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GOLD SOUTHFIELD, also known as PINCHY SPIDER, is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group associated with operating the REvil ransomware-as-a-service operation. REvil campaigns encrypted victim data, used affiliate and campaign tracking, and maintained ransom-payment and victim leak infrastructure. The operation employed double-extortion pressure by threatening publication of stolen victim data and publishing material through leak sites. REvil development and infrastructure activity continued through periods of operational disruption, with malware changes reflecting active maintenance and attempts to reduce operational exposure. GOLD SOUTHFIELD activity includes staging and executing PowerShell on compromised systems and using the ConnectWise remote monitoring and management product to capture victim screens. REvil samples have used PowerShell to download files and remove volume shadow copies, and have included capabilities to use configured credentials when authenticating to protected network resources before encryption. The group operated REvil as a RaaS model, with evidence of affiliate-associated configuration and tracking values.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
46 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
10 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 10 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
5 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
19 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned only as an annotation associated with a detection for PYTHONPATH modification during package installation; no specific GOLD SOUTHFIELD activity is described.
GOLD SOUTHFIELD is listed only in the detection's annotations.
GOLD SOUTHFIELD is listed in the detection's annotations for Python site-hook creation during package installation.
Listed in the detection's Annotations section.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.