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HighPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2026-3854: Remote Code Execution via Git Push Metadata Injection in GitHub Enterprise Server

Published Mar 10, 2026 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
CVSS8.7High · v4
EPSS41.9%99th percentile
CISA KEVNoNot listed
In the wildNonePublic exploit, no exploitation reported
Vendor
GitHub
IdentifiersCVE-2026-3854CWE-74

CVE-2026-3854 is a remote code execution vulnerability in GitHub Enterprise Server's server-side Git push pipeline. Client-controlled push option values were embedded into semicolon-delimited internal X-Stat metadata without adequate sanitization. An authenticated attacker with repository push access could inject additional fields, with last-write-wins parsing allowing attacker-controlled values to override trusted execution settings. Downstream hook processing trusted these settings, enabling manipulation of the execution environment and hook resolution to bypass sandboxing and execute arbitrary commands as the git service user. The underlying vulnerability also affected GitHub-hosted services, which were patched centrally.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation permits arbitrary command execution outside the normal hook sandbox as the git service user, not directly as root. This account can access repository data, internal configuration, and service secrets, potentially allowing repository disclosure or modification beyond the attacker's authorized repository and broader compromise of the affected Enterprise Server instance. On shared GitHub-hosted infrastructure, the vulnerability created potential cross-tenant repository exposure. GitHub stated that its investigation found no evidence of malicious exploitation beyond researcher testing.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Review audit logs for Git push operations with semicolons in push option values, correlating matches with the initiating account, repository, source address, and timestamp. A semicolon alone is not proof of exploitation. Investigate associated unusual process execution, filesystem access, and repository activity. If exploitation is suspected, preserve relevant logs and system state, initiate incident response, and rotate potentially exposed credentials and internal secrets. These detection and response measures do not replace upgrading.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade GitHub Enterprise Server to a fixed release: 3.14.25, 3.15.20, 3.16.16, 3.17.13, 3.18.7, 3.19.4, or a later patched release in the applicable branch; version 3.20.0 also includes the fix. GitHub-hosted services were patched centrally and require no customer patch deployment. The underlying correction sanitizes user-controlled push options before incorporating them into internal metadata.

Public exploits

Exploits

2 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis. Hidden: 7 rejected by Mallory's analysis as not a working exploit.

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CVE-2026-3854-labThis repository is not a standalone offensive exploit against a third-party product; it is an intentionally vulnerable educational lab that reconstructs the concepts behind CVE-2026-3854 using a downstream-modified Forgejo build called ForgeDock. The repo packages a complete local environment with Docker Compose, a FastAPI portal, an isolated pre-receive runner, a disposable web terminal, Redis-backed tracing, and a vendored Forgejo tree containing the vulnerable Go processor. Core exploit capability: authenticated users can abuse Git push options to influence downstream repository-event processing. Documentation and tests describe the vulnerable chain clearly: ForgeDock serializes trusted receive state and raw push-option text into a semicolon-delimited envelope; the parser then splits on semicolons, accepts duplicate protected keys, and applies last-write-wins semantics. This lets attacker-controlled push-option text override protected fields such as pipeline_mode, runtime_mode, custom_hooks_enabled, hook_root, and hook_manifest. The final stage resolves a hook path and dispatches it to the internal executor, enabling constrained backend code execution of lab-owned tools. Repository structure: (1) root docs explain architecture, threat model, curriculum, and deployment; (2) docker-compose.yml orchestrates lab-init, forgejo, forgejo-bootstrap, portal, web-terminal, hook-executor, and redis; (3) services/portal contains the FastAPI web UI for Learning Lab and Research Lab, including challenge definitions and trace-driven progression; (4) services/pre_receive_runner contains the executor API that authenticates requests and only runs exact allowlisted binaries under /opt/forgedock; (5) challenge/system-tools contains three shell scripts that echo a FLAG environment variable; (6) scripts/ contains environment initialization, smoke tests, provenance checks, and release hygiene tooling; (7) vendor/forgejo contains the pinned downstream Forgejo source with the vulnerable repositoryevents processor added. Main exploit flow by stage: Stage 1 uses a legitimate tag=<name> push option to create a server-side tag and recover a proof embedded in annotated tag metadata. Stage 2 injects a duplicate protected field to override pipeline_mode to diagnostic and recover a diagnostic proof from push output. Stage 3 injects multiple protected fields so the legacy custom-hook branch resolves to /opt/forgedock/system-tools/escape-hook, which the executor runs and returns a proof banner/flag. The executor is intentionally constrained: it requires a bearer token, rejects relative/out-of-root paths, forbids caller-supplied commands/environment, and only permits three exact executables. Notable files: services/pre_receive_runner/main.py implements the authenticated execution boundary; docker-compose.yml exposes the public/local services and internal executor URL; services/portal/main.py and curriculum.py define the user-facing exploit workflow; docs/architecture/push-option-processing.md and docs/learning/*.md document the vulnerable serialization/parsing chain; tests/integration/test_end_to_end.py demonstrates the full exploit sequence end-to-end. Overall, this is a real, operational lab environment for studying an authenticated push-option-to-RCE chain, not a fake exploit or mere detector.royaleybovich · Disclosed Aug 2, 2026 · python · shell · network · webOperationalCVE-2026-3854-PoCSmall 3-file repository containing a README, license, and a single Python script (exploi-git.py). The Python file is the sole code artifact and entry point. It is a self-contained educational proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-3854, modeling GitHub's vulnerable X-Stat header construction/parsing logic entirely in memory. The script defines baseline X-Stat fields, a vulnerable header builder that concatenates push options with semicolons, a parser that honors the last occurrence of duplicate keys, and a patched sanitizer that percent-encodes semicolons. It then runs three demos: (1) basic injection overriding rails_env from production to staging, (2) a conceptual multi-step RCE chain that changes rails_env, custom_hooks_dir, repo_pre_receive_hooks, and enterprise_mode to show how unsandboxed hook execution could occur, and (3) patched behavior showing the injection is neutralized. It also prints a conceptual git push command and external references. No live exploitation occurs: there are no network connections, no subprocess execution, and no file writes. The exploit capability is therefore demonstrative rather than operational, but it clearly documents the attack path and the critical fields/paths involved.lysophavin18 · Disclosed Apr 29, 2026 · python · markdown · network · webPoC
Exposure surface

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
GitHubEnterprise Serverapplication
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2026-3854 exploited in the wild?
As of Nov 19, 2026, Mallory has no reports of CVE-2026-3854 being exploited in the wild. It is not listed in CISA KEV.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2026-3854?
Yes. Mallory tracks 2 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2026-3854, the earliest disclosed Apr 29, 2026.
Is there a patch for CVE-2026-3854?
Upgrade GitHub Enterprise Server to a fixed release: 3.14.25, 3.15.20, 3.16.16, 3.17.13, 3.18.7, 3.19.4, or a later patched release in the applicable branch; version 3.20.0 also includes the fix. GitHub-hosted services were patched centrally and require no customer patch deployment.
What products are affected by CVE-2026-3854?
GitHub Enterprise Server.
How severe is CVE-2026-3854?
CVE-2026-3854 has a CVSS v4 score of 8.7 (High) and an EPSS score of 41.9% (99th percentile) as of Nov 19, 2026.
Activity feed

Recent activity

261 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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malware newsNews · Oct 6, 2026CVE-2026-3854: How Git Push Options Became an Internal Metadata Injection Primitive - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsA high-severity remote code execution vulnerability in GitHub’s server-side Git push pipeline, rated CVSS 4.0 8.7. Unescaped semicolons in client-controlled push options allowed injection into the internal X-Stat metadata. Last-write-wins parsing permitted overrides of security-sensitive hook configuration, enabling execution outside the normal sandbox as the git service user. Exploitation required repository push access but no administrator privileges or victim interaction. Potential impact included access to repositories, configuration, and secrets beyond the authorized repository. The content also reports that GitHub.com was affected, creating cross-tenant risk. Minimum patched GHES releases are 3.14.25, 3.15.20, 3.16.16, 3.17.13, 3.18.7, 3.19.4, and 3.20.0. Recommended actions include upgrading, reviewing /var/log/github-audit.log for semicolons in push options, investigating correlated activity, preserving evidence, and rotating potentially exposed secrets.Read more ↗seqriteNews · Oct 6, 2026CVE-2026-3854: How Git Push Options Became an Internal Metadata Injection Primitive | SeqriteA high-severity remote code execution vulnerability in GitHub’s server-side Git push pipeline, rated CVSS 4.0 8.7. Semicolons in client-controlled push options allowed injection into trusted X-Stat metadata. Last-write-wins parsing enabled attackers to override hook-execution settings, bypass the normal sandbox, and execute commands as the git service user. Exploitation required repository push access but not administrator privileges or victim interaction. Potential impact included access to other repositories, configuration files, and secrets; the same underlying issue reportedly affected GitHub.com, creating cross-tenant risk. Minimum patched GHES builds are 3.14.25, 3.15.20, 3.16.16, 3.17.13, 3.18.7, 3.19.4, and 3.20.0. Administrators are advised to upgrade and review historical push options containing semicolons in /var/log/github-audit.log. The content describes researcher validation, not confirmed malicious exploitation in the wild.Read more ↗cyberaccord blogNews · Sep 14, 2026GitHub Pays $100,000 Bounty for Critical RCE Flaw in Git Push Pipeline - Cyber AccordA critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in GitHub's backend Git push processing workflow, reportedly caused by unsafe processing of attacker-controlled repository data and URLs. Successful exploitation could provide shell-level access in an affected server context and endanger repository integrity, source-code confidentiality, credentials, and the software supply chain.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Sep 14, 2026GitHub Pays $100,000 Bounty for Critical RCE Flaw in Git Push PipelineA critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in GitHub's Git push/repository URL processing pipeline. Crafted repository input could reach backend components without safe sanitization, potentially allowing shell-level command execution on affected GitHub infrastructure and risking repository integrity, source-code confidentiality, secrets, credentials, and software supply-chain security.Read more ↗
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Threat actor evidenceEvery report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malwareMalware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity185Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.