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Malware2 associated actors

PteroOdd

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
Post exploitation
Platforms
Windows

PteroOdd is a lightweight PowerShell-based downloader associated with the Russia-aligned Gamaredon threat group. It is used to retrieve a single next-stage PowerShell payload, notably via the Telegra.ph API, and execute follow-on malware during intrusion chains targeting Ukrainian government and military organizations. The tool forms part of Gamaredon’s broader ecosystem of simple, rapidly updated components designed to support espionage operations through modular staging, payload delivery, and infrastructure concealment using legitimate online services.

PteroOdd has been observed in campaigns in 2025 alongside other Gamaredon tooling such as PteroGraphin, PteroPaste, and PteroEffigy. It has been used after earlier-stage compromise activity, including spearphishing-delivered infection chains and malicious LNK-based propagation associated with Gamaredon operations. In documented cases, PteroOdd functioned as an intermediate downloader that fetched additional PowerShell content and enabled deployment of Turla’s Kazuar backdoor on selected Ukrainian systems. This activity is notable as evidence of operational collaboration in which Gamaredon appears to have provided access and delivery support for Turla’s more advanced espionage implant.

The malware targets Windows environments and is consistent with Gamaredon’s preference for numerous narrowly scoped tools rather than monolithic implants. Its role is primarily payload retrieval and execution within post-compromise workflows, helping operators stage additional malware while blending command-and-control or payload hosting into trusted third-party services.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Gamaredon Group

Based on the public reporting, it seems that PteroOdd and PteroPaste, two custom malware families attributed to Gamaredon, deployed Kazuar, a malware attributed to Turla.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
Turla

PteroOdd for fetching a single PowerShell payload using the Telegra.ph API and likely used in campaigns in which the Gamaredon actors collaborated with Turla

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence2

The group tracked as Gamaredon spent the first half of the year developing six new PowerShell-based downloaders and shifted focus in the second half to launching at least 35 spear-phishing campaigns.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence5

The group tracked as Gamaredon spent the first half of the year developing six new PowerShell-based downloaders.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

Six new PowerShell tools, including PteroDee, PteroCache, PteroDum, PteroOdd, PteroEffigy, and PteroPaste, were introduced

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

...use of a wide range of legitimate services as data exfiltration channels and dead drop resolvers... hidden behind tunnels or serverless workers.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

They also abused multiple legitimate messaging, social media, blogging, and paste services as dead drops for resolving C&C servers and distributing payloads.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence1

Gamaredon abused multiple legitimate messaging, social media, blogging, and paste services as dead drops for resolving C&C servers... In 2025, Gamaredon abused numerous services in this way: Telegram channels, Telegra.ph, Teletype, rentry.co, write.as, Dropbox, GoFile, DEV Community, Mastodon, lesma, nopaste.net, and Paste.ee.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

...trigger the retrieval of downloader malware... PteroEffigy for fetching the command-and-control (C2) server using the GoFile cloud storage service

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

...use of a wide range of legitimate services as data exfiltration channels and dead drop resolvers to obtain details of the C2 server... Gamaredon further expanded its use of dead drops, tunnels, workers, dynamic DNS, and cloud storage

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.