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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actorsExploits 1 CVE

GRIFFON

GRIFFON is a JavaScript backdoor malware family associated with FIN7 (also tracked as ELBRUS/Carbanak). Reporting in the provided content states that ELBRUS developed and distributed Griffon as one of its custom malware families used for persistence, alongside JSSLoader. GRIFFON is written in and executed as JavaScript, and has been observed launched through PowerShell, including in campaigns where a PowerShell command downloaded a remotely hosted script designed to launch the backdoor. In FIN7’s mailed USB/BadUSB campaigns targeting U.S. organizations, the malicious USB device emulated a keyboard, executed obfuscated PowerShell, downloaded additional payloads, and ultimately deployed the JavaScript-based GRIFFON backdoor. Those campaigns targeted sectors including hospitality, retail, restaurant, hotel, transportation, insurance, defense, and related U.S.-based businesses.

Capabilities directly described in the content include persistence via scheduled tasks/schtasks, screenshot capture, and reconnaissance. Its reconnaissance modules can retrieve Windows domain membership information as well as system date and time. Its screenshot module can capture screenshots of the remote system. The malware has also used PowerShell to execute the Meterpreter downloader TinyMet. After deployment in the USB campaign described in the content, the JavaScript payload generated a unique host identifier, registered with a remote command-and-control server, retrieved additional obfuscated JavaScript from C2, performed host reconnaissance including privilege, domain, time zone, language, OS, hardware, running processes, and installed software checks, and then periodically checked in for commands.

The content explicitly links GRIFFON to FIN7 operations and notes it has been described as the Griffon backdoor in reporting on FIN7 activity, including campaigns targeting restaurant chains. It is also listed among FIN7-associated tooling alongside Metasploit, Cobalt Strike, PowerShell scripts, Carbanak, DICELOADER, and TIRION.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2021-31207Post-auth arbitrary file write in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyShell)

ELBRUS is responsible for developing and distributing multiple custom malware families used for persistence, including JSSLoader and Griffon.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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FIN7

ELBRUS is responsible for developing and distributing multiple custom malware families used for persistence, including JSSLoader and Griffon.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
Carbanak

“They deployed their new Griffon JavaScript backdoor targeting restaurant chains.”

via securelistsecurelist.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

ELBRUS is very active in compromising organizations via phishing campaigns that lead to their JSSLoader and Griffon malware.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence4

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2
TacticExecution

AppleSeed has the ability to use JavaScript to execute PowerShell. APT32 has used JavaScript for drive-by downloads and C2 communications. Astaroth uses JavaScript to perform its core functionalities.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence4

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence4

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1069.002Domain GroupsEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

Multiple tools/actors are described using Active Directory/domain group enumeration, e.g., “AdFind can enumerate domain groups”, “net group "domain admins" /domain to enumerate domain groups”, “BloodHound can collect information about domain groups and members”, and “AD Explorer tool to enumerate groups on a victim's network.”

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence5
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

Multiple malware and threat groups are described as collecting/deriving local system time, date, timestamp, tick count, or time zone (e.g., "used time /t and net time \ip/hostname for system time discovery"; "collects the timestamp from the victim’s machine"; "can collect the time zone information from the system").

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Examples include: “Gootloader can determine if a targeted system is part of an Active Directory domain by expanding the %USERDNSDOMAIN% environment variable”, “GRIFFON…retrieve Windows domain membership information”, “Inception…gather domain membership”, and “REvil can identify the domain membership of a compromised host.”

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

"Agent Tesla can capture screenshots of the victim’s desktop"; "AppleSeed can take screenshots on a compromised host"; "APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims"; "Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of capturing screenshots"; "PowerSploit's Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals"; "Hydraq includes a component based on the code of VNC that can stream a live feed of the desktop"

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping11

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.