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APT Chimera is a possible China-sponsored threat actor that CyCraft observed targeting Taiwan’s semiconductor industry in a year-long campaign in 2019. CyCraft also reported that April 2020 intrusions against multiple Taiwan government agencies used techniques similar to APT Chimera, but stated that available evidence did not support direct attribution. Known alias in the provided content: Chimera. Observed tradecraft in the provided content includes extensive host and network discovery and post-compromise reconnaissance. Chimera used fsutil fsinfo drives, systeminfo, and vssadmin list shadows to gather system and drive information; ipconfig, ping, and tracert to enumerate local network configuration and environment; tasklist to enumerate processes; quser to identify logged-on users; and net user /dom plus net user Administrator to enumerate domain and administrator accounts. Chimera queried Registry keys including HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers and HKU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings. It also used multiple commands to identify data of interest in file and directory listings and used the path pattern \c$\Users\\Favorites\Links\Bookmarks bar\Imported From IEcitrix* for bookmark discovery. For execution and lateral activity, Chimera used the Windows Command Shell and batch scripts, PowerShell scripts to execute malicious payloads, the DSInternals PowerShell module to use Active Directory features, and WMIC to execute remote commands. It obtained and used tools including BloodHound, Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, and PsExec. For collection and staging, Chimera used custom DLLs for continuous retrieval of data from memory, staged stolen data locally on compromised hosts, and also staged stolen data on designated servers in the target environment. For command and control, Chimera used HTTPS. For defense evasion and anti-forensics, Chimera used a Windows version of the Linux touch command to modify DLL timestamps and performed file deletion to evade detection.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
51 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
8 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 additional families tracked in Mallory.
8 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 8 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
3 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
45 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection analytic.
Referenced as a threat actor associated with the Network Share Discovery technique (T1135).
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.