LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ is a financially motivated data extortion group, also tracked by Microsoft as DEV-0537 and referred to in reporting as Lapsus, Lapsus$, Slippy Spider, and Strawberry Tempest. Public reporting in the provided content also notes analytical overlap or comparison with Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters, and broader Com-affiliated activity, but only LAPSUS$ and DEV-0537 are directly identified as this actor. The group became prominent in late 2021 and 2022 for high-profile intrusions and extortion against major organizations including NVIDIA, Samsung, Microsoft, Okta, Mercado Libre, Vodafone, and Ubisoft. Its model is data theft and extortion rather than classic ransomware encryption: it steals source code, credentials, and other sensitive files, then threatens public release or leaks data directly. The content states LAPSUS$ uploaded sensitive files, information, and credentials from targeted organizations for extortion or public release. Microsoft describes LAPSUS$/DEV-0537 as primarily obtaining initial access through compromised credentials. Reported access methods include use of RedLine stealer to obtain passwords and session tokens, purchasing credentials and session tokens on underground forums, searching public repositories for exposed credentials, paying insiders at victim organizations or suppliers for credentials or MFA approval, compromising employees’ personal email accounts to facilitate password resets, SIM swapping, session replay, MFA fatigue, and phone-based social engineering including help-desk deception. The content also states LAPSUS$ popularized phone-based intrusion tactics during its 2021-2022 campaign. After access, the group has been reported using AD Explorer and RVTools, targeting collaboration and development platforms such as SharePoint, Confluence, JIRA, Slack, Microsoft Teams, GitLab, GitHub, and Azure DevOps, and in some cases exploiting Confluence, JIRA, and GitLab for privilege escalation. Microsoft reported that LAPSUS$ exfiltrated data over NordVPN connections, monitored incident response communications through compromised Slack or Teams channels, and sometimes performed destructive actions to trigger incident response. Victim-specific activity in the provided content includes: claims of stealing 1TB of data from NVIDIA and leaking archives containing source code, schematics, drivers, firmware, SDKs, Falcon-related information, and employee password hashes; leaking nearly 190GB of Samsung source code including TrustZone applets, biometric unlock algorithms, bootloader code, Samsung account authentication technology, activation server code, and some Qualcomm-related code; compromising a Microsoft employee account and stealing portions of source code related to Bing, Cortana, and Bing Maps; breaching Okta; claiming access to 24,000 Mercado Libre and Mercado Pago repositories; and claiming responsibility for Vodafone source code theft. Reporting also states LAPSUS$ later cooperated with TeamPCP in a joint sale of stolen GitHub repositories for $95,000. The content repeatedly describes LAPSUS$ as active on Telegram and Discord, where it publicly bragged about operations, ran extortion communications, and maintained a large subscriber base. Reporting in the provided material also notes multiple arrests and law-enforcement actions tied to alleged members, including UK arrests and charges in 2022. The content does not directly attribute LAPSUS$ to a nation state; instead it characterizes the group as a cybercriminal or extortion actor.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Software & Services
- Technology Hardware & Equipment
- Government & Administration
Tradecraft
46 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
15 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
10 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
9 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 9 of them exploited in the wild.
BleepingComputer reported that threat actors leveraged credentials stolen through the Trivy supply chain compromise (CVE-2026-33634) to breach Cisco's internal development environment... The CISA KEV remediation deadline for CVE-2026-33634 is today, April 8, 2026... Beyond patching Trivy to v0.69.2+, trivy-action to v0.35.0, or setup-trivy to v0.2.6, organizations must also complete credential rotation.
Researchers analyzed leaked scripts used by attackers to exploit CVE-2025-61882 on internet-facing Oracle EBS instances. The exploit uses a crafted request with a return_url to coerce the server into fetching an attacker payload (SSRF), retrieving a malicious XSL with embedded JavaScript executed via Java javax.script, leading to a reverse shell. Mandiant reports exploitation and data theft starting Aug 2025; CISA added it to KEV; Oracle provided fixes and IOCs.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
4 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
10 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Known for extortion campaigns and for popularizing phone-based social-engineering intrusions involving fake help-desk style tactics.
Presented as one of the names associated with the broader Com-linked cybercriminal ecosystem.
Extortion-focused cybercriminal group known for compromising major companies including Microsoft and Nvidia.
Referenced as cooperating with TeamPCP to sell stolen GitHub data following the GitHub supply-chain compromise.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.