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Granite Typhoon, formerly known as GALLIUM, is a China-aligned cyberespionage threat actor also tracked as Alloy Taurus and Phantom Panda. The content describes it as a China-based actor that has compromised telecommunications entities globally and expanded targeting to telecommunications, government, finance, defense, and related service-provider networks, including activity against African telecommunications and defense networks in 2024 and 2025. The group has been linked to long-running telecom-focused espionage, including overlaps with Operation SoftCell, and one report placed Operation Tainted Love in the nexus of Granite Typhoon and APT41 while noting possible tool sharing among Chinese state-sponsored actors. Reported tradecraft includes exploitation of unpatched Internet-exposed WildFly/JBoss servers and, in other reporting, compromised Microsoft Exchange servers and webshell-based command execution. The actor is described as relying heavily on publicly available tools and malware with small modifications, low-cost replaceable infrastructure using dynamic-DNS domains and reused hop points, and stolen code-signing certificates to sign tools. Observed tooling and techniques include web shells such as China Chopper and BlackMould; modified HTRAN for connection redirection, proxying, command and control, and exfiltration; SoftEther VPN for persistence and internal access; PsExec for lateral movement; PowerShell and WMI for execution, lateral movement, credential dumping, and tool deployment; Windows command shell execution; whoami and query user for user discovery; ipconfig /all and a modified NBTscan for network discovery; Mimikatz and Windows Credential Editor for credential dumping; WinRAR and multipart archives staged in the Recycle Bin prior to exfiltration; and collection of password hashes from the SAM hive in the Registry. Microsoft also reported customized Gh0st RAT and Poison Ivy payloads, including the QuarkBandit Gh0st RAT variant, with modified communications to reduce detection. Unit 42 additionally associated the group with the PingPull tool.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
47 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
22 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
17 additional families tracked in Mallory.
9 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 9 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
4 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
83 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for exploitation of the public-facing PTC Windchill vulnerability CVE-2026-4681.
Linked in the content to use of CDN-based traffic concealment techniques and SoftEther VPN to maintain persistence and evade detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.