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CriticalPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2026-21858: Ni8mare

Published Jan 7, 2026 · Updated 22 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVSS10.0Critical · v3.1
EPSS78.2%100th percentile
CISA KEVNoNot listed
In the wildReported189 exploitation records in Mallory
Vendor
N8n
IdentifiersCVE-2026-21858CWE-20 · Improper Input Validation

Ni8mare is an unauthenticated file-access vulnerability in n8n versions 1.65.0 through versions preceding 1.121.0. Content-Type confusion in webhook and form request handling allows crafted JSON requests to supply attacker-controlled file metadata instead of metadata generated by the multipart upload parser. The parseBody() processing path permits attacker-supplied file paths to populate internal request data, which certain form-based workflows subsequently trust when reading files. Exploitation can expose sensitive server files and, depending on deployment configuration and workflow capabilities, enable authentication forgery and remote code execution.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Attackers can disclose server files readable by the n8n process, potentially exposing application databases, credentials, authentication secrets, and other sensitive information. Where accessible secrets permit administrator-session forgery, attackers may take over the n8n instance, access connected-service credentials, modify workflows, and execute operating-system commands through available workflow capabilities. Full host compromise depends on deployment privileges and isolation; arbitrary file access is the direct vulnerability outcome.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

No official workaround is available. Until upgrading, restrict or disable publicly accessible webhook and form endpoints, require authentication for exposed Forms and Webhooks, and limit network access to trusted clients. Monitor for unexpected JSON submissions containing file-path metadata to form or webhook endpoints; request filtering can provide supplementary protection but does not replace patching.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade n8n to version 1.121.0 or later, which fixes CVE-2026-21858. Use a current supported release to address additional vulnerabilities that could participate in exploitation chains.

Public exploits

Exploits

13 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis. Hidden: 14 rejected by Mallory's analysis as not a working exploit; 1 not yet analyzed, such as Exploit-DB entries.

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CVE-2026-21858Repository purpose: a full-chain exploit PoC for n8n dubbed “Ni8mare”, chaining CVE-2026-21858 (unauthenticated arbitrary file read via Content-Type confusion on a form upload workflow) with CVE-2025-68613 (expression injection sandbox bypass) to achieve remote code execution. Core exploit (exploit.py, Python): - Implements a Ni8mare class that targets a user-supplied base URL and a specific n8n Form Trigger path. - Stage 1 (Unauthenticated AFR/LFI): POSTs JSON to the form endpoint with header Content-Type: application/json and a crafted body containing files[...].filepath, causing n8n to copy/read an arbitrary server-side file and return its contents. - Uses AFR to read /proc/self/environ to discover HOME, then reads $HOME/.n8n/config to extract encryptionKey, and reads $HOME/.n8n/database.sqlite to extract the global:owner (admin) user record. - Stage 2 (Token forge): derives/uses a JWT secret from encryptionKey (forge_token function is present but truncated in provided content) and sets an authenticated session cookie (n8n-auth) for subsequent REST API calls. - Stage 3 (Authenticated RCE): programmatically creates a workflow containing a Manual Trigger and a Set node whose value is an expression-injection payload. The payload uses this.process.mainModule.require to import child_process and run execSync("CMD"), returning command output. Provides --cmd for single command execution and an interactive loop for repeated commands. - Includes a version check via GET /rest/settings and flags vulnerable if version < 1.121.0. Lab environment: - Dockerfile installs n8n@1.65.0 and exposes port 5678. - docker-compose.yml runs n8n with relaxed cookie settings and executes init/setup.sh after startup. - init/setup.sh creates an owner account, logs in, creates and activates a “Vulnerable Form” workflow (Form Trigger with a file field + Respond node responding with the uploaded binary), and prints the vulnerable form URL. Notable targeting constraints (from README and code): exploit is not universal; it requires an existing (or attacker-created, once authenticated) workflow that uses a Form Trigger with file upload and a Respond node configured to return the binary, because the AFR is triggered through that specific request handling path. No evidence of being part of Metasploit/Nuclei/etc.; it is a standalone Python exploit with a dockerized vulnerable lab.Alhakim88 · Disclosed Jan 30, 2026 · python · bash · networkWeaponizedCVE-2026-21858Repository contains a Python exploit (exploit.py) and a Docker-based vulnerable lab for n8n. Core exploit (exploit.py): Implements a full-chain attack labeled “CVE-2026-21858 + CVE-2025-68613” against n8n. It targets a Form Trigger webhook endpoint (user-supplied form path) to perform unauthenticated arbitrary file read by submitting crafted JSON with a fake uploaded file object containing an attacker-controlled “filepath”. Using LFI, it reads /proc/self/environ to discover HOME, then reads $HOME/.n8n/config to obtain the encryptionKey and $HOME/.n8n/database.sqlite to extract the global owner’s id/email/password hash. It then forges an admin authentication token (used as the n8n-auth cookie) and proceeds to achieve RCE by creating/using workflow nodes containing a JavaScript expression payload that escapes to Node.js require() and executes OS commands via child_process.execSync, returning output. The CLI supports: --read PATH (LFI), --cmd CMD (single command), and an interactive command loop. Lab environment: Dockerfile installs n8n@1.65.0 and exposes port 5678. docker-compose.yml runs n8n with N8N_SECURE_COOKIE=false and WEBHOOK_URL=http://localhost:5678/. init/setup.sh waits for /rest/settings, creates an owner via /rest/owner/setup, logs in via /rest/login, creates a workflow with a Form Trigger (webhookId: vulnerable-form) and Respond node, activates it, and prints the vulnerable form URL (http://localhost:5678/form/vulnerable-form). Overall purpose: Provide an operational PoC/full-chain exploit and a reproducible container lab demonstrating unauthenticated file read leading to admin token forgery and remote command execution on vulnerable n8n instances.MOGMUNI · Disclosed Oct 12, 2023 · python · bash · networkOperationalSASTRA-ADI-WIGUNA-CVE-2026-21858-Holistic-AuditRepository contains documentation-heavy reconstruction of a claimed full-chain exploit for CVE-2026-21858 ("Ni8mare") targeting n8n (versions >=1.65.0 and <1.121.0). There are 5 files, mostly Markdown: ATTACKVECTOR.md (kill chain and attack surface), README.md (root-cause explanation, lab setup, and a single-file Python exploit), plus DISCLAIMER.md, SECURITY.md, and AUTHOR_RESEARCHER.md. Core exploit capability (as described and partially implemented in README.md): 1) Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via Content-Type confusion against an n8n Form Webhook endpoint. The exploit sends Content-Type: application/json with a JSON array containing objects shaped like uploaded files (filepath/mimetype/filename). This is intended to override req.body.files and trick server-side logic (prepareFormReturnItem/copyBinaryFile) into copying arbitrary local files into an accessible n8n storage location. 2) Session forgery/authentication bypass by stealing N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY from /home/node/.n8n/config and generating a JWT (HS256) placed in the 'n8n-auth' cookie. The script computes a short hash as sha256(email+password)[:10] and uses userId=1. 3) Post-auth RCE by calling the n8n REST API endpoint /rest/workflows to create/activate a workflow containing an Execute Command node that runs a bash reverse shell to an attacker-controlled host/port. Notable limitations/observations: the included Python class shows the chain logic but does not implement the actual retrieval of the copied file contents (read_file only checks HTTP 200) nor automated extraction of N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY from the exfiltrated artifact; those steps are described conceptually. Overall, it is an operational PoC-style chain with a hardcoded/basic payload (reverse shell) and clear network targets/endpoints (webhook test endpoint and /rest/workflows).sastraadiwiguna-purpleeliteteaming · Disclosed Jan 17, 2026 · markdown · python · network (unauthenticated HTTP POST to n8n webhook endpoint; then authenticated REST API calls using forged cookie)OperationalCVE-2026-21858Repository contains a single Python exploit (exploit.py) and a README describing an unauthenticated full-chain RCE against n8n < 1.121.0 by chaining CVE-2026-21858 (content-type confusion leading to arbitrary file read via a public form endpoint) with CVE-2025-68613 (expression injection leading to command execution). Structure & flow: - README.md: documents the attack chain, prerequisites (public form endpoint in an active workflow with file upload + binary response), and usage modes (file read, single command, interactive shell). - exploit.py: implements class Ni8mare that: 1) Targets a user-supplied base URL and form path; uses requests.Session. 2) Performs arbitrary file read by POSTing JSON to the form endpoint with a crafted "files" object containing a chosen "filepath". 3) Reads /proc/self/environ to discover HOME, then reads $HOME/.n8n/config to extract encryptionKey, and $HOME/.n8n/database.sqlite to obtain the user database. 4) Parses the exfiltrated SQLite DB locally (writes to a temp .db file) to locate admin/owner user data (code is partially truncated in provided content but clearly intended to dump/identify admin and derive needed secrets). 5) Forges an admin JWT (stored as cookie n8n-auth) and uses authenticated REST calls (at least /rest/settings is explicit; additional REST endpoints for workflow creation/execution are implied by pwn()/rce() usage). 6) Achieves RCE by constructing workflow nodes (Manual Trigger -> Set) where the Set node value contains a JavaScript expression that calls process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync("CMD") and returns stdout. Capabilities: - Unauthenticated arbitrary file read (LFI-style) against the form endpoint. - Credential/secret extraction from n8n config and SQLite DB. - Admin token forgery (JWT) and authenticated API interaction. - Remote command execution with output retrieval; supports one-shot commands and an interactive loop. Notable fingerprintable targets/observables: - HTTP GET /rest/settings for version detection. - Form endpoint at <base_url>/<form_path> for the LFI primitive. - File paths: /proc/self/environ, $HOME/.n8n/config, $HOME/.n8n/database.sqlite. - Auth cookie name: n8n-auth. - Node.js execution primitive: child_process.execSync via injected expression.sec-dojo-com · Disclosed Jan 20, 2026 · python · networkOperationalCVE-2026-21858Repository provides an operational exploit chain for n8n 1.120.4 labeled as CVE-2026-21858. Structure: (1) dockerfile + run.bat stand up a local vulnerable n8n instance (port 9000 mapped to localhost) and set N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY; (2) workflow.txt is a workflow template the victim/admin must import and activate, exposing a Form Trigger webhook and using Extract From File to convert an uploaded file to text; (3) poc.py is the main exploit. poc.py takes a Form Trigger URL, parses it into TARGET_URL and FORM_PATH, then abuses the form submission JSON to supply an arbitrary server-side filepath in the 'files.file.filepath' field. It submits to the form endpoint, reads the returned formWaitingUrl, and fetches the processed output to exfiltrate local files. It specifically reads /home/n8n/.n8n/config to extract 'encryptionKey', derives a 'final_secret' as sha256(enc_key[::2]) hex, then reads /home/n8n/.n8n/database.sqlite to regex-extract an email, a bcrypt password hash, and a nearby UUID (treated as admin/user id). Using these, it computes an 'admin_hash' (base64(sha256(email:bcrypt)) truncated) and forges an HS256 JWT placed in the 'n8n-auth' cookie along with a browser-id header. With this forged authenticated session, it calls the n8n REST API to create a workflow containing the 'n8n-nodes-base.executeCommand' node with attacker-supplied commands, runs the workflow, and retrieves execution output from /rest/executions/{id}. The script then provides an interactive loop ("n8n-shell>") to execute arbitrary commands and print results.EQSTLab · Disclosed Feb 11, 2026 · python · dockerfile · networkOperationalCVE-2026-21858Repository purpose: provides a runnable PoC/operational exploit chain (“Ni8mare”) against n8n combining CVE-2026-21858 (unauthenticated arbitrary file read via Content-Type confusion on a Form Trigger upload flow) and CVE-2025-68613 (expression injection leading to sandbox bypass and RCE). Structure: - exploit.py: main Python exploit. Implements (1) unauthenticated file read by POSTing JSON to a user-supplied form webhook path with Content-Type: application/json and a crafted files[].filepath, (2) discovery of HOME via /proc/self/environ, (3) reading $HOME/.n8n/config to obtain encryptionKey, (4) reading $HOME/.n8n/database.sqlite and extracting the global:owner user record, (5) deriving a JWT secret from encryptionKey and forging an admin session cookie (n8n-auth), and (6) authenticated RCE by creating a workflow with a Manual Trigger and a Set node containing a malicious expression that uses this.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync to run arbitrary commands. Provides --read for LFI, --cmd for one-shot command execution, and an interactive command loop. - docker-compose.yml + Dockerfile: builds a local vulnerable lab using n8n@1.65.0 exposed on port 5678, with an init volume. - img/setup.sh: automates lab initialization: waits for /rest/settings, creates an owner, logs in, creates and activates a workflow exposing /form/vulnerable-form with a file upload field and Respond node configured to return the uploaded binary—matching the exploit’s prerequisite. - pyproject.toml: Python packaging/entry point (script name: exploit). Key exploit capabilities: - Unauthenticated arbitrary file read from the n8n host/container filesystem by controlling a file path in the form upload handling. - Credential/material extraction (encryptionKey + SQLite DB) and admin token forging to gain authenticated API access. - Remote command execution via expression injection sandbox escape, returning command output; supports interactive mode. Notable targeting details: - Network target is an n8n HTTP service (commonly :5678). The exploit requires a known, reachable form webhook path (e.g., /form/vulnerable-form) that uses a file upload field and Respond node; without that workflow pattern, the chain may not work (as noted in README limitations).bamov970 · Disclosed Feb 24, 2026 · python · bash · networkOperationalCVE-2026-21858This repository is a standalone exploit/lab for a full n8n attack chain combining CVE-2026-21858 (unauthenticated arbitrary file read via Content-Type confusion on a form upload workflow) with CVE-2025-68613 (expression injection sandbox bypass leading to command execution). The repository contains a Python exploit script, Docker-based vulnerable lab, and a Bash setup script that provisions a vulnerable n8n workflow. Structure: exploit.py is the main exploit entry point. It implements HTTP interaction, arbitrary file read against a supplied form endpoint, SQLite parsing of a downloaded n8n database, and JWT forging for admin authentication. The RCE stage is only stubbed in code, but the README documents the intended JavaScript expression payload using this.process.mainModule.require and child_process.execSync. init/setup.sh configures the local lab by waiting for n8n, creating an owner account, logging in, creating a workflow with a Form Trigger and Respond node, and activating it at /form/vulnerable-form. Dockerfile and docker-compose.yml build and run n8n 1.65.0 with insecure lab settings. Main exploit capabilities: (1) unauthenticated arbitrary file read by POSTing crafted JSON to a vulnerable form endpoint and controlling the file filepath field; (2) extraction of admin id/email/password hash from database.sqlite; (3) derivation of the JWT secret from the encryption key and forging of an n8n-auth cookie; (4) intended authenticated RCE through workflow/expression injection. The implemented code is operational for file read and token forging, while the final command-execution logic is incomplete in exploit.py and described in the README. Notable targets/endpoints include the vulnerable form path, n8n REST API endpoints used by the lab (/rest/settings, /rest/owner/setup, /rest/login, /rest/workflows), and sensitive local files such as /proc/self/environ, $HOME/.n8n/config, and $HOME/.n8n/database.sqlite. Overall, this is a real exploit repository with a working proof-of-concept for the early chain stages and documented end-to-end RCE intent.kaleth4 · Disclosed Apr 9, 2026 · python · bash · web · networkOperationalPoC-CVE-2026-21858This repository is a small standalone Python exploit PoC for CVE-2026-21858 affecting n8n. The repo contains one main exploit script (CVE-2026-21858.py), a README with setup/usage instructions, a docker-compose lab for reproducing the issue against n8n 1.120.0, and a minimal requirements file (requests, PyJWT). The exploit chain is multi-stage. First, it abuses a vulnerable form workflow endpoint by POSTing crafted JSON to /form/{form_id} with a fake attachment object whose filepath points to an arbitrary server-side file. It uses this to read /proc/self/environ, then parses HOME and N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY from the returned content. From HOME it derives the n8n data directory (~/.n8n) and the SQLite database path (~/.n8n/database.sqlite). Next, it downloads the database file through the same file-read primitive and queries the user table for the global owner account. With the extracted encryption key and owner data, it forges an n8n-auth JWT and places it in the session cookie jar. After authentication bypass, the script uses n8n API functionality to validate the token, create a malicious workflow, execute it, poll/fetch the execution result, and print the command output supplied via --command. Finally, it attempts cleanup by archiving and deleting the created workflow artifact. This makes the PoC more than a simple file-read demonstration: it turns unauthenticated file disclosure into authenticated takeover and command execution, assuming the target deployment matches expected n8n filesystem and auth behavior. Repository structure is straightforward: the Python script is the only real code artifact and clear entry point; docker-compose.yml provisions a vulnerable local lab with a predictable N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY and exposed port 5678; README.md explains how to create a vulnerable form workflow and run the exploit. Overall purpose: demonstrate end-to-end compromise of vulnerable n8n instances via form-based arbitrary file read chained into JWT forgery and malicious workflow execution.masterwok · Disclosed Apr 16, 2026 · python · yaml · web · networkOperationalcve-2026-21858Repository contains a standalone Python exploit plus a Dockerized lab for reproducing a full unauthenticated-to-RCE chain against n8n. The main exploit file is exploit.py, which implements a multi-stage attack: it first abuses CVE-2026-21858 by POSTing JSON with Content-Type: application/json to a user-supplied form endpoint, crafting a fake uploaded file object whose filepath points to arbitrary local files. This yields arbitrary file read from the n8n host. The script then reads /proc/self/environ to locate HOME, reads $HOME/.n8n/config to recover the encryptionKey, and reads $HOME/.n8n/database.sqlite to extract admin-related data. From that material it forges an n8n-auth admin token/cookie and uses authenticated REST API calls to create/trigger a malicious workflow. For code execution, it abuses CVE-2025-68613 by inserting a JavaScript expression payload into a Set node; the payload reaches this.process.mainModule.require, imports child_process, and executes arbitrary shell commands via execSync. The script supports direct file read mode, single-command execution, and an interactive shell loop. Repository structure is small and purpose-built: exploit.py is the operational exploit; init/setup.sh provisions a local vulnerable n8n instance by creating an admin account, logging in, creating a formTrigger + respondToWebhook workflow, and activating it; Dockerfile installs n8n 1.65.0; docker-compose.yml exposes port 5678 and runs the setup script automatically; pyproject.toml defines Python dependencies (requests, pyjwt) and a console entry point; README.md documents the chain, limitations, references, and lab usage. This is not a detection script and not merely a README—it is a functional PoC/operational exploit with a hardcoded but effective RCE payload and a reproducible local lab.Fomovet · Disclosed Jun 21, 2026 · python · bash · web · networkOperationaln8n-cve-2026-21858Repository contains a complete exploit lab and attack chain for n8n, centered on CVE-2026-21858 (unauthenticated arbitrary file read through a vulnerable Form endpoint using JSON Content-Type confusion) and CVE-2025-68613 (expression injection leading to RCE). Structure is small and focused: docker-compose.yml launches a vulnerable n8n 1.65.0 container on port 5678; init/setup.sh waits for the service, creates an admin account, logs in, and provisions an active workflow exposing /form/vulnerable-form with a file field and binary response node; n8n-chain.py is the main exploit; n8n-audit.sh is a detection/audit helper; run.sh automates lab startup and exploit execution. The main exploit script n8n-chain.py implements a multi-stage compromise flow: (1) POST crafted JSON to the form endpoint to coerce the server into reading arbitrary local files; (2) read /proc/self/environ to infer HOME, then read ~/.n8n/config for encryptionKey and ~/.n8n/database.sqlite for admin account data; (3) forge an admin JWT/token using the recovered key; (4) use authenticated access to trigger expression injection with a JavaScript payload that imports Node's child_process and runs arbitrary shell commands via execSync. The script supports file-read mode, single-command execution, interactive shell mode, and generation of an audit script. The repository is a real exploit, not just a README or scanner. It includes an operational payload and a reproducible vulnerable environment, but it is not packaged as a larger exploitation framework. The audit script separately checks version exposure, health, common form paths, and attempts a benign proof read of /etc/passwd, optionally escalating to config key extraction if successful.qianlijaingshan · Disclosed Jul 21, 2026 · markdown · yaml · web · networkOperationalCVE-2026-21858-and-CVE-2025-68613Repository contains two Python exploit scripts, a Docker-based vulnerable lab, and extensive Markdown documentation/reporting for the 'Ni8mare' exploit chain against n8n. The main purpose is to demonstrate and operationalize a pre-auth attack chain combining CVE-2026-21858 (Content-Type confusion leading to arbitrary file read) with CVE-2025-68613 (expression injection / sandbox escape leading to RCE). Structure: README.md summarizes the vulnerabilities, attack chain, affected versions, and lab usage. REPORT.md is a long technical write-up explaining root cause, exploitation flow, and mitigations. ni8mare-lab/ contains a Dockerfile that installs n8n 1.65.0, a docker-compose.yml exposing port 5678, and init/setup.sh which waits for n8n readiness, creates an admin account, logs in, creates a vulnerable Form Trigger workflow with webhookId 'vulnerable-form', and activates it. Exploit capability: ni8mare_exploit.py is the primary Linux/lab exploit. It performs three phases: (1) sends JSON to a form endpoint with a forged files structure to coerce n8n into reading attacker-chosen files; (2) reads /proc/self/environ to locate HOME, then reads ~/.n8n/config and ~/.n8n/database.sqlite, extracts admin data from SQLite, and forges a JWT; (3) uses a malicious JavaScript expression that reaches this.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('CMD') to execute arbitrary commands. It supports file-read mode, single-command mode, and an interactive shell-like loop. ni8mare_exploit_2.py is a variant with extra operator options such as --home for Windows/source-build environments and --token to skip earlier phases. Fingerprintable targets/endpoints: the exploit is aimed at operator-supplied n8n base URLs and form paths, while the lab hardcodes localhost/127.0.0.1:5678 and uses REST endpoints /rest/settings, /rest/owner/setup, /rest/login, /rest/workflows, and /rest/workflows/$ID. Important file targets include /proc/self/environ, ~/.n8n/config, ~/.n8n/database.sqlite, and example /etc/passwd. Overall assessment: this is a real exploit repository, not just a detector or README. It is operational rather than framework-based, with a hardcoded but effective payload chain for arbitrary file read, auth bypass via JWT forgery, and command execution on vulnerable n8n instances.Giangdurian · Disclosed Jul 31, 2026 · markdown · dockerfile · web · networkOperationalCVE-2026-21858This six-file repository provides a Python proof of concept and Docker-based lab for a claimed n8n 1.120.4 vulnerability, CVE-2026-21858. poc.py is the primary entry point and accepts a victim Form Trigger URL. It abuses a crafted JSON form submission containing a file filepath field to request /home/n8n/.n8n/config and /home/n8n/.n8n/database.sqlite. It extracts the encryptionKey from config, derives a SHA-256-based secret, identifies nearby administrator data in the SQLite content with regular expressions, and forges an HS256 n8n-auth JWT. It then calls n8n REST endpoints to create a workflow with n8n-nodes-base.executeCommand, run it, retrieve execution details, and display command output in an interactive shell loop. workflow.txt defines the required vulnerable workflow chain: Form Trigger -> Extract From File -> Form response. The Dockerfile installs n8n 1.120.4 on Ubuntu 22.04, while run.bat exposes the demonstration service only on 127.0.0.1:9000 and supplies an encryption-key environment variable. No external command-and-control or hard-coded third-party target is present; all operational network requests are directed to the operator-provided target.yym8538 · Disclosed Aug 21, 2026 · python · dockerfile · web · networkOperationalCVE-2026-21858This repository provides a full-chain exploit for n8n, targeting CVE-2026-21858 (Arbitrary File Read) and CVE-2025-68613 (Expression Injection RCE). The exploit is implemented in Python (exploit.py) and automates the attack chain: it first abuses a file upload endpoint to read arbitrary files (including sensitive n8n config and database files), then forges an admin JWT token, and finally creates a malicious workflow to achieve remote code execution via a sandbox bypass. The repository includes a Dockerfile and docker-compose.yml for setting up a vulnerable n8n instance, and an init/setup.sh script to automate the creation of a vulnerable workflow. The exploit requires the target n8n instance to have a specific workflow configuration (form with file upload and Respond node). The main attack vector is network-based, exploiting HTTP endpoints exposed by n8n. Key fingerprintable endpoints include the n8n web interface (http://localhost:5678/), the REST API (/rest/settings), and the vulnerable form endpoint (/form/vulnerable-form). The exploit demonstrates a critical unauthenticated RCE chain and is a proof-of-concept, not a universal exploit.Chocapikk · Disclosed Jan 7, 2026 · python · bash · networkPoC
Exposure surface

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
N8nN8napplication
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2026-21858 exploited in the wild?
Yes. As of Oct 26, 2026, Mallory has reports of exploitation in the wild.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2026-21858?
Yes. Mallory tracks 13 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2026-21858, the earliest disclosed Oct 12, 2023.
Is there a patch for CVE-2026-21858?
Upgrade n8n to version 1.121.0 or later, which fixes CVE-2026-21858. Use a current supported release to address additional vulnerabilities that could participate in exploitation chains.
What products are affected by CVE-2026-21858?
N8n.
How severe is CVE-2026-21858?
CVE-2026-21858 has a CVSS v3.1 score of 10.0 (Critical) and an EPSS score of 78.2% (100th percentile) as of Oct 26, 2026.
Activity feed

Recent activity

224 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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csirt bjNews · Sep 18, 2026Vulnérabilité critique d’accès non authentifié aux fichiers affectant n8n - bjCSIRTA critical vulnerability in n8n caused by improper handling of webhook or form requests. An unauthenticated attacker could access sensitive files on the underlying server through certain form-based workflows, potentially compromising data confidentiality and system integrity. The advisory assigns a CVSS v3.1 score of 10.0. Affected versions are 1.65.0 through versions before 1.121.0. Upgrade to 1.121.0 or later; until then, restrict or disable publicly accessible webhook and form endpoints.Read more ↗expel blogNews · Aug 27, 2026The AI CVE exploitation evidence story: Headlines are scarier than reality | Expeln8n file-access vulnerability associated with unauthenticated remote code execution reporting.Read more ↗nuclei templates pull requestsNews · Aug 14, 2026fix: CVE-2026-21858 - add /rest/sentry.js fallback for n8n 1.65.0-1.111.x detection by shreyas-malhotra · Pull Request #16888 · projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates · GitHubA vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-21858 affecting n8n versions from 1.65.0 up to but not including 1.121.0; the content is about improving detection coverage for the full vulnerable version range.Read more ↗nuclei templates pull requestsNews · Aug 12, 2026fix: CVE-2026-21858 - add /rest/sentry.js fallback for n8n 1.65.0-1.111.x detection by shreyas-malhotra · Pull Request #16869 · projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates · GitHubA vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-21858 affecting n8n versions from 1.65.0 up to but not including 1.121.0; the content discusses improving detection coverage for the full vulnerable version range.Read more ↗
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Exposure mappingQuery your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Threat actor evidenceEvery report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malwareMalware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signatures2YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity142Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.