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Malware5 associated actors1 associated CVE

Ragnar Locker

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK54Techniques
IOCs27Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExfiltrationExtortionDefense evasionLateral movementDDOSReconnaissance
Delivery
Cracked software
Platforms
Windows

Ragnar Locker is a Windows ransomware family first observed in late 2019 and operated by the financially motivated cybercriminal group of the same name. It targets enterprise networks, including organizations in manufacturing, energy, financial services, government, and information technology. The operation uses double extortion: attackers steal sensitive information, encrypt files, and threaten to publish stolen data if victims refuse to pay. Ragnar Locker operators have also used DDoS attacks to increase payment pressure and cooperated with Maze by publishing victim data through its leak platform.

The ransomware encrypts files on local disks and mapped network drives and displays victim-specific ransom notes. Operators prepare customized executables for individual organizations. The malware enumerates drives and volumes, gathers host information, and stops selected database, backup, security, and remote-management processes and services to unlock files and impede detection or response. It deletes volume shadow copies and can disable Windows recovery features. Encryption exclusions preserve selected operating-system files and directories, while language checks prevent execution on systems configured for several former Soviet Union languages.

Observed intrusions have involved attacks against Remote Desktop Protocol connections and managed service provider infrastructure. After obtaining domain administrator access, operators have used PowerShell and Group Policy to distribute ransomware across Windows clients and servers. A distinctive deployment method packages the ransomware with Oracle VirtualBox and a stripped-down Windows XP guest inside an unsigned MSI installer. Writable shared folders expose host disks, removable media, and mapped network drives to the guest, allowing encryption to occur outside the direct visibility of host-based security tools while host file activity appears to originate from legitimate virtualization software. Other observed evasion measures include packing, debugger detection, and API hooking to interfere with debugger attachment. Law enforcement disruption subsequently brought the Ragnar Locker operation to a halt.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-0213via acronisExploited in the wildWindows COM Aggregate Marshaler Local Privilege EscalationTo elevate privileges, the attacker exploits the CVE-2017-0213 vulnerability in the Windows COM Aggregate Marshaler to run arbitrary code with elevated privileges. | Analysis of Ragnar Locker Ransomware. First discovered in April 2020. Uses the increasingly popular “double extortion” tactic, in which the attacker first exfiltrates sensitive data, then triggers the encryption attack, threatening to leak the stolen data if the target refuses to pay the ransom.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Ragnar Locker

We observed with medium confidence that IAB (Broker1) sold access to Sierra Packaging & Converting, and later the organization was compromised by Ragnar_Locker ransomware group.

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
Ragnar

The organization in question came to Sophos Rapid Response after falling victim to a Ragnar Locker attack in early 2020.

via sophos threat researchnews.sophos.com
Dark Angels

The Russian-speaking cybercriminal group has a dark web site under a different name, dubbed "Dunghill Leak," and doesn't have its own ransomware; Dark Angels has used variants of other ransomware such as Ragnar Locker.

via techtargettechtarget.com
VIKING SPIDER

"December 2019 VIKING SPIDER’s Ragnar Locker"

via crowdstrike bloggo.crowdstrike.com
FIN8

Ragnar Locker encrypts files on the local machine and mapped drives prior to displaying a note demanding a ransom.

via mitre attackattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

54 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

2 techniques
T1590Gather Victim Network InformationEvidence1

After reconnaissance and pre-deployment stages, the attackers drop a highly targeted ransomware executable

T1596Search Open Technical DatabasesEvidence1

On Sept. 27, 2021, Conti’s open source intelligence (OSINT) team leader had a conversation that revealed he updated the group’s ransom note by copying a portion of the text from the Ragnar Locker ransom note.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

These ransomware strains include both exclusively managed ransomware and RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service) type, which involves cooperating with initial access brokers for initiating attacks and affiliates for performing them.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The threat actor begin the attack by compromising the company’s network via RDP service, using brute force to guess weak passwords or with stolen credentials bought on the Dark Web.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence3

In past attacks, the Ragnar Locker group has used exploits of managed service providers or attacks on Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections to gain a foothold on targeted networks.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

In most cases, the initial vector of attack is exploiting some already known vulnerabilities in commercial VPN software.

T1199Trusted RelationshipEvidence1

Maze mentioned that its member breached SEI Investments company using information previously stolen from BHiveLab and M.J. Brunner.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Ragnar Locker can be run with ‘-list’ or ‘-force’ command-line options.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

After gaining administrator-level access... they have used native Windows administrative tools such as Powershell and Windows Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to move laterally across the network.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) has used cmd.exe and batch scripts to execute commands.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

The script’s first task is to register and run the necessary VirtualBox application extensions VBoxC.dll and VBoxRT.dll, and the VirtualBox driver VboxDrv.sys: regsvr32 /S "%binpath%\VboxC.dll" rundll32 "%binpath%\VBoxRT.dll,RTR3Init"

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence4

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) has used sc.exe to execute a service that it creates.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

Persistence

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The threat actor begin the attack by compromising the company’s network via RDP service, using brute force to guess weak passwords or with stolen credentials bought on the Dark Web.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence3

In past attacks, the Ragnar Locker group has used exploits of managed service providers or attacks on Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections to gain a foothold on targeted networks.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

CreateProcessAsUserWを使用してログインしたユーザーの権限で起動させたNotepad.exeのプロセスの引数に渡すことで画面に表示させます。

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence4

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) has used sc.exe to create a new service for the VirtualBox driver.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

To start the ransomware, a batch file called vrun.bat is located in C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\.

Privilege Escalation

7 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

ntdll.dllのDbgUiRemoteBreakinの先頭5バイトを自身のオリジナルのフック関数へジャンプするようにメモリを書き換えます。

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

To elevate privileges, the attacker exploits the CVE-2017-0213 vulnerability in the Windows COM Aggregate Marshaler to run arbitrary code with elevated privileges.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The threat actor begin the attack by compromising the company’s network via RDP service, using brute force to guess weak passwords or with stolen credentials bought on the Dark Web.

T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence2

The Ragnar Locker actors used a GPO task to execute Microsoft Installer (msiexec.exe), passing parameters to download and silently install a 122 MB crafted, unsigned MSI package.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

CreateProcessAsUserWを使用してログインしたユーザーの権限で起動させたNotepad.exeのプロセスの引数に渡すことで画面に表示させます。

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence4

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) has used sc.exe to create a new service for the VirtualBox driver.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

To start the ransomware, a batch file called vrun.bat is located in C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\.

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The ransomware code is protected with obfuscation techniques that include adding junk code as well as encryption.

T1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesEvidence1

暗号化ファイルの拡張子変更は、以下のようにMoveFileExを使用し、ファイル移動させることでリネームします。

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

ntdll.dllのDbgUiRemoteBreakinの先頭5バイトを自身のオリジナルのフック関数へジャンプするようにメモリを書き換えます。

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence4

wmicを使用し、ボリュームシャドウコピーを削除するコマンドを実行

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The threat actor begin the attack by compromising the company’s network via RDP service, using brute force to guess weak passwords or with stolen credentials bought on the Dark Web.

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence6

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) has been delivered as an unsigned MSI package that was executed with <code>msiexec.exe</code>.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence5

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) has used regsvr32.exe to execute components of VirtualBox.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence4

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) has used rundll32.exe to execute components of VirtualBox.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence6

Ragnar Locker ransomware was deployed inside an Oracle VirtualBox Windows XP virtual machine to hide the ransomware from view.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

Ragnar Lockerは、実行された環境がロシア語など特定の言語情報が設定された端末であった場合、感染を行いません。具体的には、GetLocaleInfoにより感染端末の言語設定情報を取得し、特定の国リストと比較した結果、同じであった場合、最終的に自身のプロセスを強制終了させます。

T1564.006Run Virtual InstanceEvidence3

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) has used VirtualBox and a stripped Windows XP virtual machine to run itself. The use of a shared folder specified in the configuration enables [Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) to encrypt files on the host operating system, including files on any mapped drives.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

デバッガを使用し単純に解析を行おうとすると、パッカーによるエラーメッセージが表示され、Ragnar Lockerの実行ファイルはすぐに強制終了します。

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence2

The Ragnar Locker actors used a GPO task to execute Microsoft Installer (msiexec.exe), passing parameters to download and silently install a 122 MB crafted, unsigned MSI package.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence11

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) has attempted to terminate/stop processes and services associated with endpoint security products.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

The threat actor begin the attack by compromising the company’s network via RDP service, using brute force to guess weak passwords or with stolen credentials bought on the Dark Web.

Discovery

13 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence2

同様に特定のサービスを強制停止させます。特定のサービス名と一致するサービスが起動していると判断した場合...

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Next, the attacker performs second-stage reconnaissance.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

In all cases, the original entry point is to start network reconnaissance, then lateral movement, then data exfiltration.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence4

端末で起動しているプロセスの一覧を取得したあと、自身にハードコーディングされている強制終了リストと比較します。

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The VM is configured with 256 MB RAM, 1 CPU, a single 299 MB HDD file micro.vdi and an Intel PRO/1000 network adapter attached to NAT.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

マッピングされたドライブを含む、全てのドライブに対してファイルを検索し、見つかったファイルを暗号化していきます。

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence7

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) may attempt to connect to removable drives and mapped network drives.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

The install.bat script then goes on to enumerate all local disks, connected removable drives and mapped network drives on the physical machine... This means that the ransomware in the guest environment can now fully access the host’s local disks, mapped network and removable drives.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence6

Ragnar Locker ransomware was deployed inside an Oracle VirtualBox Windows XP virtual machine to hide the ransomware from view.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

Ragnar Lockerは、実行された環境がロシア語など特定の言語情報が設定された端末であった場合、感染を行いません。具体的には、GetLocaleInfoにより感染端末の言語設定情報を取得し、特定の国リストと比較した結果、同じであった場合、最終的に自身のプロセスを強制終了させます。

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence4

Before executing malicious code, [Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) checks the Windows API <code>GetLocaleInfoW</code> and doesn't encrypt files if it finds a former Soviet country.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence3

when first started Ragnar Locker will check the configured Windows language preferences and if they are set as one of the former USSR countries, will terminate the process and not encrypt the computer.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

デバッガを使用し単純に解析を行おうとすると、パッカーによるエラーメッセージが表示され、Ragnar Lockerの実行ファイルはすぐに強制終了します。

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence3

...uses a PowerShell script to move from one company network asset to another one. | The threat actor begin the attack by compromising the company’s network via RDP service, using brute force to guess weak passwords or with stolen credentials bought on the Dark Web.

T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

In past attacks, the Ragnar Locker group has used exploits of managed service providers or attacks on Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections to gain a foothold on targeted networks.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

After gaining administrator-level access to the domain... they have used native Windows administrative tools such as Powershell and Windows Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to move laterally across the network to Windows clients and servers. In the detected attack, the Ragnar Locker actors used a GPO task to execute Microsoft Installer (msiexec.exe), passing parameters to download and silently install a 122 MB crafted, unsigned MSI package from a remote web server.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The adversaries behind Ragnar Locker have been known to steal data from targeted networks prior to launching ransomware... [they] claimed to have stolen 10 terabytes of sensitive company data.

T1074Data StagedEvidence2

the Ragnar Locker operators state that they have stolen 1 TB of unencrypted files from the corporate networks in Japan, the USA, and Canada.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

[msiexec.exe] pass[ed] parameters to download and silently install a 122 MB crafted, unsigned MSI package from a remote web server.

Exfiltration

4 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

Before encrypting a victim's network, most network-targeting ransomware operations will steal a victim's unencrypted files.

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence3

According to the attackers, one of these pre-deployment tasks is to first steal a victim's files and upload it to their servers. They then tell the victim that they will release the files publicly if a ransom is not paid.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence2

one of these pre-deployment tasks is to first steal a victim's files and upload it to their servers

T1567.003Exfiltration to Text Storage SitesEvidence1

As 14 ransomware gangs are now stealing data and publishing it in their blogs, we can assume that more ransomware operators will adopt the tactic and will require double ransoms.

Impact

4 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence22

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) encrypts files on the local machine and mapped drives prior to displaying a note demanding a ransom.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)(Citation: Cynet Ragnar Apr 2020)

T1489Service StopEvidence8

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) has attempted to stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence10

[Ragnar Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0481) can delete volume shadow copies using <code>vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet</code>.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)

T1657Financial TheftEvidence4

These files are then used as leverage by threatening to release them publicly on data leak sites if a ransom is not paid.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

27 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

76 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching27Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping54Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.