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Mallory
Threat actor

Ragnar Locker

Updated 12 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days5 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
CVEs0Associated
Malware2Families
ATT&CK61Techniques
IOCs24Tracked
Origin
🇺🇦 Ukraine
Motivation
Financial
Targets
USJPCAPT
Ransomware tactics
EncryptionDouble extortionTriple extortionData theft extortionLeak siteDDOS extortionVictim harassment
Capabilities
Initial accessReconnaissanceLateral movementExfiltrationDefense evasionDDOSExtortion
Also known asRagnar Locker groupragnar_lockerragnar_locker_teamragnarlocker

Ragnar Locker, also written RagnarLocker or Ragnar_Locker, is a financially motivated ransomware and extortion group first observed in late 2019. It targets Windows environments and has compromised organizations in manufacturing, energy, financial services, government, and information technology. The FBI identified at least 52 affected US critical infrastructure organizations. Notable victims include Capcom and Energias de Portugal, with attacks also affecting networks in Japan, Canada, and Portugal. The group primarily uses double extortion, stealing sensitive information before encrypting systems and threatening to publish the stolen data. It operates public and victim-specific leak pages and has published stolen information from nonpaying victims. Its pressure tactics have included DDoS attacks and fraudulent Facebook advertisements publicizing the attack against Campari Group. It has also conducted extortion using stolen data without encrypting systems. Initial-access methods include attacks against Remote Desktop Protocol services and managed service providers. The Capcom intrusion involved an old backup VPN device at its US subsidiary. After obtaining domain administrator access, operators have used PowerShell and Group Policy to distribute ransomware across Windows clients and servers. A distinctive defense-evasion technique runs the ransomware inside an Oracle VirtualBox virtual machine containing a stripped-down Windows XP installation, exposing host and network drives to the guest for encryption while reducing host-based security visibility. Ragnar Locker enumerates systems and storage, terminates selected applications and security services, deletes shadow copies, and disables recovery features. Its malware uses packing and anti-debugging techniques, avoids execution under several former Soviet Union language settings, and encrypts files using Salsa20 with RSA protection of encryption keys. Law-enforcement disruption resulted in the cessation of the group's activity.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Energy
  • Media & Entertainment
  • Software & Services
  • Government & Administration
  • Banks
  • Food, Beverage & Tobacco
  • Health Care Equipment & Services
  • Capital Goods
  • Commercial & Professional Services
  • Military
  • Transportation

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Japan
  • United States
  • Canada
  • Portugal
  • Ukraine
  • Armenia
  • Azerbaijan
  • Belarus
  • Georgia
  • Israel
  • Italy
  • Kyrgyzstan
  • Kazakhstan
  • Moldova
  • Russia
  • Tajikistan

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Ukraine
  • France
  • Czechia
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

61 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

15 of 15 tactics82 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0043Reconnaissance1 technique
T1590Gather Victim Network Information
TA0042Resource Development1 technique
T1583Acquire Infrastructure
TA0001Initial Access6 techniques
T1078×3Valid Accounts
T1133×4External Remote Services
T1189Drive-by Compromise
T1190×2Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1199Trusted Relationship
T1566Phishing
TA0002Execution3 techniques
T1059×3Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×3PowerShell
T1129×2Shared Modules
T1203Exploitation for Client Execution
TA0003Persistence5 techniques
T1078×3Valid Accounts
T1112Modify Registry
T1133×4External Remote Services
T1543Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003Windows Service
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004Privilege Escalation8 techniques
T1055×2Process Injection
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1078×3Valid Accounts
T1134Access Token Manipulation
T1484Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
T1484.001×2Group Policy Modification
T1543Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003Windows Service
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
TA0005Stealth9 techniques
T1027×4Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.002Software Packing
T1036Masquerading
T1036.003Rename Legitimate Utilities
T1055×2Process Injection
T1070Indicator Removal
T1070.004×6File Deletion
T1078×3Valid Accounts
T1134Access Token Manipulation
T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.007Msiexec
T1497×7Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001×4System Checks
T1622Debugger Evasion
TA0112Defense Impairment3 techniques
T1112Modify Registry
T1484Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
T1484.001×2Group Policy Modification
T1685×6Disable or Modify Tools
TA0006Credential Access1 technique
T1110Brute Force
TA0007Discovery11 techniques
T1007×2System Service Discovery
T1033System Owner/User Discovery
T1046Network Service Discovery
T1057×4Process Discovery
T1082×3System Information Discovery
T1083×2File and Directory Discovery
T1120×2Peripheral Device Discovery
T1135×2Network Share Discovery
T1497×7Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001×4System Checks
T1614System Location Discovery
T1614.001×4System Language Discovery
T1622Debugger Evasion
TA0008Lateral Movement3 techniques
T1021×3Remote Services
T1210Exploitation of Remote Services
T1570Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0009Collection2 techniques
T1005×2Data from Local System
T1074×2Data Staged
TA0011Command and Control3 techniques
T1071×2Application Layer Protocol
T1105×2Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219Remote Access Tools
TA0010Exfiltration4 techniques
T1020Automated Exfiltration
T1041×6Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1537×4Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567×3Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
T1567.003Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites
TA0040Impact6 techniques
T1486×25Data Encrypted for Impact
T1489×9Service Stop
T1490×7Inhibit System Recovery
T1498Network Denial of Service
T1499Endpoint Denial of Service
T1657×7Financial Theft
Indicators of compromise

Observables

24 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does Ragnar Locker target?
Ragnar Locker targets Energy, Media & Entertainment, Software & Services, Government & Administration, Banks, Food, Beverage & Tobacco, Health Care Equipment & Services, Capital Goods, and 3 more in Japan, United States, Canada, Portugal, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and 8 more.
What malware does Ragnar Locker use?
Ragnar Locker is associated with Ragnar Locker and AnyDesk.
What other names is Ragnar Locker known by?
Ragnar Locker is also known as Ragnar Locker group.
Where is Ragnar Locker from?
Mallory's sources associate Ragnar Locker with Ukraine, France, and Czechia.
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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xakepNews · Oct 27, 2026У компании Capcom утекли данные 11,7 млн пользователей - ХакерMentioned as historical background, not attributed responsibility for the October 2026 CAPCOM ID breach. Ragnar Locker attacked Capcom in November 2020 and claimed to have stolen 1 TB of corporate data. Capcom subsequently reported that up to 390,000 people could have been affected and that attackers entered through an old VPN device.Read more ↗breachnewsNews · Oct 25, 2026Capcom Confirms CAPCOM ID Breach Hitting 11.7M RecordsMentioned as historical context for Capcom's latest breach. Ragnar Locker conducted a 2020 ransomware attack against Capcom, encrypting devices in the United States and Japan. Capcom traced that intrusion to an old backup VPN device at its US subsidiary and confirmed that 15,649 people had personal data compromised. The content does not attribute the 2026 CAPCOM ID breach to Ragnar Locker.Read more ↗security affairsNews · Oct 24, 2026Capcom Data Breach Exposes 11.7 Million Email AddressesRansomware group mentioned as historical context for its November 2020 attack against Capcom, during which it claimed to have stolen 1 TB of data. The article does not attribute the October 2026 CAPCOM ID breach to this group.Read more ↗teiss newsNews · Oct 23, 2026teiss - News - Capcom says hackers exposed email addresses of more than 11.7 million CAPCOM ID membersMentioned as historical context for a separate Capcom attack in November 2020. The group claimed to have stolen 1 TB of data; Capcom subsequently warned that up to 390,000 people could be affected and disclosed that the attackers entered through an old VPN device. The content does not attribute the current CAPCOM ID breach to Ragnar Locker.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping61MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware2Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables24Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.