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CVE-2026-6664 is an integer overflow vulnerability in PgBouncer's network packet parsing logic within the SCRAM authentication code path affecting versions prior to 1.25.2. A malformed SCRAM authentication packet can trigger an integer overflow that bypasses an intended boundary check during packet processing, leading PgBouncer to mishandle attacker-controlled input and terminate unexpectedly. The issue is reachable remotely before authentication and does not require user interaction.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a self-contained proof-of-concept lab for CVE-2026-6664, a denial-of-service vulnerability in PgBouncer caused by an integer overflow during SCRAM-SHA-256 SASLInitialResponse parsing. The main exploit is poc.py, a Python script that speaks the PostgreSQL wire protocol directly: it connects to a target PgBouncer instance, sends a startup packet, waits for an AuthenticationSASL response, and then transmits a malformed 'p' (SASLInitialResponse) message with a claimed length of 0xFFFFFFFF. According to the embedded comments, this bypasses a 32-bit bounds check in mbuf_get_bytes(), then causes a second integer overflow in an allocation size calculation, leading to memcpy of nearly 4 GB from a 4-byte source buffer and crashing PgBouncer with SIGSEGV. After sending the payload, the script checks whether the connection resets and whether the service becomes unreachable, confirming the crash. Repository structure is small and purpose-built: README.md documents the vulnerability, expected behavior, and usage; docker-compose.yml orchestrates a local lab with PostgreSQL, a vulnerable PgBouncer instance, and a one-shot PoC runner; pgbouncer/Dockerfile builds PgBouncer 1.25.1 from source; pgbouncer/pgbouncer.ini configures PgBouncer to listen on 0.0.0.0:5432 with auth_type=scram-sha-256 and a backend database mapping to the postgres service; pgbouncer/gen_userlist.py deterministically generates a SCRAM verifier for testuser/testpassword; pgbouncer/entrypoint.sh writes userlist.txt and launches PgBouncer; and postgres/init.sql creates the backend test user. The exploit is network-based, unauthenticated beyond reaching the SCRAM negotiation path, and intended to demonstrate service crash rather than code execution.
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An integer overflow vulnerability in PgBouncer network packet parsing that is remotely exploitable over the network and can cause high availability impact (denial of service).
An integer overflow in PgBouncer network packet parsing within the SCRAM authentication path that can allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to crash PgBouncer.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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