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CVE-2026-19650 is a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in GitLab Community Edition and Enterprise Edition GraphQL multiplex query handling. Improper request validation permitted a multiplexed request to be validated as a read-only GraphQL GET operation while executing a state-changing mutation. The underlying condition resulted from shared tracer state across multiplexed queries, allowing a validated document and the document executed for a query to diverge. This bypassed GitLab’s intended restriction against executing mutations through GET requests.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
Repository is a small self-contained GitLab vulnerability lab and PoC set with 5 files: a README, Docker Compose lab definition, two Python PoCs, and a Bash setup script. The main exploit file, poc_cve_2026_19478.py, targets CVE-2026-19478 in GitLab GraphQL. It sends POST requests to /api/graphql with attacker-controlled GraphQL fields annotated by @gl_introduced(version:"99.0.0") so that on vulnerable servers the fallback path resolves the field by calling object.public_send(field_name). In safe mode it probes with a harmless zero-argument method such as to_param against a public project and treats a non-null response as evidence of arbitrary method invocation. In optional proof mode, it first uses the authenticated REST API (/api/v4/projects) to create a disposable public project, then sends an unauthenticated GraphQL query requesting the destroy field to trigger Project#destroy, and finally verifies deletion via GET /api/v4/projects/{id}. This demonstrates unauthenticated destructive impact against public projects. The second PoC, poc_cve_2026_19650.py, is a safe detector for the sibling CVE-2026-19650. It submits a two-element Apollo-style GraphQL batch to /api/graphql and checks whether slot 0 incorrectly returns slot 1 data, indicating multiplex query/document swapping caused by shared tracer state. The repository also includes docker-compose.yml, which provisions two GitLab CE containers for A/B testing: vulnerable 19.2.2-ce.0 on port 8222 and patched 19.2.4-ce.0 on port 8224. setup.sh waits for GraphQL readiness, seeds a public project at root/pub, and creates an admin personal access token on each instance for lab use. Overall, this is a real exploit repository with both detection and optional impact-proof capability, focused on unauthenticated GraphQL abuse in GitLab rather than a generic scanner or framework module.
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33 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A high-severity GitLab CSRF vulnerability affecting GraphQL multiplex-request validation. It can cause authenticated victims to execute GraphQL mutations through crafted GET requests after social engineering.
A GitLab GraphQL request-processing flaw that allows unauthorized users to make server-side changes.
A high-severity GitLab CE/EE GraphQL multiplex-query validation flaw (CWE-352) that allows unauthenticated users to perform server-state mutations through GET requests. The content assigns it a CVSS 3.1 score of 7.1.
A high-severity GitLab GraphQL API vulnerability that requires user interaction, such as victims clicking manipulated links.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.