Loading threat actor…
ToddyCat is a China-linked advanced persistent threat group focused primarily on cyberespionage. Also known as Storm-0247 and Websiic, it has targeted organizations in Asia and Europe since at least 2020, including Malaysian government entities. The group has conducted long-term post-compromise operations using custom remote-access tools, HTTPS command and control, data collection, archive staging, and cloud-service-based exfiltration. ToddyCat has used exploitation of public-facing servers and malicious loaders for initial access, followed by remote service creation, scheduled tasks, SMB-based tool transfer, PsExec-style remote execution, and remote task creation for lateral movement. It has established persistence through malicious services, scheduled tasks, and DLL side-loading, and has performed security-software discovery and host reconnaissance to adapt activity and evade defenses. A prominent ToddyCat capability is Umbrij and its Shadow Token via Remote Debug technique. Umbrij abuses authenticated Chromium browser sessions, browser remote debugging, and OAuth authorization flows to covertly obtain authorization artifacts for Google Workspace accounts. Attackers then exchange those artifacts for OAuth tokens, enabling durable access to Gmail and other Google Workspace resources without retaining access to the endpoint and, depending on tenant configuration, potentially surviving password resets. ToddyCat has also used browser-profile copying, headless browser automation, user-token impersonation, and masquerading to execute this activity covertly.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
53 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
23 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
18 additional families tracked in Mallory.
15 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 15 of them exploited in the wild.
APT41 leveraged vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon exploitation... APT41 exploited CVE-2021-26855 against a vulnerable Microsoft Exchange Server... Threat Group-3390 ... exploited ... CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 in Exchange Server. ToddyCat has exploited the ProxyLogon vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855)...
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Previously, Eset reported that about five APT groups has been exploiting the four Exchange vulnerabilities - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065
Previously, Eset reported that about five APT groups has been exploiting the four Exchange vulnerabilities - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065
Previously, Eset reported that about five APT groups has been exploiting the four Exchange vulnerabilities - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065
10 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
63 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Previously abused ESET software for DLL side-loading by exploiting a search-order flaw in ESET's command-line scanner.
Listed in the detection's Annotations section.
Mentioned as another prior example of SoftEther VPN installation in attacks.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.