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Malware10 associated actors2 associated CVEs

Bazar

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors10Associated
ATT&CK79Techniques
IOCs250Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Initial accessPersistenceReconnaissanceProcess injectionPost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingVishingLure
Platforms
Windows
Also known asBazaloaderKEGTAPTeam9

Bazar, also known as BazaLoader, KEGTAP, and Team9, is a Windows malware family used to establish backdoor access and deliver additional payloads to compromised systems. It has development ties to the TrickBot group and has been used by Wizard Spider and other threat actors to establish footholds in high-value targets. Follow-on payloads have included Cobalt Strike, IcedID, TrickBot, and Emotet. Bazar infections have also served as an entry point for ransomware attacks, including Ryuk deployments.

Distribution methods include phishing emails with malicious links and spearphishing attachments containing macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents or PDFs with download links. BazarCall campaigns, active from early 2021, used fraudulent subscription emails to persuade recipients to call purported cancellation services. Telephone operators then guided victims into downloading files containing BazaLoader, leading to further compromise.

Bazar supports command-and-control-directed payload download and execution, including execution of PowerShell scripts. It can establish persistence through scheduled tasks, enumerate remote systems using the Windows Net utility, identify its current process, and inject code using VirtualAllocExNuma. Its command-and-control activity has used TLS certificates issued by trusted certificate authorities.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-8570via intel471Exploited in the wildMicrosoft Office Object-Handling Remote Code Executionthe seller offered two types of weaponized Microsoft Office documents (maldocs) to users: one that exploits a known vulnerability in Microsoft Office (CVE-2017-8570) and another that uses a malicious macro.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-40444via microsoft generalExploited in the wildMicrosoft MSHTML Remote Code ExecutionAdditionally, some of the infrastructure that hosted the oleObjects utilized in the August 2021 attacks abusing CVE-2021-40444 were also involved in the delivery of BazaLoader and Trickbot payloads — activity that overlaps with a group Microsoft tracks as DEV-0193. | In August, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) identified a small number of attacks (less than 10) that attempted to exploit a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML using specially crafted Microsoft Office documents. These attacks used the vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2021-40444, as part of an initial access campaign that distributed custom Cobalt Strike Beacon loaders.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

10 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
WIZARD SPIDER

Wizard Spider has used spearphishing attachments to deliver Microsoft documents containing macros or PDFs containing malicious links to download either Emotet, Bokbot, TrickBot, or Bazar.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
TA800

This actor has predominantly used BazaLoader since April of 2020, but on February 3rd, 2021 they distributed a new malware we are calling NimzaLoader... there has been some research community analysis suggesting that NimzaLoader is just another variant of BazaLoader, but based on our observations of significant differences, we are tracking this as a distinct malware family.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
Team9

Domains serving Bazar loader files ... Bazar domains ... Operational Backdoor

via cybereason blogcybereason.com
Storm-0249

Microsoft attributes this campaign to Storm-0249, an access broker active since 2021 and known for distributing, at minimum, BazaLoader, IcedID, Bumblebee, and Emotet malware.

via microsoft technet blogsblogs.technet.microsoft.com
TA572

BazaLoader is a downloader written in C++ whose primary function is to download and execute additional modules. It was first observed in the wild in April 2020 and since has steadily been adopted by more actors.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
TA578

TA578 uses email campaigns to deliver malware like Ursnif, IcedID, KPOT Stealer, Buer Loader, and BazaLoader, as well as Cobalt Strike.

via resecurity blogresecurity.com

+4 more in the app. View in Mallory

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

79 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence11

Lately, Ryuk attacks usually start with a phishing campaign that installs the BazarLoader/KegTap infection on a recipient's computer.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes threat actors sending spearphishing or phishing emails with malicious attachments such as Microsoft Office documents, PDFs, RAR/ZIP archives, CHM files, and executables disguised as documents.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence10

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) has been spread via emails with embedded malicious links.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Bazar September 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)

Execution

14 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence6

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can execute a WMI query to gather information about the installed antivirus engine.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020)

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

After execution of the initial access malware, many threat actors deploy persistence mechanisms, such as the creation of scheduled tasks... Scheduled tasks were the most common persistence method observed in our intrusions.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can create a scheduled task for persistence.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Command 12, 13: C2 server replies with a script file to Bazar in a command. Bazar then decrypts the script file and saves it to a Windows temporary folder. Finally, Bazar runs it by calling the API CreateProcessA().

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence8

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can execute a PowerShell script received from C2.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence7

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can launch cmd.exe to perform reconnaissance commands.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Bazar September 2020)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The Excel sheet contains macros that, if enabled by the user, will download BazaLoader.

T1059.009Cloud APIEvidence1

The maldoc then leverages Excel 4.0 macros stored in a hidden sheet, which allow an externally-hosted payload to be downloaded, written to disk and executed

T1106Native APIEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can use various APIs to allocate memory and facilitate code execution/injection.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) has been downloaded via Windows BITS functionality.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

The downloaded file is an executable that will install the BazarLoader infection onto a victim's computer when executed.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence3

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can gain execution after a user clicks on a malicious link to decoy landing pages hosted on Google Docs.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Bazar September 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence6

there is an Excel spreadsheet named subscription_1617056233.xlsb . This spreadsheet has malicious macros. | At the video's 10 minute mark, I enable macros on the malicious spreadsheet, but nothing apparently happened. So the call center operator had me re-open the spreadsheet and enable macros again.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

Bazar has manually loaded ntdll from disk in order to identity and remove API hooks set by security products. Donut can patch AMSI, WLDP, as well as exit-related Native API functions... Turla has used a AMSI bypass, which patches the in-memory amsi.dll.

Persistence

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

After execution of the initial access malware, many threat actors deploy persistence mechanisms, such as the creation of scheduled tasks... Scheduled tasks were the most common persistence method observed in our intrusions.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can create a scheduled task for persistence.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) has been downloaded via Windows BITS functionality.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Command 17: The C2 server replies with a piece of native code... Bazar decrypts the native code... and deploys it on a newly-create thread to execute. To achieve this, it needs to call some APIs, such as VirtualAlloc(), memcpy(), VirtualProtect(), and CreateThread().

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can create or add files to Registry Run Keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLEvidence4

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can use Winlogon Helper DLL to establish persistence.(Citation: Zscaler Bazar September 2020)

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can establish persistence by writing shortcuts to the Windows Startup folder.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

Privilege Escalation

9 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

After execution of the initial access malware, many threat actors deploy persistence mechanisms, such as the creation of scheduled tasks... Scheduled tasks were the most common persistence method observed in our intrusions.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can create a scheduled task for persistence.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence12

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can inject code through calling <code>VirtualAllocExNuma</code>.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence7

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can inject into a target process including Svchost, Explorer, and cmd using process hollowing.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1055.013Process DoppelgängingEvidence4

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can inject into a target process using process doppelgänging.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Command 17: The C2 server replies with a piece of native code... Bazar decrypts the native code... and deploys it on a newly-create thread to execute. To achieve this, it needs to call some APIs, such as VirtualAlloc(), memcpy(), VirtualProtect(), and CreateThread().

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can create or add files to Registry Run Keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLEvidence4

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can use Winlogon Helper DLL to establish persistence.(Citation: Zscaler Bazar September 2020)

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can establish persistence by writing shortcuts to the Windows Startup folder.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

Stealth

21 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence8

Bazar hides key APIs in the code... ASM Code Obfuscation... All constant strings are encoded in Bazar... Bazar’s constant strings are hidden in encrypted data throughout the code to perform anti-analysis.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) has a variant with a packed payload.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Bazar September 2020)

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence4

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can hash then resolve API calls at runtime.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) has used XOR, RSA2, and RC4 encrypted files.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence3

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can create a task named to appear benign.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence4

The [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) loader has named malicious shortcuts "adobe" and mimicked communications software.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)

T1036.007Double File ExtensionEvidence3

The [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) loader has used dual-extension executable files such as PreviewReport.DOC.exe.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence12

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can inject code through calling <code>VirtualAllocExNuma</code>.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence7

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can inject into a target process including Svchost, Explorer, and cmd using process hollowing.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1055.013Process DoppelgängingEvidence4

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can inject into a target process using process doppelgänging.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence9

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can delete its loader using a batch file in the Windows temporary folder.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1070.009Clear PersistenceEvidence3

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534)'s loader can delete scheduled tasks created by a previous instance of the malware.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence10

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can decrypt downloaded payloads. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) also resolves strings and other artifacts at runtime.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) has been downloaded via Windows BITS functionality.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

In this post I’ll work through analyzing an AppX package from Magnitude Exploit Kit that drops Magniber... AppX packages have gotten some mileage as droppers lately.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can attempt to overload sandbox analysis by sending 1550 calls to <code>printf</code>.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence6

The content includes environment-aware checks such as "Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine and terminate if it is found," "CaddyWiper can also halt execution if the compromised host is identified as a domain controller," and "OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks."

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence4

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can use a timer to delay execution of core functionality.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

Bazar has manually loaded ntdll from disk in order to identity and remove API hooks set by security products. Donut can patch AMSI, WLDP, as well as exit-related Native API functions... Turla has used a AMSI bypass, which patches the in-memory amsi.dll.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Decrypting the Resource data uncovers a piece of ASM (assembly language) code and a PE file. This ASM code, called by the Bazar loader, dynamically deploys the PE file into memory and executes it.

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence4

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) has been signed with fake certificates including those appearing to be from VB CORPORATE PTY. LTD.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence6

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) has manually loaded ntdll from disk in order to identity and remove API hooks set by security products.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

Credential Access

1 technique
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

All of these (malicious tools) are used to gain access to corporate networks, steal files and network credentials, and ultimately deploy ransomware on the network.

Discovery

21 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence9

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can query <code>Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall</code> for installed applications.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence9

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can collect the IP address and NetBIOS name of an infected machine.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence4

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can enumerate remote systems using <code> Net View</code>.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence9

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can identify the username of the infected user.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence9

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can identity the current process on a compromised host.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1069.002Domain GroupsEvidence1

Brute Ratel C4 can use LDAP queries, net group "Domain Admins" /domain and net user /domain for discovery. OilRig has run net group "domain admins" /domain and net group "Exchange Trusted Subsystem" /domain to get account listings on a victim. Wizard Spider has identified domain admins through the use of net group "Domain admins" /DOMAIN.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence14

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can fingerprint architecture, computer name, and OS version on the compromised host. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can also check if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine and terminate if it is found.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence9

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can enumerate the victim's desktop.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence2

“actors used the following commands… to enumerate user accounts: net user >> %temp%\download; net user /domain >> %temp%\download … APT1 used the commands net localgroup, net user, and net group to find accounts… APT32 enumerated administrative users using the commands net localgroup administrators … OilRig has run net user, net user /domain, net group "domain admins" /domain …”

T1087.001Local AccountEvidence3

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can identify administrator accounts on an infected host.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1087.002Domain AccountEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) has the ability to identify domain administrator accounts.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020)

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can collect the time on the compromised host.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence6

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can enumerate shared drives on the domain.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence6

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can use [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) tools to obtain information about the domain.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can attempt to overload sandbox analysis by sending 1550 calls to <code>printf</code>.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence6

The content includes environment-aware checks such as "Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine and terminate if it is found," "CaddyWiper can also halt execution if the compromised host is identified as a domain controller," and "OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks."

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence4

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can use a timer to delay execution of core functionality.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence8

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can query the Registry for installed applications.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence5

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can identify the installed antivirus engine.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

Examples include: “Bazar … check if the Russian language is installed … and terminate if it is found.”; “DropBook … checked for the presence of Arabic language …”; “Maze … checked the language … GetUserDefaultUILanguage”; “SynAck … checks installed keyboard layouts to estimate … countries.”

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence9

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can perform a check to ensure that the operating system's keyboard and language settings are not set to Russian.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence6

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can retrieve information from the infected machine.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

Command and Control

13 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Many entries describe XOR, XOR/ADD, bitwise NOT and XOR, ROR plus XOR, hexadecimal encoding after encryption, and custom encoding/obfuscation of HTTP traffic or beacons.

T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence4

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) has the ability to use an alternative C2 server if the primary server fails.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence7

Cobalt Strike was sent through encrypted HTTPS traffic generated by BazaLoader.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence14

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can use HTTP and HTTPS over ports 80 and 443 in C2 communications.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)(Citation: DFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021)

T1071.004DNSEvidence1

In the past several years, we have seen multiple malware samples using DNS tunneling to exfiltrate data... Anchor malware that uses DNS tunneling to communicate with C2 servers... DNS tunneling is an old technique that allows attackers to communicate with C2 servers and exfiltrate data through many firewalls.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence3

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) downloads have been hosted on Google Docs.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Bazar September 2020)

T1104Multi-Stage ChannelsEvidence3

The [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) loader is used to download and execute the [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) backdoor.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Bazar September 2020)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence15

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can download and deploy additional payloads, including ransomware and post-exploitation frameworks such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154).(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Bazar September 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

The A record of the domains is encrypted, just as in previous versions. Meaning, the four bytes of the IP are XORed with 0xFE. The IP is then used in URLs of format https://{ip}:443.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence7

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can implement DGA using the current date as a seed variable.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence3

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can send C2 communications with XOR encryption.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can use TLS in C2 communications.(Citation: Zscaler Bazar September 2020)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

When this collection is done, it sends all of the gathered information in the 'body' of the 'POST' request to the C2 server... Command 16: Bazar reads a file path from the C2 server’s command and collects the file’s contents. It sends the collected data as the 'body' of a 'POST' request back to the C2 server.

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence1

The TrickBot cybercrime group is responsible for a variety of sophisticated malware targeting Windows and Linux devices to gain access to victim's networks, steal data, and deploy other malware, such as ransomware.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

All of these (malicious tools) are used to gain access to corporate networks, steal files and network credentials, and ultimately deploy ransomware on the network.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

250 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

160 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching250Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors10Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping79Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.