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Mallory
Malware7 associated actors5 associated CVEs

BADIIS

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 13 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns5Associated
Actors7Associated
ATT&CK32Techniques
IOCs81Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasion
Delivery
Seo poisoningCloaking
Platforms
Windows

BadIIS is a family of malicious native modules for Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) on Windows servers, used primarily for search engine optimization fraud and traffic monetization. It integrates into the IIS request-processing pipeline to intercept requests, modify HTTP responses, inject backlinks and JavaScript, replace legitimate content, and redirect visitors to attacker-controlled destinations. Its reverse-proxy functionality serves externally generated SEO content through compromised websites, exploiting the reputation of legitimate sites to promote illicit gambling, adult content, and fraudulent services.

BadIIS distinguishes search crawlers from human visitors using HTTP User-Agent and Referer headers. Variants selectively return manipulated content to crawlers while redirecting qualifying visitors through JavaScript landing pages. Additional filtering can depend on mobile-device identifiers, browser language, geographic configurations, and server subnets, concealing malicious behavior from visitors who do not meet the targeting criteria. Some variants replace selected HTTP 404 responses with attacker-generated content returned as successful responses. Configuration and destination information can be retrieved from external infrastructure and protected with encryption.

Operators typically deploy BadIIS after compromising vulnerable web applications or obtaining access through web shells and other remote-access mechanisms. Installation can involve scripts, multi-stage installers, Windows services, and registration as an IIS global module. Some deployment packages masquerade as legitimate system components and maintain hidden backup copies, allowing a persistent service to restore removed modules after a server restart.

BadIIS is used by multiple Chinese-speaking cybercrime groups, including REF4033, also tracked as UAT-8099, and UAT-10147. Commodity variants have customer-customization and graphical-builder tooling. Campaigns have affected IIS servers worldwide, with substantial concentrations in Asia, across government, education, technology, telecommunications, healthcare, finance, media, and e-commerce organizations.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-23758via the hacker newsExploited in the wildAjax.NET Professional Unsafe Deserialization Remote Code ExecutionSome of the vulnerabilities weaponized by the threat actor over the course of the campaign include CVE-2022-27925 (Zimbra), CVE-2021-23758 (AjaxPro), CVE-2019-18935 (Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX), CVE-2021-29441, and CVE-2021-29442 (Alibaba Nacos).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2022-27925via the hacker newsExploited in the wildZimbra Collaboration mboximport ZIP Path Traversal Leading to Remote Code ExecutionSome of the vulnerabilities weaponized by the threat actor over the course of the campaign include CVE-2022-27925 (Zimbra), CVE-2021-23758 (AjaxPro), CVE-2019-18935 (Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX), CVE-2021-29441, and CVE-2021-29442 (Alibaba Nacos).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-29441via the hacker newsExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Alibaba Nacos AuthFilterSome of the vulnerabilities weaponized by the threat actor over the course of the campaign include CVE-2022-27925 (Zimbra), CVE-2021-23758 (AjaxPro), CVE-2019-18935 (Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX), CVE-2021-29441, and CVE-2021-29442 (Alibaba Nacos).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2019-18935via the hacker newsExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX RadAsyncUploadSome of the vulnerabilities weaponized by the threat actor over the course of the campaign include CVE-2022-27925 (Zimbra), CVE-2021-23758 (AjaxPro), CVE-2019-18935 (Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX), CVE-2021-29441, and CVE-2021-29442 (Alibaba Nacos).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-29442via the hacker newsExploited in the wildMissing Authorization in Alibaba Nacos Derby Database ManagementSome of the vulnerabilities weaponized by the threat actor over the course of the campaign include CVE-2022-27925 (Zimbra), CVE-2021-23758 (AjaxPro), CVE-2019-18935 (Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX), CVE-2021-29441, and CVE-2021-29442 (Alibaba Nacos).View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

7 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
UAT-8099

Deploys custom BadIIS malware to facilitate SEO poisoning.

via talos intelligence blogstorage.ghost.io
Group11

In 2024, we observed a substantial distribution of malware known as "BadIIS" in Asia. BadIIS targets Internet Information Services (IIS) and can be used for SEO fraud or to inject malicious content into the browsers of legitimate users.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
UAT-10147

On Windows systems, UAT-10147 ... deploys malware including BadIIS, QuasarRAT, Gh0stCringe and SPECTRE.

via imda singaporeimda.gov.sg
DragonRank

The comparison table lists DragonRank's custom implants as “Yes (BadIIS, PlugX).”

via reliaquest com threat huntingreliaquest.com
REF4033

REF4033 is a Chinese-speaking cybercrime group responsible for a massive, coordinated SEO poisoning campaign that has compromised more than 1,800 Windows web servers worldwide using a malicious IIS module called BADIIS.

via elastic security labselastic.co
Operation Rewrite

"...alters SEO rankings using web shells, open-source hacking tools, Cobalt Strike, and various BadIIS malware..."

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com

+1 more in the app. View in Mallory

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

3 techniques
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

T1588.002 — Obtain Capabilities: Tool (Resource Development)

T1608.003Install Digital CertificateEvidence1

"BadIIS Malware Spreads via SEO Poisoning"; "HiddenGh0st, Winos and kkRAT Exploit SEO"

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence2

"UAT-8099 manipulates search rankings..."; "Threat actors are leveraging SEO poisoning and malicious advertisements to trick users into downloading backdoored versions of Microsoft Teams..."

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence7

Elastic Security Labs observed post-compromise activity from a Windows IIS server from an unknown attack vector; the ATT&CK mapping includes Exploit Public-Facing Application.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Persistance via tâche planifiée nommée Google Chrome Start

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The attack uses multiple Windows batch scripts to carry out its objectives.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

the script modifies the Windows Registry and uses PowerShell to add specific directories to the Windows Defender exclusion list

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

File name back.bat Alternate name for the main Windows deployment script File name bai.bat Secondary batch script used for backdoor execution and persistence File name user.bat Script used to create a privileged local account

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

BadIIS works by planting a malicious module inside the IIS server software that runs quietly in the background.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Persistance via tâche planifiée nommée Google Chrome Start

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

uses PowerShell to add specific directories to the Windows Defender exclusion list ... reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths"

T1505Server Software ComponentEvidence2

This SEO hijacking web handler silently takes over an IIS application's request pipeline via reflection.

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence5

Select instances entail the deployment of a web shell, which then paves the way for BadIIS and additional backdoors for persistent access.

T1505.004IIS ComponentsEvidence3

The malicious DLL stages the BADIIS IIS native modules and alters the IIS configuration to load them into the request pipeline of the DefaultAppPool.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

If an antivirus solution flags and removes the active hooking module, the persistent Windows service automatically extracts a fresh copy from a hidden backup directory (C:\Windows\Logs) upon the next server restart, ensuring durable, long-term survival.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Persistance via tâche planifiée nommée Google Chrome Start

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Content Hijacking: Modifying target title, description, and keyword (TDK) metadata at a configurable percentage rate to silently piggyback off the victim site’s domain authority.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

If an antivirus solution flags and removes the active hooking module, the persistent Windows service automatically extracts a fresh copy from a hidden backup directory (C:\Windows\Logs) upon the next server restart, ensuring durable, long-term survival.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The malware uses custom Base64 encoding and single-byte XOR obfuscation to conceal command-and-control server addresses from security scanners.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

These installers copy the payloads straight into native IIS resource trees—impersonating trusted core processes like svchost.exe or FaxService.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence2

During this attack, the threat actor stages three files masquerading within the System32\drivers folder.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Content Hijacking: Modifying target title, description, and keyword (TDK) metadata at a configurable percentage rate to silently piggyback off the victim site’s domain authority.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

the script attempts to delete its initial staging files and scripts to cover its tracks and hinder forensic analysis

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The tool employs a custom parsing routine to segment the file based on these tags... Using this extracted data, the malware dynamically assembles command-line instructions... These fully-formed commands are then executed...

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

the persistent Windows service automatically extracts a fresh copy from a hidden backup directory (C:\Windows\Logs) upon the next server restart

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

BadIIS works by planting a malicious module inside the IIS server software that runs quietly in the background.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

uses PowerShell to add specific directories to the Windows Defender exclusion list ... reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths"

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

They also used scripts to raise privileges, weaken endpoint scanning around IIS folders, create high-privilege access, and retain control after the original break-in.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

For search engine crawlers, BadIIS acts as a reverse proxy, fetching illicit content from the attacker’s command-and-control backend and serving it as though it belongs to the legitimate website.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

"UAT-8099... theft of high-value credentials, configuration files, and certificate data."

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Webroot enumeration: dir C:\inetpub\wwwroot\ -Name reveals deployed applications

Collection

1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

For search engine crawlers, BadIIS acts as a reverse proxy, fetching illicit content from the attacker’s command-and-control backend and serving it as though it belongs to the legitimate website.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

the web shell is transmitted to “up.ashx” via an HTTP POST request

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Upon initialization, the module downloads content from URLs defined in its configuration... Each URL in the configuration points to a static .txt file that contains a second-stage resource.

T1090ProxyEvidence2

Reverse Proxying: Intentionally intercepting search engine crawlers. When a crawler arrives, the malware acts as a reverse proxy, silently pulling black-hat SEO spam data from the attacker’s backend and rendering it to the search engine to manipulate public rankings.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

enabling capabilities including traffic redirection to illicit sites, reverse proxying for search engine crawler manipulation, content hijacking, and backlink injection for malicious search engine optimization (SEO) fraud

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

The builder allows threat actors to input target URLs, typically JavaScript-based redirectors, designed to be injected into the victim's browser. This feature forcibly redirects legitimate user traffic to spam infrastructure, such as illegal gambling, adult content, or other malicious websites.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

Using a batch script that employs certutil to download a privilege escalation tool ("EfsPotato"), a secondary batch script, and Quasar RAT from a remote server

Impact

1 technique
T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

The builder facilitates a diverse menu of illicit capabilities: Traffic Redirection: Forcibly hijacking legitimate consumer browser traffic and routing it directly to underground spam infrastructure, illegal gambling arenas, or adult content platforms.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

81 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching81Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors7Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities5CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping32Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.