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A denial-of-service condition in ingress-nginx affects the validating admission controller (admission webhook) feature. An attacker can send abnormally large requests to the validating admission controller, causing excessive memory consumption. This can lead to the ingress-nginx controller pod being OOM-killed and/or the Kubernetes node exhausting available memory.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a single Python proof-of-concept exploit script plus a detailed README. Structure & purpose: - README.md: Describes CVE-2026-24514 as a memory exhaustion/DoS issue in ingress-nginx validating admission webhook when enabled; includes affected versions (<1.13.7 and 1.14.x <1.14.3), attack flow, safe testing guidance (kubectl port-forward), and mitigations (upgrade/disable webhook/restrict network access). - cve-2026-24514-Kubernetes.py: Standalone Python3 PoC that crafts a Kubernetes AdmissionReview (admission.k8s.io/v1) for an Ingress CREATE operation and injects a user-controlled, very large string into the Ingress spec under a configurable field name (default largeJunkData). It then POSTs the JSON to a user-supplied webhook URL using requests, optionally disabling TLS verification (--insecure). The intent is to force the webhook/controller to allocate excessive memory while parsing the request, leading to OOMKill and denial of service. Exploit capabilities: - Remote network-triggered DoS against the ingress-nginx admission webhook endpoint by sending an oversized JSON body. - Payload size is operator-controlled via CLI argument size_mb (MB converted to bytes and used to generate an 'A' * size_bytes string). - No persistence, no code execution, no privilege escalation; impact is availability (crash/hang/timeouts). Notable targeting details: - Targets the validating admission webhook endpoint (commonly /validate) for the ingress-nginx admission service; examples include https://localhost:8443/validate (port-forward) and https://ingress-nginx-controller-admission.ingress-nginx.svc/validate (cluster-internal DNS). - Requires webhook enabled and network reachability to that service (often internal-only unless misconfigured/exposed).
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