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Frozenvista is a Russian state-linked threat actor associated with GRU Unit 29155 and widely tracked as Cadet Blizzard. It is also identified as DEV-0586, Ember Bear, SaintBear, UAC-0056, UNC2589, TA471, Lorec53, Bleeding Bear, and Storm-0587. The actor has conducted cyberespionage and disruptive operations primarily against Ukrainian government and public-sector organizations, with reported phishing activity also targeting Georgian government agencies. Its operations have included the destructive WhisperGate campaign against Ukrainian organizations. Frozenvista commonly uses spear-phishing impersonating Ukrainian public institutions to deliver malicious Office documents, shortcut files, and fake software updates. Observed malware ecosystems include OutSteel, SaintBot, GrimPlant, GraphSteel, Pandora hVNC, RemoteUtilities, and Cobalt Strike Beacon. The actor has used staged downloaders and custom Go-based backdoors to collect host information, execute remote commands, steal credentials and documents, and exfiltrate data. It has established persistence through user-level autorun mechanisms and startup-folder artifacts, and has used PowerShell, AMSI bypasses, disabled PowerShell logging, packed payloads, and trusted cloud-hosting services to evade defenses. WhisperGate masqueraded as ransomware but was a destructive wiper that overwrote master boot records and victim files rather than encrypting them.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
49 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
22 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
17 additional families tracked in Mallory.
12 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 12 of them exploited in the wild.
...has exploited Office vulnerabilities such as CVE-2017-11882...
BlackByte exploited vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon and ProxyShell for initial access... Magic Hound has exploited ... on-premises MS Exchange servers via "ProxyShell" (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207)... Ember Bear ... CVE-2022-41040, ProxyShell, and other vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange.
Ember Bear ... CVE-2022-41040 ... in Microsoft Exchange... Play ... CVE-2022-41082 and CVE-2022-41040 ("ProxyNotShell") in Microsoft Exchange.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Ember Bear has used exploits for vulnerabilities such as MS17-010, also known as Eternal Blue, during operations.
7 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
368 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Cited as using Rclone to exfiltrate data to MEGA cloud storage.
Saint Bear appears only in the detection's annotations list.
Cyberespionage activity targeting Ukrainian entities via spear-phishing emails with macro-embedded Excel documents that drop multi-stage malware; the group is also described as having conducted wiper/disruptive attacks against Ukrainian government entities.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.