Handala
Handala is an Iran-linked threat actor and hacktivist-branded persona assessed by the FBI, the U.S. Department of Justice, Recorded Future Insikt Group, and multiple commercial threat intelligence firms to be a front for Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). It is also linked in the provided reporting to Void Manticore and tracked under aliases including Banished Kitten, Dune, Homeland Justice, Red Sandstorm, Storm-0842, and Void Manticore. The content also describes Handala Hack Team as a Handala-branded persona and notes the self-referenced sub-brand Handala Popular Resistance Front (HPRF). The actor presents itself as an independent pro-Palestinian or hacktivist group, but the provided content consistently describes it as operating on behalf of Iranian state interests. Reporting states that MOIS has likely expanded the Handala brand beyond cyber operations to include influence, espionage, recruitment, and physical threat activity targeting U.S. and Israeli interests. Insikt Group links additional Handala-associated personas including HPRF, VIPEmployment, MOISIRAN, and Brave Israel to the broader MOIS-linked cluster. Targets mentioned in the content include Israeli leadership, government agencies, security institutions, police, technology companies, critical infrastructure, and nuclear-related entities; Iranian opposition groups in Albania through the Homeland Justice persona; U.S. government personnel and officials; and U.S. private-sector organizations including Stryker. The content also notes targeting of Albania’s government and parliamentary infrastructure, and claimed operations against county government infrastructure, FBI Director Kash Patel, U.S. Marine Corps personnel, Iran International, and senior Israeli officials. Observed and reported tactics in the content include hack-and-leak operations, destructive wiper attacks, psychologically oriented ransomware activity, data leaks, disinformation, recruitment of proxies via Telegram bots, surveillance claims, and solicitation of espionage and physical attacks for payment. Homeland Justice activity included long-term access before deployment of ransomware and disk-wiping malware, use of renamed ROADSWEEP and ZeroCleare binaries, modification and disabling of EDR components including Microsoft Defender Antivirus, and RDP for lateral movement. Handala-linked operations are described as using ransomware primarily to sow chaos rather than for extortion. A major operation directly attributed in the content is the March 11, 2026 attack on Stryker, a U.S. medical device manufacturer. In that incident, Handala allegedly penetrated Active Directory and abused Microsoft Intune through a compromised administrator account, created a new Global Administrator account, and issued remote wipe commands that erased thousands of devices and disrupted ordering, manufacturing, and shipping. The content states the attack was a significant wiper operation and that Handala claimed broader impact and data theft, though investigators reportedly found no evidence of exfiltration. The content also references Handala claims involving leaks of Israeli leaders’ personal data, Mossad agent identities, Israeli police databases, Soreq and Dimona nuclear facility data, and sensitive corporate information. The provided reporting further states that since late 2023 Handala has used pro-Palestinian symbolism and Axis of Resistance narratives as cover while preserving plausible deniability, and that since the beginning of the Iran war its claimed cyber operations against U.S. targets have surged. Insikt Group assesses that MOIS likely coordinates distinct cyber, influence, and physical personas under the Handala brand to amplify intimidation, recruitment, and psychological impact.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Government & Administration
- Software & Services
- Utilities
- Health Care Equipment & Services
- Military
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇮🇱 Israel
- 🇺🇸 United States
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- IR
Tradecraft
52 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
28 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
23 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
VOID MANTICORE has exploited public facing vulnerabilities within victim environments to include SharePoint CVE-2019-0604. For HomeLand Justice, threat actors exploited CVE-2019-0604 in Microsoft SharePoint for initial access.
One of the Hikvision vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-3626; command injection) grants an attacker full root access to control the device.
Observables
136 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Handala-branded cluster attributed in the content to Iran’s MOIS, used across cyber, influence, and physical-threat operations targeting US and Israeli interests. The group/persona ecosystem is described as amplifying solicitation for physical attacks, espionage, sabotage, and related operations under a single recognizable brand.
A Void Manticore/MOIS-linked persona focused on Iranian opposition targets, especially MEK-linked interests in Albania, and associated with cyberattacks and solicitation of physical threats.
Iran-nexus front persona linked to wiper attacks, hack-and-leak activity, and doxxing of employees and officials, with concern for disruptive operations during the 2026 FIFA World Cup.
Claimed responsibility for the destructive cyberattack on Stryker and is described as an MOIS-backed group masquerading as an independent hacktivist organization.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.