CVE-2026-35194 is a code injection vulnerability in Apache Flink’s SQL code generation pipeline affecting Apache Flink 1.15.0 through 1.20.x and 2.0.0 through 2.x before the fixed releases 1.20.4, 2.0.2, 2.1.2, and 2.2.1. The flaw occurs because user-controlled strings from SQL queries are interpolated into generated Java code without proper escaping. This allows an attacker to break out of intended string literals and inject arbitrary Java expressions during Flink’s SQL-to-Java code generation process. The issue specifically affects JSON functions starting in 1.15.0 and LIKE expressions with ESCAPE clauses starting in 1.17.0. An authenticated user with query submission privileges can exploit the vulnerability by submitting a maliciously crafted SQL query, resulting in arbitrary code execution on TaskManager nodes.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-35194, described as an Apache Flink SQL code injection leading to remote code execution on TaskManager nodes. The repo contains three files: a README with usage and lab instructions, a docker-compose lab that deploys Flink 1.20.3 with the SQL Gateway exposed, and a Python exploit script as the main entry point. The exploit script uses the requests library to interact directly with the Flink SQL Gateway REST API. Its workflow is: check target version via /v1/info, create a SQL session via /v1/sessions, submit a crafted SQL statement to /v1/sessions/{session}/statements, and poll /operations/{operation}/status until completion. The script supports both HTTP and HTTPS, optional client certificate/key authentication for mTLS environments, a check-only mode, and two exploit vectors named 'json' and 'like'. Although the middle of the file is truncated in the provided content, the visible logic and README clearly indicate that the exploit is intended to inject attacker-controlled content into SQL code generation paths and execute arbitrary shell commands on TaskManager hosts. Operationally, this is more than a detector: it accepts an arbitrary command from the operator, with a default payload that writes command output to /tmp/CVE-2026-35194-pwned. The README also demonstrates a reverse shell payload using bash over TCP/4444. The included docker-compose.yml provisions a vulnerable two-node Flink lab (jobmanager and taskmanager) and explicitly exposes port 8083 as the attack surface, making the repository suitable for local reproduction and validation of the exploit.
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A critical remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Flink’s SQL code-generation engine caused by improper sanitization of user-supplied input embedded into dynamically generated Java code.
A code injection vulnerability in Apache Flink SQL code generation that allows authenticated users with query submission privileges to execute arbitrary code on TaskManagers via crafted SQL queries.
A critical remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Flink caused by code injection in SQL code generation. Authenticated users with query submission privileges can execute arbitrary code on TaskManagers via crafted SQL queries affecting JSON functions and LIKE expressions with ESCAPE clauses.
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