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Granite Typhoon, formerly tracked as GALLIUM and also referred to as Alloy Taurus and Phantom Panda, is a China-linked cyberespionage threat actor associated with long-running intrusions against telecommunications providers and other strategic sectors. The group has been publicly tied to Chinese state-sponsored activity and is known for targeting organizations of intelligence value, particularly telecommunications, government, finance, and defense-related entities across multiple regions including Southeast Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the United Kingdom. Granite Typhoon is notable for sustained operations against telecommunications networks, including campaigns overlapping with or associated with Operation Soft Cell. Reported activity shows the actor compromising internet-facing enterprise infrastructure, including application servers and Exchange environments, then establishing footholds with web shells and follow-on malware. The group has used both commodity and customized tooling, including modified remote access trojans, credential-dumping utilities, connection redirectors, VPN software for covert internal access, and tools signed with stolen code-signing certificates. Public reporting has also linked the actor to PingPull and to malware clusters and credential-theft tooling that overlap with broader Chinese intrusion ecosystems, with some reporting noting possible connections or tool sharing involving APT41. Observed tradecraft includes exploitation of public-facing systems for initial access; extensive post-compromise reconnaissance using native commands and utilities; credential theft from LSASS and the SAM hive; user and network discovery; lateral movement using remote administration mechanisms such as PsExec, WMI, RDP, and remote services; persistence through web shells and remote-access tooling; and staging and exfiltration of collected data through archives and proxying utilities. Granite Typhoon has repeatedly relied on living-off-the-land techniques and lightly modified public tools to reduce cost and blend into victim environments, while also employing defense-evasion measures such as modified malware communications, use of stolen certificates, protocol tunneling, and trusted remote-access software.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
47 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
22 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
17 additional families tracked in Mallory.
9 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 9 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
4 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
83 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
China-linked state-sponsored group named as actively targeting the UK.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for exploitation of the public-facing PTC Windchill vulnerability CVE-2026-4681.
Linked in the content to use of CDN-based traffic concealment techniques and SoftEther VPN to maintain persistence and evade detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.