APT5 is a China-attributed cyber-espionage threat actor, also known as Keyhole Panda, UNC2630, MANGANESE, Mulberry Typhoon, Bronze Fleetwood, and TG-2754. The group has targeted telecommunications, technology, government, and defense organizations, including the U.S. defense industrial base. Its operations are associated with intelligence collection and intellectual-property theft. APT5 has exploited internet-facing enterprise appliances, including Pulse Secure VPN products and Citrix ADC/Gateway systems, to gain initial access. Following VPN compromise, it has modified authentication components to log credentials and circumvent authentication flows, including MFA; maintained access; and deployed web shells. Reported operational behaviors include PowerShell execution, process injection, DNS-based command-and-control, proxying through multi-hop relay infrastructure, and file discovery. APT5 has also been associated with exploitation of CVE-2021-22893 and CVE-2022-27518.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
50 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
17 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
12 additional families tracked in Mallory.
12 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 12 of them exploited in the wild.
Recent zero-day vulnerability in Pulse Secure VPN (CVE-2021-22893) ... FireEye published a blog detailing how the vulnerability (CVE-2021-22893) was being exploited by a China-linked APT group it tracks as UNC2630.
CVE-2022-27518 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to perform arbitrary code execution on a Citrix appliance. NSA and Citrix reported active exploitation by APT5.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
"By exploiting multiple Pulse Secure VPN weaknesses (CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2020-8260, CVE-2020-8243, and CVE-2021-22893), UNC2630 is said to have harvested login credentials..." ... "...advisory, warning businesses of active exploitation of five publicly known vulnerabilities by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), including CVE-2019-11510..."
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
7 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
98 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
APT5 appears only in the detection's annotations list.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Named as one of the adversaries associated with ORB network usage in Project ORBITAL; also described as a long-running cyber-espionage and IP theft operator under its aliases.
Mentioned only in a list of actors tied to ATT&CK T1190 within detection annotations.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.