FIN7 is a prolific financially motivated cybercrime group widely associated with the broader Carbanak cluster and also tracked under aliases including Carbon Spider, ELBRUS, FIN_7, G0046, Gold Niagara, ITG14, and Sangria Tempest. The group has been active since at least 2013 and is commonly assessed as Russia-based. FIN7 is known for intrusions against financial institutions as well as retail, hospitality, energy, high-technology, and other enterprise sectors, with a long record of targeting organizations in the United States and internationally. FIN7 has conducted phishing-led intrusions, including lures that rely on user execution of disguised attachments and hidden shortcut files. The group has also staged trojanized legitimate software on cloud infrastructure to deliver remote management tooling. Across campaigns, FIN7 has used remote access malware and backdoors including tooling associated with the Carbanak lineage, NetSupport RAT, Domino, and commercially available malware such as AveMariaRAT. Reporting also links FIN7 to development of the Domino backdoor under the ITG14 designation and to cooperation with ITG23 in intrusion chains where Domino was delivered by Dave Loader and used to profile victims, communicate with command infrastructure, and deploy follow-on payloads. Operationally, FIN7 is associated with credential theft, use of scripting and command interpreters, PowerShell-based payload retrieval, persistence through Registry Run keys, Startup folders, and Windows services, and lateral movement through remote services such as PsExec. The group has also been observed using process injection and reflective loading techniques, and historical Carbanak-linked activity overlapping with the FIN7 cluster included keylogging, screen and video capture, remote control, and movement into payment, card-processing, and ATM-management systems. FIN7 tradecraft frequently emphasizes defense evasion and post-compromise operational depth. FIN7 is also notable for commercialization of offensive tooling. The group has advertised and sold AvNeutralizer, a custom security-evasion tool designed to disable or bypass endpoint protections, to other criminal actors, including ransomware operators. This activity indicates that FIN7 functions not only as an intrusion actor but also as a supplier of capabilities within the cybercriminal ecosystem. Although FIN7 is strongly linked to financially driven operations and has overlap with ransomware ecosystems, the available facts here support the group primarily as an eCrime actor focused on theft, intrusion enablement, and security-evasion tooling rather than as a distinct ransomware brand operator.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
59 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
49 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
44 additional families tracked in Mallory.
12 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 12 of them exploited in the wild.
The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.
The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.
The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
CVE-2019-0604, a critical vulnerability opening unpatched Microsoft SharePoint servers to attack, is being exploited by attackers to install a web shell... A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft SharePoint when the software fails to check the source markup of an application package...
7 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
303 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned as one of several groups linked through Cobalt Strike watermark analysis on BitLaunch infrastructure.
Referenced as a priority threat group for the financial sector and as an example group whose ATT&CK techniques can be unioned for purple-team planning and detection gap prioritization.
Mentioned as a broader criminal cluster overlapping in tradecraft and tooling with Carbanak, but not the primary subject of the report.
Listed as an associated threat actor in the detection annotation for exploitation of the public-facing PTC Windchill vulnerability CVE-2026-4681.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.