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Mallory
Threat actor

UAT-8099

Updated 13 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs0Associated
Malware4Families
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs80Tracked
Origin
🇨🇳 China
Motivation
Financial
Targets
THVNINCABRPKJPAUKRLTNP
Ransomware tactics
Encryption
Capabilities
Initial accessReconnaissancePrivilege escalationPersistenceCredential theftExfiltrationPost exploitationDLL sideloadingDefense evasion
Also known asuat_8099

UAT-8099 is a China-linked, Chinese-speaking cybercrime group focused on financially motivated search engine optimization (SEO) fraud and theft of credentials, configuration data, and certificates. It compromises reputable Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) servers belonging to universities, technology companies, telecommunications providers, government bodies, and financial organizations. Its operations have a strong Asia-Pacific focus, particularly Thailand and Vietnam, with additional compromises in other regions. Its activity has substantial operational overlap with the WEBJACK campaign, including shared malware, command-and-control infrastructure, victimology, and promoted gambling sites. The group gains access through vulnerable web applications and weak file-upload controls, deploying ASP.NET web shells for command execution and reconnaissance. It escalates privileges, enables RDP, creates concealed administrative accounts, and maintains access through scheduled tasks and remote-access or tunneling tools including GotoHTTP, SoftEther VPN, EasyTier, and FRP. It also deploys Cobalt Strike through DLL sideloading and uses customized automation to conceal activity. Credential and data collection includes dumping LSASS memory with ProcDump, searching for sensitive configuration and certificate material, and archiving collected files before exfiltration. UAT-8099 deploys BadIIS malicious IIS modules to intercept HTTP traffic, inject backlinks and other SEO content, and redirect visitors to unauthorized advertising or illegal gambling sites. Conditional handling of search-engine crawlers, referrers, and language preferences conceals manipulation from ordinary visitors and administrators. Region-specific variants include BadIIS IISHijack and BadIIS asdSearchEngine. Defense-evasion measures include clearing Windows event logs, concealing malicious files, terminating security-product processes, and modifying malware to reduce antivirus detection. The group also hardens compromised servers against competing attackers to preserve its footholds.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Software & Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • South Africa

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • China
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

18 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

12 of 15 tactics29 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0042Resource Development1 technique
T1608Stage Capabilities
T1608.006×2SEO Poisoning
TA0001Initial Access1 technique
T1190×4Exploit Public-Facing Application
TA0002Execution1 technique
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
TA0003Persistence3 techniques
T1098Account Manipulation
T1505Server Software Component
T1505.003×3Web Shell
T1505.004×2IIS Components
T1543Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003Windows Service
TA0004Privilege Escalation2 techniques
T1098Account Manipulation
T1543Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003Windows Service
TA0005Stealth2 techniques
T1036Masquerading
T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
TA0006Credential Access1 technique
T1649Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
TA0007Discovery2 techniques
T1082System Information Discovery
T1083File and Directory Discovery
TA0008Lateral Movement1 technique
T1021Remote Services
T1021.001Remote Desktop Protocol
TA0009Collection1 technique
T1005Data from Local System
TA0011Command and Control4 techniques
T1090Proxy
T1102Web Service
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219Remote Access Tools
TA0040Impact1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact
Indicators of compromise

Observables

80 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does UAT-8099 target?
UAT-8099 targets Software & Services in South Africa.
What malware does UAT-8099 use?
UAT-8099 is associated with BADIIS, Cobalt Strike, CbsMsgApi, and LockBit.
Where is UAT-8099 from?
Mallory's sources associate UAT-8099 with China.
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Are they targeting you?See whether this actor's campaigns touch your sector, your geography, or the products you run, and get alerted when that changes.
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping18MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware4Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables80Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.