UNC1151, also tracked as UAC-0057 and commonly called Ghostwriter, is a Belarus-linked state-sponsored threat actor conducting credential theft, cyberespionage, and intrusions that support information operations. The group has been linked to the Belarusian Ministry of Defence. Ghostwriter originally designated an influence campaign supported by UNC1151 rather than the intrusion group itself; the campaign has operated since at least March 2017. Its activities promote Belarusian government interests, undermine NATO, and amplify political divisions in Eastern Europe and the Baltics. Targets include government officials, politicians, military personnel, media figures, political activists, Belarusian dissidents, and Ukrainian energy-sector organizations. Documented targeting spans Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Germany, and Belarus. The group compromises personal and organizational email accounts, searches mailboxes for sensitive documents, and takes over associated social media accounts. Access and stolen information support disinformation and hack-and-leak operations, including fabricated official correspondence and misleading material published through compromised news websites. UNC1151 relies heavily on spearphishing, impersonating email-provider administrators and government authorities. Credential-harvesting operations use account-suspension and verification pretexts, redirects through compromised websites, and Browser-in-the-Browser login imitations. Malware-delivery campaigns use malicious compiled HTML help files, deceptive JavaScript attachments, and crafted archives exploiting WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831. Execution chains employ VBScript, JavaScript, HTA content, Windows scripting utilities, and obfuscated .NET loaders. Documented payloads include MicroBackdoor, Cobalt Strike Beacon, and PicassoLoader. Its modified MicroBackdoor supports system discovery, remote command execution, file transfer, and screenshot capture. The group uses startup shortcuts and registry-based persistence, obfuscation, and in-memory payload loading.
Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
42 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.
17 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
12 additional families tracked in Mallory.
3 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 3 of them exploited in the wild.
321 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.