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Mallory
Threat actorLinked to in-the-wild CVEs

RTM

Updated 2 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
CVEs1Associated
Malware2Families
ATT&CK29Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Origin
🇷🇺 Russia
Motivation
Financial
Targets
RUCZDEKZUA
Ransomware tactics
EncryptionDouble extortion
Capabilities
Initial accessPersistenceLateral movementDefense evasionDLL sideloadingReconnaissanceExtortion
Also known asRTM

RTM is a financially motivated, Russian-speaking cybercriminal group associated with the distribution of the RTM banking trojan, banking fraud, and ransomware-based extortion. Its targets include Russian transportation and financial-sector organizations. The group compromises corporate environments to locate accounting workstations and manipulate remote banking transactions by replacing payment details. RTM delivers malware through phishing and spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments, using business-related lures to induce recipients to execute them. It establishes persistence through Windows Registry autorun mechanisms and uses modified TeamViewer software, LiteManager, RMS, and custom utilities for remote access, persistence, and lateral movement. The group has abused DLL search order hijacking to make TeamViewer load malicious code. Its malware distribution has incorporated Rex3Packer and HellowinPacker, which use payload encryption, code mutation, obfuscation, and reflective loading to hinder detection and analysis. In a campaign whose active phase began in December 2020, RTM targeted approximately ten Russian organizations and supplemented banking fraud with additional monetization methods. When banking manipulation failed, the attackers deployed Quoter ransomware against reachable computers, sometimes several months after gaining access. Quoter encrypted data using AES-256-CBC. The attackers subsequently applied further pressure by claiming to have stolen confidential information and threatening publication, with demands reaching approximately US$1 million in bitcoin.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Financial Services
  • Transportation

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Russia
  • Czechia
  • Germany
  • Kazakhstan
  • Ukraine

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Russia
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

29 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

12 of 15 tactics47 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access2 techniques
T1189×6Drive-by Compromise
T1566Phishing
T1566.001×33Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×4Spearphishing Link
TA0002Execution4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×2PowerShell
T1106Native API
T1204×3User Execution
T1204.001Malicious Link
T1204.002×15Malicious File
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001×16DLL
TA0003Persistence2 techniques
T1112Modify Registry
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×13Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004Privilege Escalation2 techniques
T1134Access Token Manipulation
T1134.002Create Process with Token
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×13Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005Stealth5 techniques
T1036Masquerading
T1036.008Masquerade File Type
T1070Indicator Removal
T1070.004File Deletion
T1134Access Token Manipulation
T1134.002Create Process with Token
T1564Hide Artifacts
T1564.006Run Virtual Instance
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001×16DLL
TA0112Defense Impairment2 techniques
T1112Modify Registry
T1685Disable or Modify Tools
T1685.005Clear Windows Event Logs
TA0007Discovery2 techniques
T1057Process Discovery
T1087Account Discovery
T1087.002Domain Account
TA0008Lateral Movement1 technique
T1021×2Remote Services
TA0009Collection1 technique
T1005Data from Local System
TA0011Command and Control2 techniques
T1102Web Service
T1102.001×3Dead Drop Resolver
T1219Remote Access Tools
T1219.002×3Remote Desktop Software
TA0010Exfiltration2 techniques
T1537Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.003Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites
TA0040Impact3 techniques
T1486×2Data Encrypted for Impact
T1489Service Stop
T1565Data Manipulation
Vulnerabilities

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting. 1 of them is exploited in the wild (not necessarily by this actor).

CVE-2025-94912 evidence · Mar 18, 2026Exploited in the wildMicrosoft Windows LNK Shortcut UI Misrepresentation Leading to Code ExecutionThis detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.View vulnerability →
Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does RTM target?
RTM targets Financial Services and Transportation in Russia, Czechia, Germany, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.
What malware does RTM use?
RTM is associated with RTM and Quoter.
Where is RTM from?
Mallory's sources associate RTM with Russia.
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping29MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware2Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEs1CVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables1Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.