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Carbanak, also tracked historically as Anunak and sometimes referred to as the Carbanak Group, is a financially motivated cybercrime actor known for large-scale intrusions into banks, payment processors, e-payment systems, and other financial institutions. The group emerged around 2013 under the Anunak name and became widely known through the Carbanak campaign documented in 2015. Its operations are closely associated with a malware lineage that later evolved into activity tracked as Cobalt, and some reporting notes overlap with the broader Carbanak/FIN7 cluster. No reliable state alignment is established. Carbanak’s hallmark tradecraft was to compromise financial institutions directly rather than stealing from retail banking customers. Initial access commonly relied on targeted spearphishing emails sent to bank employees, often using weaponized Microsoft Office documents or similar lures. After foothold, operators conducted extended internal reconnaissance, sometimes remaining in victim environments for weeks or months while observing employee workflows and approval processes. The malware and associated tooling supported remote control, keylogging, screenshot capture, and screen-video recording, enabling the attackers to learn institution-specific procedures and mimic legitimate operator behavior. The group is known for post-compromise movement toward high-value banking infrastructure, including payment systems, card-processing environments, SWIFT-related systems, and ATM-management infrastructure. Reported monetization methods included ATM jackpotting, fraudulent interbank or e-payment transfers, and manipulation of account databases to inflate balances before withdrawing the fabricated funds. This operational model made Carbanak one of the most consequential bank-heist actors of its era, with public estimates placing cumulative losses in the hundreds of millions to roughly one billion dollars across more than 100 financial institutions in over 40 countries. Carbanak combined custom malware with extensive living-off-the-land and dual-use tooling. Reported techniques include use of Rundll32 for execution, installation as a Windows service for persistence and SYSTEM-level privileges, scheduled tasks and startup mechanisms for persistence, credential theft through tools such as Mimikatz and LSASS dumping via ProcDump, and lateral movement through RDP, SMB, PsExec, remote service creation, and administrative shares. The group also used legitimate remote-access software including Ammyy Admin and TeamViewer for interactive command and control. Some activity leveraged trusted third-party services for command and control, including Google Apps Script, Google Sheets, and Google Forms via a VBScript component known as ggldr. Masquerading behavior has also been reported, including naming malware to resemble legitimate Windows processes. Law-enforcement action in 2018 led to the arrest in Spain of an alleged mastermind associated with Carbanak and Cobalt operations, but the tooling and tradecraft continued to appear afterward. More recent reporting indicates the Carbanak backdoor resurfaced in 2024 and 2025 through modern loader chains, although such activity should be treated cautiously as tooling reuse rather than definitive proof that the original operators returned.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
51 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
11 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
6 additional families tracked in Mallory.
15 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Financially motivated bank-heist operations against banks, e-payment systems, and other financial institutions using spearphishing, long dwell time, insider-like reconnaissance, ATM jackpotting, fraudulent transfers, and database balance manipulation.
Listed as an associated threat actor for exploitation activity related to abuse of the Windows Cloud Files API / cldapi.dll detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with exploitation and privilege-escalation detection coverage for Windows admin password changes by non-admin users.
Listed in the detection annotations as a threat actor associated with exploitation for privilege escalation and Windows service persistence/installation.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.