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🇷🇺 RU

Doppelgänger

Also known asdoppelganger

Doppelganger is a pro-Russian, Russia-aligned information operation and disinformation network publicly referred to as “Doppelganger” or “Doppelgänger,” and also referenced as “RRN.” Multiple cited sources describe it as operating since at least 2022 and attribute it to Russian actors; U.S. court filings further state it operated under the direction and control of the Russian Presidential Administration, particularly Sergei Kiriyenko, with Russian entities including Social Design Agency (SDA), Structura National Technology, and ANO Dialog involved. Sanctions and public reporting also link SDA and associated operators to the campaign. The operation is designed to reduce international support for Ukraine, bolster pro-Russian policies, and influence voters in U.S. and foreign elections. Reported targeting includes audiences in Germany, France, Poland, the United States, Israel, and broader European audiences. It has also pushed narratives around the 2024 Paris Olympics, German elections, and Polish airspace incidents, while promoting anti-Ukraine, anti-Western, anti-government, and anti-NATO themes. A defining characteristic of Doppelganger is large-scale impersonation of legitimate media outlets and government or independent media brands. Reported examples include spoofed or lookalike domains imitating outlets such as The Washington Post, Fox News, Reuters, Der Spiegel, Bild, T-Online, Le Monde, Welt, and FAZ, alongside fabricated “independent” news brands. Researchers also describe cloned websites and fake news sites used to infiltrate Europe’s media landscape. Distribution and amplification rely on coordinated inauthentic social media accounts across multiple platforms, including large networks of X accounts. These accounts have been observed posting multilingual content, posing as citizens of targeted countries, and coordinating reposting and engagement to amplify narratives. Reporting also states the campaign used fake social media personas, paid advertisements, influencers, and AI-generated content. Technically, researchers describe a resilient, scalable infrastructure built around multi-stage redirection chains and traffic tracking. Observed tradecraft includes first-stage and second-stage redirector domains, telegra.ph-hosted preview images, Base64-obfuscated JavaScript, rotating domains, Cloudflare fronting, geofencing, and Keitaro-based tracking infrastructure used to monitor campaign effectiveness. Reports characterize the operation as industrialized and focused on infrastructure resilience, scalability, and operational continuity. Known aliases and related references directly mentioned in the content include Doppelgänger and RRN. Related entities and operators directly linked in the content include Social Design Agency (SDA), Structura National Technology, ANO Dialog, Sergei Kiriyenko, Ilya Gambashidze, Nikolai Tupikin, and Vladimir Tabak.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Media & Entertainment

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇫🇷 France

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • RU
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

9 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

7 of 15 tactics14 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
1 technique
T1598
Phishing for Information
T1598.001
Spearphishing Service
TA0042
Resource Development
1 technique
T1585
Establish Accounts
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1566
Phishing
T1566.002
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
1 technique
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.007
JavaScript
TA0005
Stealth
3 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036×3
Masquerading
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0007
Discovery
1 technique
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0011
Command and Control
2 techniques
T1090
Proxy
T1090.002
External Proxy
T1568
Dynamic Resolution
IOCS

Observables

171 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping9

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables171

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.