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FIN7 is a financially motivated Russian cybercrime group also known as Carbon Spider, Elbrus, FIN_7, G0046, GOLD NIAGARA, ITG14, and Sangria Tempest. The group has conducted intrusion activity using spearphishing attachments and mailed malicious USB devices disguised as legitimate packages. Its BadUSB operations used keyboard-emulation and keystroke injection to execute hidden PowerShell payloads, including in-memory download-and-execution staging. FIN7 has used malware including POWERPLANT and GRIFFON, deployed Cobalt Strike, created scheduled tasks for persistence, and downloaded additional payloads through PowerShell. The group has conducted screen capture and desktop video recording and has exfiltrated data through the MEGA cloud-storage service. FIN7 expanded its criminal operations to include ransomware, although the available information does not establish the specific encryption or extortion model used. FIN7-associated activity has also included AvNeutralizer, which tampered with endpoint-security software through abuse of legitimate Windows drivers.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
56 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
50 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
45 additional families tracked in Mallory.
13 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 13 of them exploited in the wild.
The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.
The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.
The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
CVE-2019-0604, a critical vulnerability opening unpatched Microsoft SharePoint servers to attack, is being exploited by attackers to install a web shell... A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft SharePoint when the software fails to check the source markup of an application package...
8 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
363 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
FIN7 is listed in the detection's annotations for MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter).
Cited as exfiltrating data to MEGA cloud storage.
Listed as an annotated threat actor associated with the Socat detection; no actor-specific activity is described.
Included only as an annotated threat-actor association; no actor-specific activity is described.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.