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Blue Mockingbird is a threat actor associated in the provided content with cryptocurrency mining activity, specifically deployment of XMRIG packaged as a DLL. The content describes the actor using multiple persistence mechanisms, including Windows Scheduled Tasks, modifying existing services, creating new Windows services, and abuse of the .NET COR_PROFILER feature to force .NET processes to load a malicious unmanaged DLL. Red Canary reported Blue Mockingbird used machine-scope COR_PROFILER environment variables, added via wmic.exe, so that .NET processes such as PowerShell and mmc.exe would load the malicious profiler DLL; the loaded DLL could then establish additional persistence such as services and scheduled tasks. The actor is also described as making XMRIG payloads persistent as a Windows service and using Windows Registry modifications to specify a DLL payload. Additional behaviors directly mentioned in the content include use of batch scripts to automate payload deployment and execution, PowerShell reverse TCP shells for interactive command execution, collection of victim hardware details including CPU and memory information, use of Mimikatz, obfuscation of the wallet address in the payload binary, and masquerading the XMRIG payload as wercplsupporte.dll to resemble the legitimate wercplsupport.dll. The content also states Blue Mockingbird used Remote Desktop to log on to servers interactively and manually copy files to remote hosts. The only alias directly provided in the content is "blue_mockingbird".
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42 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
11 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
6 additional families tracked in Mallory.
10 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 10 of them exploited in the wild.
Blue Mockingbird has gained initial access by exploiting CVE-2019-18935, a vulnerability within Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
5 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
6 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for exploitation of the public-facing PTC Windchill vulnerability CVE-2026-4681.
Listed as an associated threat actor for exploitation activity related to abuse of the Windows Cloud Files API / cldapi.dll detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with exploitation for privilege escalation and Windows service persistence/installation in the detection annotations.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.