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CVE-2026-23697 is an authenticated unrestricted file upload vulnerability in Vtiger CRM affecting versions before 8.4.0. A low-privileged authenticated user can upload a .phar file containing arbitrary PHP code through the Documents module because the application's extension denylist in config.inc.php omits the .phar extension. The uploaded file is preserved with its original .phar extension and stored in a web-accessible storage directory. On Apache 2.4 deployments, the intended access restrictions are ineffective because the accompanying .htaccess uses Apache 2.2 syntax and is silently ignored, allowing direct HTTP access to the uploaded payload. Successful exploitation results in remote code execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Single-file Python proof-of-concept exploit targeting Vtiger CRM 8.3.0. The script automates an authenticated web attack chain: it logs into Vtiger, retrieves CSRF tokens from the application, uploads a malicious .phar file containing a minimal PHP webshell through the Documents module, enumerates the /storage/ directory structure to locate the randomized uploaded filename via Apache directory listing, and then invokes the uploaded file with a 'cmd' GET parameter to execute arbitrary OS commands. Repository structure is minimal: one Python script using requests, argparse, datetime, re, and sys. Core functions are get_csrf() for token extraction, login() for authenticated session establishment, upload_webshell() for malicious file upload, find_shell() for locating the stored payload under /storage/<year>/<month>/weekX/, execute() for command execution, and main() for CLI handling and optional interactive shell mode. The exploit is operational rather than a mere detector because it delivers a working payload and provides post-exploitation command execution, but payload customization is basic and hardcoded.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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