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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

Mistic

Tracked since Jun 24, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK21Techniques
IOCs39Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
Clickfix
Platforms
Windows

Mistic, also tracked as MLTBackdoor, is a Windows remote-access backdoor used in financially motivated enterprise intrusions since April 2026. It has targeted organizations in the insurance, education, information technology, and professional-services sectors. Mistic is designed for stealthy, durable access: it receives command-and-control tasking, supports file upload, download, deletion, movement, renaming, and folder creation, can adjust its check-in interval, and executes operator-supplied code directly in memory. It can also load Beacon Object Files to extend post-exploitation functionality without relying on disk artifacts. A built-in kill switch enables operators to terminate and remove the implant, reducing forensic evidence. Mistic has been deployed through DLL sideloading involving trusted Microsoft endpoint-security software, and has been observed in ClickFix-based infection chains that induce victims to execute malicious PowerShell commands. Related intrusions included a separate fake-login credential-stealing component and ModeloRAT. Activity involving Mistic is assessed as associated with the financially motivated initial-access broker KongTuke, also known as Woodgnat, whose operations seek opportunistic enterprise footholds that may be sold to ransomware affiliates.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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KongTuke

The technique was employed alongside ModeloRAT and Mistic (aka MLTBackdoor); the report later calls it Backdoor.Mistic.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Woodgnat

The technique was employed alongside ModeloRAT and Mistic (aka MLTBackdoor); the report later calls it Backdoor.Mistic.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

A separate credential-stealing component, delivered as a .NET DLL, was also observed alongside Mistic, presenting victims with a fake login screen to harvest their usernames and passwords.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584.006Web ServicesEvidence1

The group typically gains a foothold by compromising WordPress websites through vulnerable plugins or stolen credentials, then injecting JavaScript that serves social engineering lures to visitors.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The group typically gains a foothold by compromising WordPress websites through vulnerable plugins or stolen credentials

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

ClickFix remained a preferred initial access technique, with KongTuke using it to deploy the previously unknown Mistic backdoor, which later enabled compromises by Qilin affiliates.

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

Additional tools seen in the same attack chains included PowerShell, certutil, WMIC, and curl.exe, all legitimate Windows utilities repurposed for malicious activity.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

Once loaded, Mistic connects to its command-and-control server and waits for instructions... run code directly in memory

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

Woodgnat attack chains abuse node.exe to execute attacker JavaScript and chain PowerShell and Windows command-line tools.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

Woodgnat attack chains abuse node.exe to execute attacker JavaScript and chain PowerShell and Windows command-line tools.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Attackers downloaded the official Node.js installer and used the trusted, signed node.exe runtime to execute attacker JavaScript and deploy a malicious implant.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

Attackers obtained initial access through the ClickFix social engineering technique, using fake CAPTCHA or error-fix prompts that instruct users to copy and paste a command into Windows Run or Windows Terminal.

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The group typically gains a foothold by compromising WordPress websites through vulnerable plugins or stolen credentials

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The backdoor runs payloads in memory with no file written to disk... Zscaler researchers say that 'one of the most powerful features [in MTLBackdoor] is the ability to load Beacon Object Files (BOFs) to expand its capabilities.'

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The group typically gains a foothold by compromising WordPress websites through vulnerable plugins or stolen credentials

Stealth

8 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The malicious DLL is named EndpointDlp.dll, borrowing the name from a genuine Microsoft endpoint security component, helping it blend seamlessly into trusted software environments.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The backdoor runs payloads in memory with no file written to disk... Zscaler researchers say that 'one of the most powerful features [in MTLBackdoor] is the ability to load Beacon Object Files (BOFs) to expand its capabilities.'

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence4

Its capabilities include ... terminating and removing itself from an infected system.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

When the mission is accomplished, it then terminates and deletes itself.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The group typically gains a foothold by compromising WordPress websites through vulnerable plugins or stolen credentials

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

a legitimate Microsoft executable named MpExtMs.exe is manipulated into loading a malicious file instead of the expected one.

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence1

Additional tools seen in the same attack chains included PowerShell, certutil, WMIC, and curl.exe, all legitimate Windows utilities repurposed for malicious activity.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence6

It executes payloads entirely within memory, meaning no malicious file is ever written to the hard drive.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

A separate .NET DLL is also loaded, which displays a fake login screen to the victim to steal their account credentials.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

It can also create new folders, and check for additional commands from the attacker-controlled command-and-control (C2) server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence8

It can upload and download files, create and delete folders, move or rename data

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

Mistic is a stealthy backdoor used by KongTuke-linked actors to keep long-term access in ransomware-targeted networks.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

39 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching39Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping21Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.