DarkReplica is a post-authentication use-after-free vulnerability in Redis affecting versions with Lua scripting support. An authenticated attacker can abuse the master-replica synchronization mechanism to trigger the flaw when full synchronization occurs during a yielding Lua script or function execution. The vulnerable condition arises when replication processing replaces or frees the active Lua engine or related state while a long-running Lua execution is paused, allowing execution to later resume against freed objects. The issue affects replicas where replica-read-only is disabled or can be disabled, and may lead to remote code execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
DarkReplica is a standalone Python exploit for CVE-2026-23631, described as a Redis post-auth RCE. The repository is not a generic framework module; it is a purpose-built exploit package with a CLI entry point in `dark_replica/__main__.py`, core exploitation logic in `dark_replica/exploit.py`, a minimal fake Redis master implementation under `dark_replica/master_server/`, Lua staging resources under `dark_replica/resources/lua/`, and helper code for crafting Redis RDB payloads and modeling Lua internal structures. Operationally, the exploit connects to a target Redis server using redis-py, optionally authenticates, flushes existing functions/scripts, and then prepares a multi-stage attack. It starts an attacker-controlled TCP server that impersonates a Redis master. The target is forced to replicate from this fake master using `SLAVEOF`, and the fake master handles `PING`, `REPLCONF`, and `PSYNC/SYNC`, replying with `FULLRESYNC` and a crafted RDB payload. That RDB payload contains staged Lua/function content used later in the exploit chain. The Lua stages are central to the exploit. `slow_function.lua` registers a function (`scam` in library `hoax`) that creates coroutine activity, enters an infinite loop to block execution, and manipulates bytecode layout to support the use-after-free trigger. `stage1.lua` performs heap spraying and controlled allocations, builds fake Lua tables/stack objects, stores the operator command payload in memory, and returns useful addresses. `stage2.lua` sprays serialized fake `lua_State` and bytecode objects and registers a function to pin them against garbage collection. `stage3.lua` implements arbitrary read/write primitives using corrupted Lua table metadata, derives the Redis base from `os.clock`, resolves libc via `umask@got.plt`, computes `system`, forges a fake `global_State`, and corrupts a coroutine state so that resuming it reaches a path that invokes `system(command_payload)`. The exploit depends on target-specific symbol offsets supplied in JSON5 format. Example offsets are included for the official `redis:latest` Docker image and Redis 8.6.2. The helper script `extract_offsets.sh` extracts required offsets (`os_clock`, `umask@got.plt`, `umask`, `system`) from Redis and libc ELF files using `readelf`. This indicates the exploit is practical but environment-sensitive rather than fully universal. Repository structure is coherent and purposeful: Python code orchestrates the attack, Lua templates implement memory corruption stages, `rdb/writer.py` builds a valid Redis RDB with function records, and `master_server/client.py` emulates enough of the replication protocol to deliver the malicious payload. Overall, this is a real exploit repository implementing post-auth network-based RCE against vulnerable Redis instances, with an operator-provided command payload and a custom fake-master delivery mechanism.
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26 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Unknown
A vulnerability in Redis addressed indirectly through upgraded third-party components in Tenable Security Center.
A post-authentication remote code execution vulnerability in Redis functions engine replication handling caused by a use-after-free condition, allowing full host compromise.
A publicly disclosed remote code execution vulnerability described as a use-after-free issue involving Redis Lua Engine.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.