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CVE-2026-33340 is a critical server-side request forgery vulnerability in LoLLMs WEBUI, affecting all known existing versions at the time of publication. The flaw is in the unauthenticated POST /api/proxy endpoint, referenced in lollms/server/endpoints/lollms_apps.py (lines 443-450 in the cited repository context). The endpoint accepts a user-supplied URL and causes the server to perform an arbitrary outbound GET request to that destination. Proof-of-concept material shows that sending JSON such as {"url":"http://<attacker-controlled-host>"} to /api/proxy results in the server fetching the remote resource and returning the fetched content, confirming SSRF behavior. Because the request is made by the server, an attacker can abuse the application as a proxy to reach resources not directly accessible from the Internet.
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/api/proxy endpoint, preferably removing public exposure entirely. Place the application behind an authentication gate or reverse proxy ACLs so unauthenticated users cannot reach the endpoint. Apply egress filtering at the host, container, VPC, or firewall level to prevent the application from reaching internal networks, localhost, link-local ranges, and cloud metadata services such as 169.254.169.254. Where possible, isolate the service in a network segment with minimal outbound access and monitor for anomalous outbound requests originating from the application.Patch, then assume compromise.
/api/proxy endpoint should require authentication and authorization, and it should not permit arbitrary user-controlled destinations. Implement strict allowlisting of permitted upstream hosts, schemes, ports, and paths; block access to loopback, link-local, RFC1918, and cloud metadata address space; and validate and canonicalize URLs before any outbound request is issued.No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 1 candidate as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.
All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.
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8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A critical server-side request forgery vulnerability in LoLLMs WEBUI involving the /api/proxy endpoint, demonstrated by causing the target server to make an outbound request to an attacker-controlled URL.
A critical unauthenticated SSRF vulnerability in LoLLMs WEBUI's /api/proxy endpoint that allows arbitrary server-side GET requests, enabling access to internal services, local network scanning, and possible cloud metadata exfiltration.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.