The exploit defaults to the public client 'account'. Repository structure: exploit.py is the operational PoC; run_lab.sh launches a vulnerable local Keycloak container, waits for readiness, obtains an admin token, creates realm 'poc', and creates user 'victim'; lab/docker-compose.yml provides an alternate lab deployment using keycloak/keycloak:26.5.0; requests/burp-chain.txt documents the same exploit chain for manual replay in Burp; docs/ROOTCAUSE.md explains the two underlying bugs and patch behavior. Overall, this is a concise exploit repo with both automation and reproducible lab material.Red-Darkin · Disclosed Aug 24, 2026 · python · bash · web · networkOperationalKeycloak_CVE-2026-18963_PoCThis repository is a small standalone Python PoC for CVE-2026-18963 affecting Keycloak reset-credentials flows. It is not tied to a larger exploitation framework. The main artifact is cve_2026_18963_poc.py, a Python 3 stdlib-only script that automates an unauthenticated account takeover chain against vulnerable Keycloak 26.x deployments. The README documents safe-check, proof, full takeover, and username-enumeration modes, while docker-compose.yml and realm-poc.json provide a reproducible local lab with Keycloak 26.7.1 and Mailpit. Exploit capability: the script abuses flaws in the reset-credentials workflow described in the README and code comments: a sticky AUTHENTICATION_SELECTOR_SCREEN_DISPLAYED state and missing verification in ResetCredentialEmail.action(). The result is that an attacker can progress through the password reset flow without authenticating and without clicking the emailed reset link. Operationally, the exploit can: (1) perform a safe probe to determine whether the vulnerable execution path is exposed, (2) reach the update-password form as a non-destructive proof, (3) submit a new password to take over a victim account, and (4) enumerate valid usernames by observing behavioral differences in the reset flow. Repository structure: README.md explains affected versions, usage, expected results, and detection signals. cve_2026_18963_poc.py is the entry point and contains argument parsing, HTML form parsing, cookie/session handling, and the exploit workflow logic. docker-compose.yml launches a vulnerable Keycloak container and a Mailpit SMTP/UI container bound to localhost. realm-poc.json seeds a realm named 'poc' with forgot-password enabled, a public client 'poc-app', redirect URIs on localhost:9999, SMTP host 'mailpit', and a victim user for testing. Notable implementation details visible from the code excerpt: the script parses HTML forms to discover dynamic reset endpoints, extracts execution identifiers from query strings, and uses a permissive cookie policy so Keycloak session cookies are resent even in the HTTP lab environment. This indicates the exploit is meant to reliably walk a multi-step browser-style authentication flow rather than simply fire a single request. Overall, this is a real exploit PoC with practical account-takeover impact, plus a self-contained lab for validation and demonstration.prot0tw · Disclosed Aug 25, 2026 · python · yaml · webOperationalExploit-For-CVE-2026-18963This is a small standalone Python repository rather than a Metasploit, Nuclei, or other exploit-framework module. It contains a README, an active exploitation tool (exploit.py), and a separately named safe checker (checler.py). Both Python scripts use requests, disable TLS certificate verification, impersonate a browser User-Agent, manually preserve raw Set-Cookie values, parse HTML with regular expressions, and manually follow redirects. They accept an optional HTTP(S) proxy. exploit.py implements the claimed CVE-2026-18963 Keycloak reset-credentials attack against an operator-specified target. It supports automatic/forced legacy-vs-modern Keycloak URL path selection, version gating with a skip option, verbose HTTP tracing, one username or usernames loaded from a local file, and a supplied replacement password. Its additional discovery functions probe common realm names and common OIDC client IDs; enum-only mode is intended to test account behavior without changing passwords. Its primary harmful capability is changing the password of a selected Keycloak account after allegedly bypassing email verification. checler.py is a non-destructive companion checker. It contains the same version/fix-range logic and reset-flow parsing helpers, can inspect one supplied realm, and can discover common realms before checking those where Forgot Password appears enabled. It exits successfully only when its internal verdict is VULNERABLE. No hard-coded victim host, C2 server, IP address, credential, or exfiltration endpoint is present; all network destinations derive from the supplied --url and dynamically extracted Keycloak links. The repository claims fixed versions 26.4.15, 26.6.6, 26.7.2, and 26.8.0 or later in their respective release lines.BlackHatExploitation · Disclosed Aug 25, 2026 · python · web · networkOperationalkeycloak-CVE-2026-18963This five-file repository contains an operational Python web exploit/validation PoC, a Dockerfile and Docker Compose configuration for a local Keycloak 26.6.2 lab, plus documentation. Keycloak_CVE_2026_18963.py uses requests and BeautifulSoup to parse Keycloak forms and execute a stateful reset-credentials sequence. It deliberately invokes the selector/email-reset execution, optionally follows a session-polling restart URL, then reuses the original reset URL and posts the known victim username. On affected servers, this reaches kc-passwd-update-form despite no email action-token click. By default it only demonstrates reachability; --change-password performs the password change. The script constrains parsed form and restart actions to the supplied origin, and only relaxes Secure cookies for explicit HTTP loopback targets. The included Docker environment binds port 8080 only to 127.0.0.1 and exposes a temporary administrator account for lab setup. README material identifies affected Keycloak 26.x releases, states fixed releases, and provides detection heuristics based on reset-flow and action-token request sequences.gman0x00 · Disclosed Aug 25, 2026 · python · dockerfile · web · networkOperationalCVE-2026-18963This is a standalone Python Keycloak reconnaissance and exploitation utility, not a Metasploit/Nuclei module. Its sole executable, kc-resetforge.py, uses requests and BeautifulSoup (with optional Rich output) to process one target or a target list, automatically trying HTTPS/HTTP where needed. It supports passive/lightweight checks such as Keycloak version and patch-status fingerprinting, detection of an exposed self-service password-reset link, and broader realm, client-ID, and username discovery using built-in candidate lists or user-supplied wordlists. The operational exploit targets CVE-2026-18963, described as a reset-credentials state bypass: it drives Keycloak's reset flow through reset/restart/selector replay steps in order to set a selected user's password, then can verify the takeover through the OIDC token endpoint. Version identification is supported by six JSON corpus files containing OIDC discovery-field signatures, Admin Console HTML hashes, and static asset SHA-256 hashes for Keycloak 26.6.2, 26.6.3, 26.6.4, 26.7.0, 26.7.1, and 26.7.2. Documentation identifies versions 26.6.2–26.7.1 as vulnerable and 26.7.2 as patched. targets.txt is a local demonstration batch list for six localhost Keycloak instances. The repository contains one Python code file, six JSON fingerprint datasets, README documentation, a GPL-3.0 license, and the sample target list.alt3kx · Disclosed Aug 27, 2026 · python · json · web · networkOperationalCVE-2026-18963This two-file repository consists of a minimal README identifying CVE-2026-18963 and `exploit.py`, a standalone Python 3 exploit. It targets an asserted Keycloak reset-credentials authentication-bypass condition affecting versions prior to 26.7.2. The script starts an unauthenticated OIDC authorization request, discovers the reset-password link and relevant HTML form actions, posts `tryAnotherWay` to establish selector state, submits a chosen victim username, re-enters the reset flow, and attempts to reuse a stale credential-selector form. If the vulnerable state transition returns `kc-passwd-update-form` without an action token, it sets an operator-provided password for the victim. It subsequently sends a password-grant request to the realm token endpoint as `admin-cli`; receipt of an `access_token` is treated as confirmation of account takeover. It supports configurable base URL, victim, new password, realm, client ID, and an optional HTTP(S) proxy. The implementation handles cookies and redirect chains manually, disables environment proxy inheritance, and exits with diagnostic messages when expected forms are absent, allowing it to serve both as an active exploit and a practical patch-state check. No external exploit framework, shell payload, persistence mechanism, or post-compromise actions are included.EQSTLab · Disclosed Sep 1, 2026 · python · markdown · webOperationalCVE-2026-18963-keycloakThe repository contains a short README identifying CVE-2026-18963 and one standalone Python 3 exploit (`exploity.py`). The script uses `requests` to drive Keycloak's browser-based OpenID Connect reset-credentials flow. It creates an unauthenticated session, finds the reset form, submits `tryAnotherWay=on`, selects an operator-specified victim, optionally follows a session restart URL, revisits the reset flow to obtain a stale selector, and resubmits the victim to obtain the password-update form without an email action token. It then posts an operator-supplied new password twice and treats a 302/303 response as takeover success. The code manually handles redirects and rebuilds Cookie headers to preserve Keycloak session cookies, supports an intercepting proxy and disabled TLS validation, and writes HTML response dumps for each stage to `dump/`. It is an operational proof-of-concept rather than a framework module or detection-only tool.0xlyvio · Disclosed Sep 5, 2026 · python · markdown · webOperationalKeySniperThe repository contains a single Python 3 executable, KeySniper.py, plus a README. KeySniper is a network-facing Keycloak/Red Hat SSO scanner and exploit for the claimed CVE-2026-18963 weak password-recovery flaw. It accepts one URL, a URL list, or stdin pipeline input; normalizes targets; fingerprints Keycloak; detects legacy /auth deployments; extracts realms from redirects, HTML, JavaScript, issuer data, and OpenID metadata; and falls back to a common-realm wordlist only after Keycloak indicators are found. The scan follows the reset-credentials flow, looking for a changed execution UUID and the kc-passwd-update-form as its confirmation signal. Detect mode (--takeover 0) stops before changing credentials. Takeover mode (--takeover 1) posts a configurable replacement password, defaulting to SelaM1337@@, for a supplied/default admin username and identifies success from the resulting redirect/code response. A successful single-target takeover can launch SessionShell, an interactive token and Keycloak account/admin API helper. The tool supports concurrent scans, colored status output, and reports VULN, ATO, SAFE, SKIP, or FAIL. It is not merely a detector because it includes password-change and post-compromise capabilities; it is a standalone operational Python exploit rather than a module for a recognized exploitation framework.ynsmroztas · Disclosed Sep 6, 2026 · python · markdown · web · networkOperationalCVE-2026-18963This five-file standalone Python proof-of-concept repository implements CVE-2026-18963 against Keycloak's reset-credentials flow. The principal exploit, `exploit_cve_2026_18963.py`, uses `requests`, maintains cookies manually, generates PKCE values, parses Keycloak HTML forms and redirects, and performs a seven-stage unauthenticated workflow: initialize an OIDC authentication session, enter credential reset, submit `tryAnotherWay` to corrupt selector state, submit the victim username, re-enter the reset flow, send an empty form POST to invoke the reset-email authenticator action without a valid email token, set an attacker-selected password, and verify login/account takeover. The replacement password, realm, username, and Keycloak URL are command-line configurable. The vulnerability chain described by the repository combines selector-state corruption in `DefaultAuthenticationFlow` with an unconditional `context.success()` in `ResetCredentialEmail.action()`. The resulting empty POST reaches the authenticator action based on the execution ID in the URL, rather than validating an action token obtained from the victim's reset email. Supporting infrastructure is explicitly a local lab: `docker-compose.yml` starts Keycloak 26.0.6 on port 8080 and MailHog on SMTP port 1025 and web port 8025. `setup-lab.py` provisions the `vuln-lab` realm, enables password reset and direct grants, configures MailHog SMTP, and creates a `victim` account through Keycloak's administrative API. `requirements.txt` contains only `requests`; `README.md` documents setup, affected versions, mitigations, and references. No C2, reverse-shell, persistence, or destructive behavior is present; the exploit's material impact is unauthorized credential replacement and account access.ivanesk315 · Disclosed Sep 10, 2026 · python · yaml · web · networkOperational-CVE-2026-18963-POCThe supplied repository contains four files: a README and three standalone Python scripts. poc.py is the main exploit and uses requests to preserve an authentication session, parse server-rendered forms, manipulate the reset-credentials selector, bypass the email-token check, and submit a replacement password. Its verification compares password-grant responses for the new and old credentials. The payload defaults are lab-oriented but configurable. No exploit framework, remote-code-execution payload, or external callback infrastructure is present. The claimed vulnerability combines an authentication-selector state error with an email-reset action that succeeds without validating the action-token user binding. Static inspection shows code implementing this claimed chain, but does not establish that it succeeds against actual Keycloak releases. The CVE identity, affected versions, patch dates, and advisory details are repository assertions and were not independently verified. provision.py uses the authenticated Admin REST API to delete and recreate a poc realm, create a victim user, enable event recording, and create the poc-check verification client. Its realm deletion is intentional setup behavior, not evidence of a fake exploit, but can destroy an existing realm of that name. poc.py also removes the Secure flag from its local session-cookie objects to support the HTTP lab, weakening client-side cookie transport restrictions. cve-2026-18963-hunt.py is a separate authenticated hunting utility. Visible code correlates SEND_RESET_PASSWORD or SEND_RESET_PASSWORD_ERROR with password-related UPDATE_PASSWORD or UPDATE_CREDENTIAL events on the same code_id, using a default five-second threshold. Such matches are heuristic and can include legitimate fast resets. The middle of this file is truncated, so its event-fetching endpoint construction and complete implementation cannot be inspected. The README is also partially truncated. Server-derived form-action URLs are used by the exploit, so their complete session-specific endpoint values are not available statically. The README's claim of a completely silent takeover with no reset email conflicts with both its own exploit-chain description and poc.py, which explicitly trigger a reset-email attempt. The code supports bypassing receipt or use of the email link, not guaranteeing that no email is sent. Claims of username enumeration are not implemented as a dedicated capability in the visible exploit. MFA or other required actions may also prevent a changed password alone from providing full access. No original repository URL, git reference, archive location, or archive size was supplied. Empty repository identifiers and size_bytes=0 represent unavailable metadata; the four listed file sizes total 36,874 bytes, which is not a measured archive size.SonOfABot · Disclosed Oct 8, 2026 · python · web · networkOperationalKeycloak-CVE-2026-18963-ExploitThe supplied repository contains eight files: a standalone Python exploit, two executable lab helpers, Docker Compose and realm configurations, a candidate-identifier example, an MIT license and documentation. The main script uses Python standard-library HTTP, cookies, HTML form parsing and URL construction rather than an exploit framework. Its visible CLI dispatch supports safe-check, check-only and full takeover; enumeration is also referenced. Full takeover calls the exploit routine and then attempts password-grant verification with the selected password. HTTP handling maintains session cookies, supports optional TLS certificate-verification bypass, logs requests in verbose mode and intercepts redirects to the configured application callback. Verbose form-body logging can expose submitted passwords. The documented vulnerability chains a sticky authentication-selector state, set through tryAnotherWay without authenticationExecution, with reset-flow behavior that permits bypassing the emailed action-token gate. The claimed outcome is changing an existing account password without prior authentication or mailbox access. Safe-check is described as requiring no valid user and avoiding account changes; ordinary check and enumeration can still generate emails and mark emailVerified true. The visible material contains no shell payload, destructive local command, attacker-controlled callback or exfiltration destination. The lab runs claimed vulnerable Keycloak 26.7.1 and patched 26.7.2 alongside Mailpit. Its poc realm enables resets, imports a victim account with a known password and configures a public client with password grants enabled. lab/legit_reset.py supplies a control trace by actually reading and following the reset email; lab/reset-victim.sh uses authenticated administrative APIs to restore the account. These administrative credentials and intentionally permissive settings are lab conveniences, not exploit prerequisites. Useful detection indicators described by the repository are a reset-credentials POST containing tryAnotherWay followed by an empty-body POST and password update, without an intervening action-token GET. Correlated SEND_RESET_PASSWORD and UPDATE_PASSWORD events and unexpected emailVerified changes provide supporting evidence, but no single missing event proves exploitation. Both README.md and the main Python file are truncated in the supplied content. Consequently, the complete exploit, enumeration, classification and verification implementations cannot be audited, and the CVE assignment, affected range and reported effectiveness remain unverified repository claims. No obvious fake-exploit behavior appears in the visible code. The original URL was inferred from the README clone command; no git reference or archive size was supplied. The listed file sizes total 54,177 bytes, which is not an archive-size measurement; size_bytes is therefore recorded as 0 to represent unavailable metadata.hardeep-sudo · Disclosed Oct 8, 2026 · python · bash · web · networkOperationalCVE-2026-18963-PoCThe supplied repository contains one standalone Python exploit/checker, a README, and an MIT license. The listed files total 64,863 bytes; repository URL, revision, and archive size were not supplied. The Python script uses standard-library HTTP, cookie, TLS, HTML-parsing, and argument-handling facilities. Playwright is an optional, lazily imported dependency for browser presentation, not an exploit framework. The repository attributes the flaw to CVE-2026-18963 / GHSA-4gv3-mc9p-5wqc and describes a weak password-recovery mechanism. An authentication-selector note allegedly remains valid across executions. After selecting another authentication method and submitting an identifier, revisiting the reset URL binds the selector to the email execution. An empty POST then invokes an email-reset handler that allegedly marks the account verified and advances the flow without validating the emailed action token. These vulnerability identifiers and affected-version claims are repository assertions, not independently verified findings. The documented modes include a random nonexistent-identifier probe, account-resolution checks, stopping at the password form, and optional password replacement. Testing real accounts can send recovery email even on patched systems. On affected systems, reaching the form can modify email-verification state and leave a persistent required action; password replacement changes the account credential. The reserved .invalid probe address is intended as a nonresolving identifier, not a callback or exfiltration destination. Visible structures support outcome reporting, per-request status and redirect records, JSON output, rate-limit handling, and optional browser display. An owner-only umask protects local captures. No fixed attacker-controlled host, command-execution payload, or exfiltration endpoint is visible. Both the README and the Python source are substantially truncated in the supplied content, so the full request implementation, browser behavior, and claimed end-to-end exploit reliability cannot be independently established from this excerpt.orevim · Disclosed Oct 15, 2026 · python · network · webOperational
Exposure surface

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
Red HatBuild Of Keycloakapplication
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2026-18963 exploited in the wild?
Yes. As of Nov 13, 2026, Mallory has reports of exploitation in the wild.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2026-18963?
Yes. Mallory tracks 15 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2026-18963, the earliest disclosed Aug 20, 2026.
Is there a patch for CVE-2026-18963?
Upgrade upstream Keycloak to 26.7.2 or later. For Red Hat Build of Keycloak, deploy the fixed 26.4.15 or 26.6.6 release, or a later supported release, using the applicable security updates under RHSA-2026:56519, RHSA-2026:56520, RHSA-2026:56523, and RHSA-2026:56524.
What products are affected by CVE-2026-18963?
Red Hat Build Of Keycloak.
How severe is CVE-2026-18963?
CVE-2026-18963 has a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.1 (Critical) and an EPSS score of 8.1% (95th percentile) as of Nov 13, 2026.
Activity feed

Recent activity

115 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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tenable nessus pluginsNews · Nov 13, 2026RHEL 8 : Red Hat Single Sign-On 7.6.14 security update on RHEL... | Tenable®A critical vulnerability affecting Red Hat Single Sign-On Keycloak packages. The supplied CVSS v3 vector indicates network exploitation with low complexity, no privileges or user interaction required, and high confidentiality and integrity impacts without an availability impact. The excerpt does not describe the underlying flaw. Exploits and a patch are reported as available.Read more ↗tenable nessus pluginsNews · Nov 12, 2026RHEL 9 : Red Hat Single Sign-On 7.6.14 security update on RHEL... | Tenable®A vendor-rated critical vulnerability affecting Red Hat's rh-sso7-keycloak and rh-sso7-keycloak-server packages. The listed CVSS v3 vector indicates network exploitation without authentication or user interaction, with high confidentiality and integrity impact and no availability impact. Exploits and an official patch are available. The reference lists CWE-640 but provides no technical description of the flaw.Read more ↗tenable nessus pluginsNews · Nov 12, 2026RHEL 7 : Red Hat Single Sign-On 7.6.14 security update on RHEL... | Tenable®A critical vulnerability affecting Red Hat Single Sign-On 7 Keycloak packages. The supplied CVSS v3 vector indicates network exploitation without authentication or user interaction, with high confidentiality and integrity impacts and no availability impact. The reference associates the vulnerability with CWE-640 but provides no technical description of the underlying flaw. Exploits and an official patch are available; exploitation in the wild is not specified.Read more ↗codebyNews · Oct 17, 2026Уязвимость password reset: CVE-разбор и пентест | 2026A Keycloak password-reset state-validation flaw that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass email action-token verification and proceed directly to setting a new password, including for administrative accounts. The article assigns CVSS 3.1 severity 9.1 and reports no exploitation at the cited assessment time, but identifies public proof-of-concept repositories and a Nuclei template. Fixed versions are upstream Keycloak 26.7.2, Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4.15, and 26.6.6. The stated temporary mitigation is disabling Forgot Password separately in every realm.Read more ↗
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Exposure mappingQuery your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Threat actor evidenceEvery report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malwareMalware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity83Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.