CVE-2026-59827 is a critical unsafe deserialization vulnerability in Metabase affecting instances configured with an H2 database connection, including deployments using the default sample database. In affected versions, Metabase deserializes arbitrary Java objects returned in native H2 query result columns of type OTHER without validating the object type or trust boundary. An authenticated user with permission to run native H2 queries can craft query results that cause Metabase to deserialize attacker-controlled serialized Java objects on the server, resulting in arbitrary code execution in the Metabase server process. Reported affected versions include 1.58.0 through before 1.58.15, 1.59.0 through before 1.59.12, 1.60.0 through before 1.60.6.3, and 1.61.0 through before 1.61.1.4.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
Repository is a small standalone Python proof-of-concept repository with 3 files: a single executable script (CVE-2026-59827.py), README, and Apache 2.0 license. The Python script is the clear entry point and implements an 'AuthorizedMetabaseTester' class around requests.Session plus argparse-driven CLI handling. Primary purpose: validate the presence of the claimed Metabase vulnerability CVE-2026-59827 by sending crafted SQL expressions to the Metabase dataset API. The visible exploitation path is a POST request to the target's /api/dataset endpoint with JSON containing database=1, type='native', and native.query='SELECT <payload>'. The script then inspects only coarse response characteristics such as HTTP status, response length, and whether the response contains the word 'error'. Capabilities advertised by the code and README include demonstration modes for version disclosure, database type detection, current-user enumeration, schema disclosure, and harmless SQL execution validation. It also performs local audit logging for each action to pentest_log_<id>.json and generates a summary report after execution. The code includes interactive authorization prompts and optional auth-token input, but these are local operator-side safeguards rather than technical controls on the target. This is not a framework module and not merely a detector: it actively sends exploit-like SQL payloads to a live web API, though it is positioned as a constrained proof-of-concept rather than a destructive post-exploitation tool. No persistence, shell payload, privilege escalation, or lateral movement functionality is evident from the provided content.
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12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Critical insecure deserialization vulnerability in Metabase affecting instances connected to an H2 database, allowing arbitrary Java object deserialization from native query results and potentially arbitrary code execution by an authenticated attacker with basic privileges to run native H2 queries.
A critical authenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Metabase's H2 database handling caused by unsafe deserialization of serialized Java objects returned from native H2 queries.
A critical unsafe deserialization vulnerability in Metabase's handling of H2 query results that can allow authenticated remote code execution on the Metabase server.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.