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CVE-2026-33634 tracks a supply-chain compromise of Aqua Security Trivy distribution components in March 2026. An attacker with compromised credentials published a malicious Trivy 0.69.4 release, redirected mutable version tags for affected trivy-action releases to malicious commits, and replaced affected setup-trivy tags. The malicious artifacts embedded credential-harvesting functionality that executed in affected CI/CD environments. The compromise followed non-atomic credential rotation after an earlier incident, permitting retained access through credentials exposed during the rotation window.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (5 hidden).
This 24-file Python/Docker lab simulates a chained supply-chain and SSRF compromise against a LiteLLM-style AI gateway. The primary operator entry point is `exploit/exploit.py`, an async `httpx` multi-phase exploit supporting reconnaissance, OOB SSRF confirmation, internal scanning, internal-vault theft, IMDS credential retrieval, provider-key leakage, supply-chain beacon retrieval, and JSON loot reporting. The gateway (`gateway/app.py`) imports a locally installed trojanized package and exposes unvalidated `api_base` and `target` URL sinks. It forwards requests with real provider credentials and returns upstream response bodies, enabling credential leakage and read SSRF. The malicious dependency executes at import time, collects secret-like environment variables plus common credential files, and sends an encoded beacon to the collector in a background thread. Docker Compose builds an isolated lab with a loopback-published gateway and collector, plus non-published internal admin, IMDS, and provider-mock services on `labnet`. All embedded credentials are explicitly fake lab values, and the dependency includes lab-only egress restrictions; nevertheless, the gateway SSRF itself is deliberately unrestricted and could access real local/cloud resources if deployed unsafely.
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110 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Aqua Security Trivy supply-chain vulnerability involving embedded malicious code and an authentication bypass.
A supply-chain ecosystem flaw involving poisoned Trivy releases and LiteLLM build pipelines, enabling theft of cloud keys, SSH keys, Kubernetes tokens, database passwords, and AI-provider credentials from organizations that installed affected packages.
A supply-chain compromise affecting Trivy and related GitHub Actions components, where attackers used compromised credentials to publish malicious releases and tamper with version tags, enabling downstream credential theft and further compromises including LiteLLM.
A supply-chain compromise affecting Trivy components and malicious BerriAI LiteLLM releases 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI, enabling credential theft from installed environments.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.