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CVE-2026-76071 is a stack-based buffer overflow in Netis NC63 firmware through version V3.0.0.3327. The CGI web-management handler processes an oversized destHost parameter supplied to the ipFilterList modification action using widthless sscanf conversions into fixed-size stack buffers. The overflow occurs before authentication is verified, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to overwrite saved stack state and obtain code execution. The affected Boa-hosted CGI environment runs with root privileges.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a research and PoC package for CVE-2026-76071 affecting the Netis NC63 router firmware V3.0.0.3327. The core issue is an unauthenticated pre-auth stack buffer overflow in /bin/netis.cgi, specifically the skk_set.cgi handler path for ipFilterList where destHost (and statically also srcHost) is parsed by sscanf("%d,%[^,],%[^,]") into two 16-byte stack buffers without width limits. The repository is not part of a larger exploit framework. Repository structure is centered around one executable PoC and extensive supporting evidence. The main exploit file is poc/poc.py, a Python script that builds a URL-encoded POST body and optionally sends it to /cgi-bin/skk_set.cgi. By default it only prints the body; with --send and --target it transmits the request. The crafted payload sets ipFilterList=mod and destHost=1,0.0.0.0,<oversized component>, using a default 115-byte ASCII B pattern. The script explicitly avoids weaponized payloads and is intended to demonstrate crash/memory-corruption conditions only. The rest of the repository documents reverse engineering and validation: README.md explains the vulnerability, attack path, and impact; attachments/decompiled-functions/ contains normalized pseudocode and stack-layout excerpts for FUN_0040f7f4; evidence/static/ and evidence/traces/ provide route mapping, metadata, authentication-boundary observations, binary protection notes, and QEMU trace excerpts showing saved return-address overwrite and controlled program counter. Evidence also states that in a guarded lab environment attacker-controlled request data was observed reaching system() as the exact a0 argument, but the public package withholds the control-transfer details needed for practical RCE. Main exploit capability: trigger a remotely reachable, unauthenticated web-management stack overflow via crafted POST data. Publicly exposed capability is denial-of-service/crash and proof-of-control of memory corruption. Documented but withheld capability is command execution in the router-management/root CGI context. Fingerprintable targets include the CGI endpoint /cgi-bin/skk_set.cgi, affected binary /bin/netis.cgi, metadata library /lib/libapmib.so, auth marker /tmp/boa_auth, and related parameter names ipFilterList, destHost, and srcHost.
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6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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