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Critical

OpenSSL CMS AuthEnvelopedData Processing May Accept Forged Messages

IdentifiersCVE-2026-34182CWE-20

CVE-2026-34182 is a flaw in OpenSSL's Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) handling for AuthEnvelopedData containers. The vulnerable code fails to sufficiently validate attacker-controlled cipher selection and authentication tag length fields during CMS_decrypt() processing. Two abuse paths are described in the provided content. First, OpenSSL may accept an AuthEnvelopedData object that specifies a non-AEAD cipher where an authenticated cipher is expected; an attacker can replay a legitimate recipientInfos structure so the victim unwraps the genuine content-encryption key (CEK), while rewriting the inner algorithm identifier to AES-256-OFB and supplying attacker-chosen IV and ciphertext. In that case OpenSSL decrypts under the real CEK, does not meaningfully enforce the MAC for the modified message, and returns success. Second, OpenSSL accepts an attacker-reduced AEAD tag length, including a one-byte tag, instead of enforcing the expected minimum/range for the selected algorithm. This allows brute-force forgery of the integrity check for CMS content. The issue affects OpenSSL 4.0.0 before 4.0.1, 3.6.0 before 3.6.3, 3.5.0 before 3.5.7, 3.4.0 before 3.4.6, and 3.0.0 before 3.0.21. The provided content states the FIPS modules are not affected.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation can cause OpenSSL to accept forged or modified CMS AuthEnvelopedData messages as valid, resulting in loss of message integrity and unauthorized acceptance of tampered content. In the reduced-tag-length case, an attacker can lower the authentication tag to one byte and brute-force acceptance with approximately 1/256 probability per attempt, bypassing integrity validation for applications that trust CMS_decrypt() to reject altered messages. In the cipher-substitution case, if the target application exposes any success/failure signal from decryption, the attacker may obtain key-equivalent functionality for the CEK associated with a chosen recipient, enabling decryption-oracle style abuse against that recipient's CMS traffic.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

No complete workaround is provided in the supplied content. Until patches are applied, reduce exposure by preventing untrusted parties from submitting CMS AuthEnvelopedData objects, avoiding application behaviors that reveal decryption success or failure, and limiting use of vulnerable non-FIPS OpenSSL CMS processing paths. Where operationally appropriate, use validated/FIPS module configurations, as the provided content states the FIPS modules are not affected.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade OpenSSL to a fixed release: 4.0.1 or later, 3.6.3 or later, 3.5.7 or later, 3.4.6 or later, or 3.0.21 or later, as applicable to the deployed branch. Downstream consumers should also apply vendor-packaged updates from their operating system or distribution. Prioritize systems and applications that process untrusted CMS/AuthEnvelopedData input.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

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VendorProductType
FreebsdFreebsdapplication
OpenSSL Software FoundationOpensslapplication

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