Forge (node-forge) versions prior to 1.4.0 fail to enforce Ed25519 scalar canonicality during signature verification. The Ed25519 verification implementation accepts signatures whose S scalar is greater than or equal to the group order L, contrary to RFC 8032. Consequently, a valid signature can be transformed into a distinct non-canonical representation by adding L to S, and both representations verify successfully. This creates Ed25519 signature malleability in applications using Forge verification.
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What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Forge authentication bypass vulnerability via forged Ed25519 signatures.
An authentication bypass vulnerability in Forge via forged Ed25519 cryptographic signatures.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.