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KongTuke is a financially motivated initial-access broker and malicious traffic-distribution-system operator active since at least 2024. Also tracked as Woodgnat, 404 TDS, Chaya_002, LandUpdate808, and TAG-124, it compromises legitimate websites—particularly WordPress sites—to profile and redirect visitors to malware-delivery chains. Its operations commonly use fake CAPTCHA, ClickFix, FileFix, CrashFix, fake software-update, and impersonation lures that coerce victims into executing pasted commands. KongTuke-linked activity selectively profiles hosts, including distinguishing domain-joined enterprise systems from standalone systems, and has targeted insurance, education, information-technology, professional-services, financial-services, government, and hospitality organizations. The actor has been associated with delivery or use of Python-based remote-access tooling including ModeloRAT and XorBee RAT, and with the Mistic/MLTBackdoor backdoor. Mistic supports in-memory payload execution, file operations, configurable command polling, extensible post-exploitation capability, and self-deletion. KongTuke activity has also used legitimate runtimes and Windows utilities, obfuscated PowerShell and command-line execution, anti-analysis checks, persistence mechanisms, DLL sideloading, and malicious browser extensions. The actor's operating model is assessed to involve establishing corporate footholds and selling or enabling access for ransomware operators rather than directly conducting ransomware deployment. KongTuke infrastructure and access activity have been associated with Qilin, Interlock, Rhysida, Akira, 8Base, and Black Basta ransomware ecosystems. Associations involving ModeloRAT and Mistic are supported by recurring delivery patterns, overlapping tooling, and observed co-deployment; some individual attribution assessments have been reported with low confidence.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
46 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
20 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
15 additional families tracked in Mallory.
241 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An initial-access-broker cluster conducting ClickFix/CrashFix social-engineering campaigns. It abuses the legitimate Node.js runtime to execute malicious JavaScript, uses EtherHiding for resilient C2 discovery, and deploys persistent backdoors and post-compromise tooling.
Mentioned only in the title of a cited external report in connection with the CrashFix campaign and ModeloRAT.
Traffic distribution system using compromised WordPress sites to deploy malicious code leading to malware delivery.
Initial access actor using ClickFix to deploy the Mistic backdoor, enabling downstream compromises including by Qilin affiliates.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.