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APT10, also known as menuPass and Stone Panda, is a China-linked cyber-espionage threat group active since at least 2009. It has targeted Japanese academic, pharmaceutical, manufacturing, media, diplomatic, public-sector, defense, and research organizations, as well as managed service providers through the Cloud Hopper campaign. Its operations are primarily associated with intelligence collection, theft of sensitive business information, intellectual property, and other data. APT10 commonly uses spear-phishing emails with malicious Office documents or executables disguised as documents for initial access. It has deployed malware including ChChes, PlugX, Poison Ivy, RedLeaves, and UPPERCUT. ChChes functions as an initial foothold capable of collecting host and environment information, communicating with command-and-control infrastructure, and loading follow-on modules. APT10 has used PowerShell-based shellcode execution, scheduled tasks, DLL side-loading, process hollowing, and legitimate Windows utilities to execute payloads, evade defenses, and maintain access. The group has also used credential-access tooling, collected files from compromised hosts, deployed updated malware, and conducted data exfiltration, including from cloud environments. MirrorFace has been linked by multiple security vendors to the broader APT10 cluster and has been assessed as an APT10 subgroup in reporting on campaigns against Japanese organizations.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
58 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
43 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
38 additional families tracked in Mallory.
11 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 11 of them exploited in the wild.
The Microsoft Windows Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC) reuses a known, static, zero-value initialization vector... A nation-state APT group has been observed exploiting this vulnerability.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
The title of the lure was “2016年台灣總統選舉觀戰團 行程20160105.xls” which translates to “2016 Taiwan president election watching group schedule”. Once the spreadsheet is opened, CVE-2012-0158 is exploited and a file called 6EC5.tmp is dropped in the %TEMP% folder.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
6 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
488 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Chinese threat-activity cluster to which MirrorFace is linked by the cited security researchers. The reference compares the discovered Windows Sandbox persistence and evasion pattern with a documented MirrorFace campaign.
Listed in the detection's APT annotations.
Mentioned only as one of many threat actors associated with the ATT&CK technique/detection annotation for automated collection using Windows dir piped to findstr.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.