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Mallory
MediumPublic exploit

Unauthenticated file upload in Gogs attachment endpoints (/issues/attachments, /releases/attachments)

IdentifiersCVE-2026-25242CWE-862· Missing Authorization

Gogs (self-hosted Git service) versions 0.13.4 and below expose attachment upload endpoints without requiring authentication when the global configuration setting RequireSigninView is disabled (the default). In this configuration, remote unauthenticated users can upload arbitrary files to the server via the /releases/attachments and /issues/attachments endpoints (under repositories), effectively bypassing intended access control for attachment uploads. CSRF protections do not prevent the attack in this scenario (per provided content). The issue is fixed in Gogs 0.14.1.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Unauthenticated arbitrary file upload can be abused to use the Gogs instance as a public file host, including hosting/delivery of malicious content under the victim domain, and can lead to disk exhaustion (denial of service) due to uncontrolled storage consumption.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

As a workaround, set RequireSigninView=true to require authentication for views and prevent unauthenticated access to the attachment upload endpoints. Additionally, restrict external exposure (e.g., internal/VPN-only) and/or enforce reverse-proxy/WAF rules to block unauthenticated POSTs to /issues/attachments and /releases/attachments; apply storage quotas and monitoring to reduce disk-exhaustion risk.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade Gogs to version 0.14.1 or later (fixed in 0.14.1 per provided content). After upgrading, validate that anonymous users cannot upload (POST) to /issues/attachments or /releases/attachments under the deployed configuration.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 1 candidate as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.

VALID 0 / 1 TOTALView more in app

All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

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VendorProductType
GogsGogsapplication

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Social activity2

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