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LiteLLM Host Header Authentication Bypass
CVE-2026-49468 is an authentication-bypass vulnerability in LiteLLM versions before 1.84.0. The LiteLLM proxy authentication layer determines the effective route in get_request_route() from request.url.path. Because Starlette reconstructs this path using the HTTP Host header, a crafted Host header can cause authentication checks to evaluate a route different from the route FastAPI dispatches. Under affected deployment conditions, this route confusion permits unauthenticated access to protected management routes.
What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
An unauthenticated attacker may bypass LiteLLM proxy authentication and access protected management routes. The exposure applies to vulnerable deployments where upstream infrastructure does not validate or normalize the Host header before forwarding requests.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Until an upgrade can be deployed, place the LiteLLM proxy behind a trusted upstream component that strictly validates or normalizes Host headers, such as a CDN or WAF, a reverse proxy with explicit server-name allowlists, or a load balancer enforcing host-based routing. Restrict network access to the LiteLLM proxy listener.
Patch, then assume compromise.
Upgrade LiteLLM to version 1.84.0 or later. The fixed release does not require a configuration change.
2 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.