Gamaredon is a Russian state-backed cyberespionage group active since at least 2013 and associated with Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). It primarily targets Ukraine, particularly government departments, intelligence and security services, border-security agencies, and military personnel. Its targeting also includes Ukrainian opposition figures, journalists, anti-Russian individuals, and dissidents. The group is also tracked as Actinium, Aqua Blizzard, Armageddon, APT-C-53, BlueAlpha, DEV-0157, Iron Tilden, Primitive Bear, SectorC08, Shuckworm, Trident Ursa, UAC-0010, and UNC530. Gamaredon relies heavily on spearphishing, impersonating trusted officials and other contacts through spoofed senders, convincing government-themed documents, and fabricated forwarded-message chains. Delivery mechanisms include malicious Microsoft Office attachments, remote template injection, archive attachments, Windows shortcuts, and self-extracting archives. The group has also used documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199. Its multistage infection chains employ VBA macros, VBScript, batch scripts, and Windows scripting utilities to retrieve and execute additional payloads and establish command-and-control access. Persistence mechanisms include registry autorun entries, startup-folder scripts and shortcuts, and scheduled tasks. Gamaredon weakens Office macro security settings and uses encrypted or obfuscated scripts, Base64 encoding, and payload decryption to hinder detection and analysis. Its malware collects host identifiers and checks for analysis tools. Post-compromise activity includes remote command execution and access to shared network resources. The group has injected malicious macros into Word and Excel documents on mapped network drives to facilitate lateral movement and has used Outlook macros to mass-mail malicious documents. These operations support sustained access and intelligence collection against Ukrainian targets.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
70 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
49 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
44 additional families tracked in Mallory.
5 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 5 of them exploited in the wild.
Gamaredon and UAC-0226 are actively exploiting CVE-2025-8088, a CVSS 8.8 WinRAR path traversal flaw, to place malicious payloads outside the intended RAR extraction directory, including in the Windows Startup folder.
The attachments exploit CVE-2017-0199, a Microsoft Office remote code execution vulnerability in Windows.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):- ... CVE-2025-6218 WinRAR vulnerability used by Gamaredon/Sandworm/RomCom
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Interestingly, the SSU documented Gamaredon leveraging this same TTP as early as 2018 exploiting CVE-2018-20250.
853 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced only as an annotated actor associated with the detection technique.
Listed in the detection annotation metadata.
Listed only as an annotation associated with the detection.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.