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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

RTM

Tracked since Dec 3, 2025 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK52Techniques
IOCs19Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
KeyloggingPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingMalspam
Platforms
Windows

RTM, also known as Redaman, is a Windows banking trojan associated with the RTM cybercrime group. It is distributed through phishing and spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments, including archives of Windows executables masquerading as PDF documents. Infection relies on recipients opening the attachment, extracting the archive, and executing the disguised payload.

RTM records input from physical and virtual keyboards, captures screenshots, and collects the victim's username, account permissions, time zone, and process integrity levels. It can search browser history for specific strings. It attempts to establish persistence through scheduled tasks and Registry-based autostart entries, and executes its core DLL through the Windows Rundll32 utility. Command-and-control traffic is encrypted using a custom RC4 variant.

Its defense-evasion features include checking filesystem artifacts associated with sandboxes and analysis tools, and deleting files and Registry entries created during execution. RTM payloads have also been protected with Rex3Packer and HellowinPacker, which use encrypted or encoded payloads, reflective loading, and code obfuscation to hinder detection and analysis.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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RTM

(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
RTM group

In this article, we will use the example of the RTM banking trojan to discuss which packers attackers can use, how they complicate detection of the malware, and what other malware they can pack.

via ptsecurityptsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

52 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Firstly, we identify as financial the malware targeting users of financial services such as online banking, payment systems, e-money services, e-shops, and cryptocurrency services.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence8

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) has been delivered via spearphishing attachments disguised as PDF documents.(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1566.004Spearphishing VoiceEvidence1

QuasarRAT can generate a UAC pop-up Window to prompt the target user to run a command as the administrator. RTM can attempt to run the program as admin, then show a fake error message and a legitimate UAC bypass prompt to the user in an attempt to socially engineer the user into escalating privileges.

Execution

7 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) tries to add a scheduled task to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) uses the command line and rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1106Native APIEvidence4

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can use the <code>FindNextUrlCacheEntryA</code> and <code>FindFirstUrlCacheEntryA</code> functions to search for specific strings within browser history.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1204User ExecutionEvidence4

has attempted to get victims to launch malicious Microsoft Word attachments delivered via spearphishing emails... has required user execution of a malicious MSI installer... has been executed through user installation of an executable disguised as a flash installer.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence8

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) has relied on users opening malicious email attachments, decompressing the attached archive, and double-clicking the executable within.(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1559.002Dynamic Data ExchangeEvidence3

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can search for specific strings within browser tabs using a Dynamic Data Exchange mechanism.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

Persistence

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) tries to add a scheduled task to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Firstly, we identify as financial the malware targeting users of financial services such as online banking, payment systems, e-money services, e-shops, and cryptocurrency services.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence10

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can delete all Registry entries created during its execution.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) tries to add a Registry Run key under the name "Windows Update" to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence8

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) tries to add a scheduled task to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Firstly, we identify as financial the malware targeting users of financial services such as online banking, payment systems, e-money services, e-shops, and cryptocurrency services.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) tries to add a Registry Run key under the name "Windows Update" to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence5

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can attempt to run the program as admin, then show a fake error message and a legitimate UAC bypass prompt to the user in an attempt to socially engineer the user into escalating privileges.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence9

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) strings, network data, configuration, and modules are encrypted with a modified RC4 algorithm.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

"Bumblebee has been delivered as password-protected zipped ISO files" / "Flagpro has been delivered within ZIP or RAR password-protected archived files." / "TA505 has password-protected malicious Word documents."

T1027.015CompressionEvidence3

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) has been delivered to targets as various archive files including ZIP, 7-ZIP, and RAR.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) has been delivered as archived Windows executable files masquerading as PDF documents.(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence3

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) has named the scheduled task it creates "Windows Update".(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence3

Bisonal has deleted Registry keys to clean up its prior activity ... FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities ... SUNBURST ... deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence13

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can delete all files created during its execution.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1070.009Clear PersistenceEvidence3

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) has the ability to remove Registry entries that it created for persistence.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Firstly, we identify as financial the malware targeting users of financial services such as online banking, payment systems, e-money services, e-shops, and cryptocurrency services.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence5

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) runs its core DLL file using rundll32.exe.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence6

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment.(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence10

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can delete all Registry entries created during its execution.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence4

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) samples have been signed with a code-signing certificates.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1553.004Install Root CertificateEvidence4

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can add a certificate to the Windows store.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

This study analyzes the banking malware that steals the credentials used to access online banking or payment system accounts and to intercept one-time passwords.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence5

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can record keystrokes from both the keyboard and virtual keyboard.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

Discovery

12 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence8

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can obtain the victim username and permissions.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence7

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can obtain information about process integrity levels.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence3

Several entries describe identifying whether the current user has admin privileges, determining privilege level, identifying groups the user belongs to, or verifying execution as SYSTEM.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence12

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can obtain the computer name, OS version, and default language identifier.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can check for specific files and directories associated with virtualization and malware analysis.(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence6

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can obtain a list of smart card readers attached to the victim.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence5

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can obtain the victim time zone.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence6

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment.(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence6

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can scan victim drives to look for specific banking software on the machine to determine next actions.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence5

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can obtain information about security software on the victim.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

Examples include: “Bazar … check if the Russian language is installed … and terminate if it is found.”; “DropBook … checked for the presence of Arabic language …”; “Maze … checked the language … GetUserDefaultUILanguage”; “SynAck … checks installed keyboard layouts to estimate … countries.”

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence2

Examples include 'Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed,' 'DropBook has checked for the presence of Arabic language,' 'Maze has checked the language of the infected system,' and 'SynAck ... checks installed keyboard layouts to estimate if it has been launched from a certain list of countries.'

Collection

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

This study analyzes the banking malware that steals the credentials used to access online banking or payment system accounts and to intercept one-time passwords.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence5

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can record keystrokes from both the keyboard and virtual keyboard.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence8

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can capture screenshots.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence6

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) collects data from the clipboard.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence4

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) monitors browsing activity and automatically captures screenshots if a victim browses to a URL matching one of a list of strings.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence8

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) has initiated connections to external domains using HTTPS.(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence3

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) has used an RSS feed on Livejournal to update a list of encrypted C2 server names. [RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) has also hidden [Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) C2 server IP addresses within transactions on the Bitcoin and Namecoin blockchain.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Redaman October 2019)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) can download additional files.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence4

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) has the capability to download a VNC module from command and control (C2).(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence4

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) has resolved [Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) C2 server IP addresses by either converting Bitcoin blockchain transaction data to specific octets, or accessing IP addresses directly within the Namecoin blockchain.(Citation: CheckPoint Redaman October 2019)(Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence3

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) used Port 44443 for its VNC module.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) encrypts C2 traffic with a custom RC4 variant.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

Impact

3 techniques
T1489Service StopEvidence1

"Terminating running processes"

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

"Shutting down the infected host"

T1565.001Stored Data ManipulationEvidence1

"Altering DNS configuration through the Windows host file"

Indicators of compromise

Observables

19 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching19Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping52Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.