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Malware2 associated actors

Umbrij

Tracked since Jun 30, 2026 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs7Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionSession hijackingPost exploitationDLL sideloading
Delivery
Landing pagePhishingSpearphishingMalspamClickfixWatering holeSeo poisoningMalvertisingUSBSmishingVishingAitmLureFake updateCracked softwareCloakingExploit kitDrive by
Platforms
Windows

Umbrij is a Windows malware tool associated with the ToddyCat threat actor and used to obtain covert, durable access to Google Workspace resources by abusing OAuth 2.0 authorization from an already authenticated Chromium-based browser session. It has been used against corporate Gmail and related Google services, enabling access to email and other Workspace data through the Google API without requiring the victim’s password once authorization is completed.

Umbrij operates after an initial compromise of the victim system. It enumerates installed Chrome and Edge profiles, identifies profiles associated with signed-in Google accounts, copies browser profile data, and launches a hidden headless browser instance with remote debugging enabled. Using the DevTools protocol and Puppeteer automation, it drives a legitimate Google OAuth consent flow while impersonating trusted Google Workspace migration or synchronization applications, selects the victim’s existing signed-in account, and programmatically approves the requested permissions. It then extracts the resulting OAuth authorization code and sends or stores it for operator retrieval, after which the attackers exchange it on their own infrastructure for an access token.

This technique, referred to as Shadow Token via Remote Debug, is designed to evade protections tied to cookie theft and anomalous device detection because the authorization occurs on the victim’s actual device using the victim’s live browser session. The resulting access can persist beyond removal of the malware and may survive password resets depending on tenant configuration and token revocation practices. Observed Umbrij variants are implemented as obfuscated .NET DLLs and have been executed via DLL sideloading through legitimate signed binaries. The malware has also been observed duplicating the user context of explorer.exe to run with the victim’s privileges. Its primary purpose is stealthy post-compromise access to cloud-hosted communications and other Google Workspace resources.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ToddyCat

The ToddyCat hackers developed a malicious tool called Umbrij to facilitate a two-step covert authorization process when the user is already authenticated in Google.

via kaspersky blogkaspersky.com
APT ToddyCat

Чтобы получить этот токен, злоумышленники создали инструмент Umbrij и с его помощью подключались к консоли управления браузером в скрытом режиме (headless) через отладочный порт. Посредством нескольких запросов они получали код авторизации OAuth, который впоследствии обменивали на токен для доступа к целевым ресурсам через API.

via securelist rusecurelist.ru
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Это возможно, например, если злоумышленники сначала получили привилегированные учетные данные администратора организации, а затем с их помощью установили вредоносное ПО на нужные машины дистанционно.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

В прошлом для заражения организации APT ToddyCat эксплуатировала известные уязвимости в серверном ПО...

T1566PhishingEvidence1

...а также рассылала зловредные загрузчики через мессенджеры.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

A scheduled task impersonating its software ("KasperskyEndpointSecurityEDRAvp") was used to launch a digitally signed file.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

a scheduled task, KasperskyEndpointSecurityEDRAvp, was running on a user host... the attackers were attempting to masquerade their malicious activity as a legitimate process.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

It then launches an instance of the browser, specifying the path to the duplicated profile via the command line.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2

Use JavaScript to emulate mouse click events to select the appropriate Google account after navigating to the URL and grant it the necessary permissions.

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

The signed file then used the DLL sideloading technique to load the malicious tool.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

A scheduled task impersonating its software ("KasperskyEndpointSecurityEDRAvp") was used to launch a digitally signed file.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

a scheduled task, KasperskyEndpointSecurityEDRAvp, was running on a user host... the attackers were attempting to masquerade their malicious activity as a legitimate process.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Это возможно, например, если злоумышленники сначала получили привилегированные учетные данные администратора организации, а затем с их помощью установили вредоносное ПО на нужные машины дистанционно.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

A scheduled task impersonating its software ("KasperskyEndpointSecurityEDRAvp") was used to launch a digitally signed file.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

a scheduled task, KasperskyEndpointSecurityEDRAvp, was running on a user host... the attackers were attempting to masquerade their malicious activity as a legitimate process.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Это возможно, например, если злоумышленники сначала получили привилегированные учетные данные администратора организации, а затем с их помощью установили вредоносное ПО на нужные машины дистанционно.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Retrieve the user context by searching for the "explorer.exe" process and duplicating the token of the first such process it encounters in order to retain all of that logged-in user's privileges.

T1134.003Make and Impersonate TokenEvidence2

It searches the system for the explorer.exe process and duplicates its token, retaining all of its privileges (T1134.003 Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate Token).

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Сам инструмент представляет собой DLL-библиотеку, написанную на .NET и обфусцированную с помощью ConfuserEx

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

...для корпоративного сервиса... дело выглядит так, как будто пользователь решил подключить к своему аккаунту стороннее приложение... В качестве кода приложения... указывается одно из двух легитимных приложений: Google Workspace Migration for Microsoft Outlook (GWMMO) или Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO).

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

After that, the malware can terminate its operations and even delete itself from the system.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Это возможно, например, если злоумышленники сначала получили привилегированные учетные данные администратора организации, а затем с их помощью установили вредоносное ПО на нужные машины дистанционно.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Retrieve the user context by searching for the "explorer.exe" process and duplicating the token of the first such process it encounters in order to retain all of that logged-in user's privileges.

T1134.003Make and Impersonate TokenEvidence2

It searches the system for the explorer.exe process and duplicates its token, retaining all of its privileges (T1134.003 Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate Token).

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

Окно браузера и интерфейс на экране вообще не появляются (режим headless), зато браузером можно управлять через отладочный порт...

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

The signed file then used the DLL sideloading technique to load the malicious tool.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence4

This technique allows the attackers to establish reliable, persistent access to a victim’s mailbox and other resources in Google Workspace.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

If the user hasn’t logged out of their Gmail account, the browser saves their login session, which is exploited by attackers.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence3

Copy the following files and folders of each target user profile into them: IndexedDB, Local Storage, Network, Login Data, Login Data For Account, Preferences, Secure Preferences, and Web Data.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.007Cloud ServicesEvidence2

Using this toolkit, attackers can access user accounts via an API, read conversations, and harvest data from calendars and other Google services while remaining undetected for extended periods of time.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

Construct the path to the web browser application folder within the user's local application data repository and then parse the Local State file corresponding to Chrome or Edge to gather information about stored browser user profiles.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

С его помощью группа автоматизировала все этапы атаки, что позволило ей оставаться незамеченной средствами мониторинга.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence4

Umbrij copies the entire user profile folder to a different directory on the machine. It then launches an instance of the browser, specifying the path to the duplicated profile via the command line. Because this duplicate profile contains the user’s session cookies, websites with saved credentials won’t prompt for re-authentication.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

Using this toolkit, attackers can access user accounts via an API, read conversations, and harvest data from calendars and other Google services

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Umbrij extracts and saves this code, subsequently forwarding it to the attackers’ command-and-control server.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

Crucially, the browser is launched in a dedicated debugging mode typically reserved for web development... the browser can be controlled through a debugging port using the DevTools protocol, allowing the malware to issue commands and read the state of the screen. To orchestrate these actions, Umbrij leverages Puppeteer, a legitimate automation library.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1567.001Exfiltration to Code RepositoryEvidence1

It also saves the retrieved authorization code to this log file, which the operator subsequently exfiltrates from the compromised host.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

The threat actors use that token to connect to the Gmail account through the API, thus compromising corporate email communications.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
kaspersky ruNews · Jul 17, 2026Кража почты через OAuth | Блог КасперскогоMalicious tool used by ToddyCat to abuse browser profiles and headless remote-debug mode to silently complete Google Workspace OAuth authorization flows, steal the resulting authorization code, and enable long-term mailbox access via OAuth tokens.Read more ↗kaspersky blogNews · Jul 17, 2026Email hijacking via OAuth | Kaspersky official blogA malicious tool used by ToddyCat to covertly obtain Google Workspace OAuth authorization codes by launching Chrome or Edge with a copied user profile in headless remote-debugging mode, automating consent via DevTools/Puppeteer, and enabling persistent mailbox access through stolen OAuth tokens.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Jul 2, 2026ToddyCat-Linked Umbrij Malware Abuses OAuth to Access Gmail via Google APIUmbrij is a .NET malware tool used by ToddyCat to compromise Gmail and broader Google account resources by abusing an active authenticated session in Chromium-based browsers. It launches Chrome or Edge in headless mode using copied user profile data, connects through a remote debugging port, obtains an OAuth authorization code, and enables operators to exchange it for an access token granting access to Gmail, Drive, Contacts, Calendar, and Tasks via Google APIs.Read more ↗securelist ruNews · Jun 30, 2026Как APT-группа ToddyCat получает доступ к почте Gmail | SecurelistИнструмент APT ToddyCat для компрометации Gmail/Google account access через Chromium remote debugging. Он копирует профиль браузера жертвы, запускает Chrome/Edge в headless-режиме с remote-debugging-port, автоматизирует OAuth consent flow через Google API, извлекает OAuth authorization code и тем самым получает доступ к корпоративной почте и другим ресурсам Google через API.Read more ↗
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IOC matching7Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.