Git for Windows versions prior to 2.53.0.windows.3 lack protections to prevent disclosure of a user's NTLM hash during repository operations. An attacker can craft a malicious repository or branch such that, when a victim clones the repository or checks out the branch, Git for Windows accesses an attacker-controlled server and automatically attempts NTLM authentication. Because NTLM authentication can occur by default without additional user interaction, the attacker can capture the victim's NTLMv2 challenge-response material. The issue is described as enabling attackers to obtain a user's NTLM hash and was fixed in Git for Windows 2.53.0.windows.3.
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No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.