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Ryuk is a financially motivated ransomware operation first observed in August 2018 and linked to Russian cybercriminals and the broader Wizard Spider/TrickBot ecosystem. Also referred to as the Ryuk gang or Ryuk operators, it conducts targeted intrusions against organizations to encrypt data and demand substantial ransom payments, historically including multimillion-dollar demands. Ryuk-associated intrusion activity has been tracked as UNC1878. Its targets include municipal governments, hospitals, educational institutions, and large enterprises. U.S. hospitals were heavily targeted during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the attack on Universal Health Services caused extensive operational disruption and financial losses. Ryuk operators have obtained access through existing TrickBot infections and reverse shells, with Emotet also involved in associated malware-delivery chains. BazarCall callback phishing provided access to Ryuk victim networks, and Ryuk affiliates have used Zloader for initial access. Following compromise, operators conduct network reconnaissance, collect administrator credentials, take control of domain controllers, and use post-exploitation frameworks such as PowerShell Empire. They have used Advanced IP Scanner for network discovery and abused Active Directory Group Policy during intrusions. Encryption can affect systems and shared data across the compromised network. Ryuk and Conti have closely related operational histories, with corroborated links involving personnel, tooling, management, and financial flows. Conti is widely recognized as Ryuk's successor rather than an unrelated operation. Criminal investigations have resulted in convictions connected to Ryuk ransomware deployment, extortion, and laundering of ransom proceeds.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
49 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
10 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
5 additional families tracked in Mallory.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned as a historical recipient of victim-network access supplied through BazarCall. The article does not connect Ryuk to SRG's current extortion operation or financial flows.
Mentioned only as a prior example of a ransomware group that used Group Policy abuse; no Ryuk activity is described in this incident.
A ransomware operation whose members conducted large-scale attacks against global victims, including U.S. hospitals, state and local municipalities. The operation disrupted access to victim data and communications and obtained at least $15 million in ransom payments.
A ransomware operation responsible for thousands of attacks globally, including against U.S. state and local governments and hospitals. Its attacks restricted access to data and disrupted communications; the group reportedly received at least $15 million in ransom payments. The operation has been linked to Russian cybercriminals and to a Russian group managing Trickbot.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.