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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

UPPERCUT

Also known asANEL

UPPERCUT, also referred to as ANEL, is a backdoor associated with APT10/MenuPass and later reporting also links its use to MirrorFace. The content indicates it has been delivered through spear-phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents and remote Word templates with VBA code, and in Operation AkaiRyū MirrorFace also abused a signed McAfee executable to load it. MenuPass/APT10 has used DLL side-loading to launch UPPERCUT, and one reported XLL sample injected the ANEL payload into svchost.exe. Reported capabilities include Base64-encoding C2 communications; using Blowfish encryption for C2 traffic, with some versions using the hard-coded string "this is the encrypt key" and later versions using keys unique to each C2 address; collecting the current logged-on username; obtaining the victim system time zone and current timestamp; and capturing desktop screenshots in PNG format for transmission to C2. The malware has been observed in campaigns targeting Japan, including the Japanese media sector, and broader reporting references MirrorFace operations against Japan and Taiwan. High-confidence infrastructure and lure indicators mentioned for a 2018 Japan-focused campaign include C2 domain eservake.jetos[.]com; IPs 82.221.100.52, 151.106.53.147, 153.92.210.208, and 167.99.121.203; and malicious document MD5s 4f83c01e8f7507d23c67ab085bf79e97, f188936d2c8423cf064d6b8160769f21, and cca227f70a64e1e7fcf5bccdc6cc25dd.

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For your environment

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MirrorFace

During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace abused a signed McAfee executable to load UPPERCUT.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
CTG-5938

Third party reporting also suggests that the group has adopted tools including the ANEL backdoor and Cobalt Strike.

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
menuPass

Third party reporting also suggests that the group has adopted tools including the ANEL backdoor and Cobalt Strike.

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

"PLAYFULGHOST Delivered via Phishing and SEO Poisoning"; "Victims get infected via phishing emails"; "phishing campaign" (multiple entries)

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

"the group sent spear phishing emails containing malicious documents that led to the installation of the UPPERCUT backdoor" / "Microsoft Word documents ... being attached to spear phishing emails"

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1
TacticExecution

MirrorFace has leveraged WMIC on targeted systems post compromise. During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace used WMI to proxy execution of UPPERCUT.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1
TacticExecution

"Microsoft Word documents containing a malicious VBA macro"

T1106Native APIEvidence1
TacticExecution

"The DLL is then loaded into memory and the randomly named exported function is called"

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

"Once the password (delivered in the body of the email) is entered, the users are presented with a document that will request users to enable the malicious macro"

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

"The executable sideloads the malicious DLL (libcurl.dll)"

Persistence

1 technique
T1137.001Office Template MacrosEvidence1

During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace loaded malicious Word templates containing VBA code leading to installation of UPPERCUT.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

"The initial Word documents were password protected, likely in an effort to bypass detection" / "drops three PEM files, padre1.txt, padre2.txt, and padre3.txt"

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1
TacticStealth

"The macro deletes the initially dropped .txt files"

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

"The macro decodes the dropped files using Windows certutil.exe" / "The executable sideloads the malicious DLL ... which decrypts and runs shellcode"

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1
TacticStealth

"The macro decodes the dropped files using Windows certutil.exe" / "creates a copy of the files with their proper extensions using ... esentutil.exe"

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence1
TacticStealth

"An APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload." / "menuPass has used certutil in a macro to decode base64-encoded content..." / "OilRig ... used certutil to decode base64-encoded files on victims."

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

"The executable sideloads the malicious DLL (libcurl.dll)"

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

"the shellcode uses an anti-debug technique based on ntdll_NtSetInformationThread which causes the thread to be detached from the debugger"

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

MirrorFace has abused a known Microsoft digital signature verification issues to append encrypted data to digital signatures that still appear to be validly signed. During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace abused a signed McAfee executable to load UPPERCUT.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes actors and malware using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, netsh interface show, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, and network adapter/interface details.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking admin status, and enumerating user sessions.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence6
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

"...has a command to retrieve metadata for files on disk as well as a command to list the current working directory." / "...can list files and directories." / "...used the following commands... to obtain information about files and directories: dir c:\ >> %temp%\download ..."

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

Multiple malware and threat groups are described as collecting/deriving local system time, date, timestamp, tick count, or time zone (e.g., "used time /t and net time \ip/hostname for system time discovery"; "collects the timestamp from the victim’s machine"; "can collect the time zone information from the system").

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

"the shellcode uses an anti-debug technique based on ntdll_NtSetInformationThread which causes the thread to be detached from the debugger"

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

"Agent Tesla can capture screenshots of the victim’s desktop"; "AppleSeed can take screenshots on a compromised host"; "APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims"; "Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of capturing screenshots"; "PowerSploit's Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals"; "Hydraq includes a component based on the code of VNC that can stream a live feed of the desktop"

T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Examples include 'AppleJeus's COLDCAT C2 leverages cookie headers to contain data over HTTPS,' 'ChChes ... embeds data within the Cookie HTTP header,' 'GoldMax ... used custom HTTP cookies for C2,' and 'UPPERCUT ... sending error codes in Cookie headers.'

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1
T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

"Earlier versions ... used ... Blowfish encryption ... in the latest version, the keys are hard-coded uniquely for each C2 address and use the C2’s calculated MD5 hash"

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence2

"3PARA RAT command and control commands are encrypted within the HTTP C2 channel using the DES algorithm in CBC mode..."; "APT33 has used AES for encryption of command and control traffic."; "Carbanak encrypts the message body of HTTP traffic with RC2 (in CBC mode)."; "Duqu ... data stream can be encrypted with AES-CBC."; "PoisonIvy uses the Camellia cipher to encrypt communications."

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Many entries state malware or actors can upload, transfer, send, or exfiltrate files from compromised hosts to command-and-control servers or attacker infrastructure.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

25 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
6 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
16 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
3 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
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IOC matching25

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping29

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.