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CVE-2026-54390 is a critical server-side template injection (SSTI) vulnerability in JTL Shop versions 5.2.0 through 5.7.1. The flaw is caused by unsanitized user-supplied input being passed to the Smarty template engine, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to inject and evaluate malicious template syntax on the server. Successful exploitation can disclose sensitive server-side data, including database credentials and encryption keys. In JTL Shop versions 5.4.0 through 5.7.1, the impact is more severe because attackers can abuse registered Smarty modifiers, including unserialize and file_get_contents, to write a webshell into the web root and achieve arbitrary command execution as the web server user.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone Python exploit/scan tool for CVE-2026-54390 affecting JTL Shop. The repo contains four files: a README with vulnerability background and usage instructions, a single main Python script (cve_2026_54390.py), requirements.txt, and .gitignore. The Python script is the operational core and appears intended for both single-target and mass-target assessment. Main capabilities visible from the code and README: (1) detect whether a host is likely running JTL Shop by requesting the homepage and checking for JTL markers, version strings, static asset paths, and JTL-specific files; (2) attempt both HTTPS and HTTP; (3) probe common contact form paths such as /Kontakt, /kontakt, /contact, and /Kontaktformular; (4) optionally submit a Smarty SSTI payload through the contact form using attacker-controlled fields; and (5) support bulk scanning with threading and optional output file handling. The exploit path described is pre-auth web exploitation: user-supplied contact form fields are inserted into an email subject and then rendered as a Smarty template via fetch('string:' . $subject). The payloads shown include a simple arithmetic probe ({7*7}), local file read using file_get_contents on /etc/passwd, and an OOB callback payload using file_get_contents against an attacker-controlled URL. The README claims full RCE is possible on newer vulnerable branches via gadget abuse/unserialize, but the visible script excerpt mainly automates reconnaissance and SSTI probe submission rather than delivering a complete interactive RCE chain. Operationally, this is best classified as an exploit-oriented scanner with exploitation support. It is not just a detector because it includes explicit exploit payloads and a code path to submit them. However, based on the visible content, the payloading is fairly basic and hardcoded, so OPERATIONAL is the best maturity fit rather than WEAPONIZED.
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