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U-Boot versions before 2026.04 contain a FIT signature-verification flaw in which the hashed-nodes property is omitted from the protected hash. Because the verifier does not cryptographically bind the complete node-path information used to define the signed FIT content, a crafted FIT image can pass signature verification despite containing content or structure that should have caused rejection.
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What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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Patch, then assume compromise.
No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A U-Boot FIT-image verification bypass that could cause an improperly validated signed boot image to be accepted.
A U-Boot FIT-related coverage flaw where hashed-nodes metadata was insufficiently protected and failed to bind full paths.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.